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Abstract 
 
his thesis investigates the social and economic importance of Credit 
Rating Agencies (CRAs), concentrating on the case of sovereign 
ratings.  By viewing CRAs as an influential institution within the 
context of neoliberalism and financialization, the thesis offers some new insights 
regarding the way sovereign ratings are formed and the way they come to affect 
macroeconomic processes and outcomes.  The experience of the European 
Monetary Union (Eurozone) serves as the case study.  The recent and still ongoing 
European crisis and the flawed institutional structure of the Eurozone make this 
case study to be of special interest.  The thesis consists of three broad parts.  The 
first part sets the background of the thesis.  As such it contains some analytical 
reflections on how to conceptualize CRAs.  It also includes a chapter that discusses 
in detail the institutional arrangements of the Eurozone and the associated 
stylized facts.  The second part consists of two econometric chapters.  By 
employing a dataset based on the original twelve Eurozone countries and on the 
period from 1999 to 2012, the first chapter decomposes the determinants of 
sovereign ratings and seeks for evidence of systematically panicked reactions from 
CRAs.  In turn, the second chapter utilizes a panel probit model and investigates 
the statistical and economic significance of sovereign ratings in explaining 
episodes of extreme capital flow movements.  The third part establishes a two 
country stock flow consistent model and explores the linkages between sovereign 
rating movements, the financial market and the constraints for fiscal policy.  By 
separating between a weak country and a strong country, the model shows how 
following a recessionary shock, the rating downgrade of the weak country can 
T 
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affect the liquidity preference of investors.  Such influence deepens the already 
ongoing recession by amplifying the financial constraints the weak government 
faces and by forcing it to implement fiscal austerity.  
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Preface 
 
 As with any other piece of written work, a PhD thesis is first of all a 
product of the author.  As such it reflects his research interests, his skills and his 
capacities.  As once put by Professor George Krimpas from the University of 
Athens, a PhD thesis is meant to show the world that the researcher behind it is 
capable of “dancing ballet”.1   
A thesis, however, echoes more than that.  Across the various research 
questions, and the numerous literature and methodological discussions, one can 
also find reflections of the social, economic and political background of when 
the thesis was written.  In that sense a PhD thesis is also a product of its time.  
As such it cannot but embrace the roots, motivations and agonies of the author- 
as these unfold in real time- as well as the debates and “hot” questions of its era.   
In particular, living in times of great economic turbulence, and coming 
from Greece, a country that has suffered from the European malaise as no other 
in the continent, my thesis inevitably came to engage with the agenda of its day.  
The collapse of economic growth, the sky-rocketing of unemployment, the rise 
in income inequality, the shrinkage of space for public policy; these were all real 
issues seeking for real answers.  It was such concerns that primarily acted as a 
navigator throughout my PhD journey.  
Somewhere along that journey I came across some pieces on the topic of 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs).  Left on the margin of the larger debate and 
analysis of how neoliberal capitalism works, it felt to me that there was 
                                            
1 The point was made in one of our seminar discussions in Athens, at the time when I was 
preparing my PhD proposal.   
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something more to be said.  What are those organizations?  How can they be in 
a position to determine the access to finance for entire governments and tell 
them what to do?  Why should we accept their judgement as right?  I took up the 
challenge, channeling my thoughts and energy in that direction.  The result is 
now materialized into three years of work and a few hundreds of pages aligned 
behind this one. 
All in all, living in Europe at the times of the crisis, one cannot but still be 
angry at the social realities of today.  Realities that kill democracy in the name 
of “solidarity”, attack the welfare state in the name of “sound finances” and 
deplete peoples’ incomes in the name of “fostering full employment”.  Realities 
that force disinvestment in the name of “investment”, and that push economies 
into depression in the name of “growth”.  On what has to do with economics, 
one can think of those realities as reflecting nothing more but the voices of 
defunct economists, as Keynes would put it.  While a PhD thesis is certainly not 
enough to change the world, it can nevertheless make a step towards disturbing 
such voices.   
 
University of Leeds,  
September 2015 
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1 Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
 While initially established as evaluators of corporate bonds, Credit 
Rating Agencies (CRAs) have now emerged as powerful institutions capable of 
controlling the terms of financing for entire countries.  Acting as a voice of 
authority within the nexus of power of neoliberal capitalism, CRAs are in a 
position to determine not only the cost of financing for sovereigns, but also to 
prescribe the “right” set of policies.  While the power of such institutions was at 
an earlier stage transmitted mainly toward developing countries, it can 
nowadays be felt by parts of the developed world too.  In particular, the flawed 
institutional structure of the Eurozone, with no monetary institution acting as a 
Lender of Last Resort (LLR) for the governments of member states, has made 
the latter dependent upon the private market, and hence upon institutions such 
as the CRAs. 
 Against this background, my thesis aims to contribute by reflecting on a 
particular set of research questions:  is the judgement of CRAs a technical or a 
political issue? How does this reflect on the actual ratings they have been 
prescribing to Eurozone member states? Are sovereign ratings able to influence 
movements of capital flows across Eurozone?  What is their impact in triggering 
episodes of sudden stops of capital inflows in Europe?  How does their influence 
transmit towards constraints for fiscal policy?  What does this imply for 
economic policies and growth?   
 To provide answers to the above issues, my thesis employs a set of 
econometric techniques, while it also attempts to utilize a macroeconomic 
mathematical model.  More precisely, the first two research projects employ 
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linear and probit panel data models, focusing on the original twelve countries of 
Eurozone2 and the period from 1999 to 2012.  In addition, the third project is 
based on an open economy stock-flow consistent framework.   
 The rest of the chapter sets the outline of the thesis.  The following 
section goes into more detail in the discussion of how did CRAs emerge, and in 
what ways are they capable of influencing the decisions of market participants.  
This is followed by a quick outline of Eurozone dynamics, and some notes on 
the causes of the European crisis.  The next section then illustrates in a nutshell 
how the current thesis contributes to existing knowledge, by outlining the key 
features of each of the associated research projects.   
 
1.1 The Particular Importance of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
The background idea of this thesis is developed in Chapter 2.  In 
particular, I argue that CRAs are institutions that matter within the context of 
neoliberal capitalism and financialization.  Although those agencies have been 
operating for approximately one hundred years, it was only in recent decades 
that they came to be important for market participants.  As discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 2, the process of disintermediation, the globalization of 
capital flow movements, along with the fact that CRAs became ‘hardwired’ into 
financial regulation across the world, were all factors that underpinned the rise 
of the status of those agencies.  As a result, rather than just providing an opinion 
as they claim, CRAs got in a position that enabled them to affect both borrowers 
                                            
2 These include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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and lenders.  By dictating the terms of access to finance and the subsequent cost 
of financing, CRAs came to play the role of the gatekeeper and impose their 
frame of thought to borrowers seeking a favourable rating (Sinclair, 1994; 
2005).  Furthermore their attachment with financial legislation enabled them to 
affect portfolio decisions of investors in a compulsory way.  In addition their 
role as certifiers of the quality of credit allowed them to create a deceptive 
feeling of stability to market participants.  By evaluating and providing scores 
for all different sorts of debt instruments, CRAs created a comfort that made 
investors neglect the uncertainties behind different debt categories (Carruthers, 
2013).  Such reliance on CRAs’ products involved, either implicitly or explicitly, 
the adoption of the agencies’ viewpoint in economic analysis. 
 Chapter 2 also discusses the particular importance of sovereign ratings, 
as compared with other rating categories.  Most notably, sovereign ratings are 
closer to the traditional activities of CRAs’ in terms of the opaqueness 
surrounding sovereign debt instruments, while they also relate with an 
environment which is relatively free of moral hazard considerations.  These 
factors imply that sovereign ratings are to a great extent immune to the popular 
critique that followed the 2008 crash in the US, a critique that pointed out the 
high complexity of the rated instruments, as well as the conflicts of interest that 
arose between CRAs and the entities they rated.  In that sense sovereign ratings 
allow us to move the discussion to a deeper level.  Additionally, sovereign 
ratings provide a ceiling for all other categories of ratings within a country, and 
therefore link directly with the macroeconomic level.  Furthermore by being 
nothing more but the evaluation of a government’s capacity and willingness to 
repay its debt, sovereign ratings are the most direct expression of CRAs’ power 
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upon the state.  Such power translates into a constraint for fiscal policy and 
national sovereignty.   
 
1.2 The Current Realities of Eurozone 
 
Throughout the last five years Eurozone has been experiencing a major 
economic crisis.  Such crisis has involved the collapse of GDP growth and the 
sky-rocketing of unemployment, especially across the countries of the Eurozone 
periphery (for a detailed illustration of stylized facts see Chapter 3).  What is 
primarily important to note here is that times of economic turbulence are a 
crucial ingredient for a study such as the current one.  Such periods provide the 
required scenery, with sharp rating fluctuations, and volatile economic 
movements, that as such can allow the researcher to draw some valuable 
inference about the true role and importance of CRAs.   
Other than that, Chapter 3 provides a thorough discussion of the causes 
behind the European malaise, as seen from different standpoints.  Outlined here 
in brief, mainstream accounts3 point out the dynamics of financial integration 
that came along with the introduction of the Euro.  They also discuss the 
domestic weaknesses of deficit countries, such as the deterioration of their 
competitiveness throughout the last decade.   On the other hand, heterodox 
scholars take the debate to a deeper level.  Pointing out the underlying realities 
of falling labour income shares and rising income inequality, they show how 
                                            
3 Across this thesis, the term ‘mainstream’ is used as a label for those authors who conduct their 
analysis within the broader neoclassical framework (including here the New Keynesian 
framework).  Heterodox would then group everybody else.  While the distinction is not 
comprehensive enough to classify certain streams of economic literature (e.g. Austrian 
economists), it is mainly employed for the practical purpose of organizing and separating the 
literatures discussed throughout the current thesis.  
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certain European countries came to follow a debt-led growth, while others 
shifted to an export-led regime.  As they stress, both growth patterns were the 
two sides of the same coin, and as such came to support each other.  
Furthermore, in examining the drawbacks of the institutional arrangements of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), heterodox researchers stress the fact that 
with the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB), unemployment was 
abandoned as a policy objective.  They also point out the lack of coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policy at the European level.   
Most importantly heterodox scholars argue that for EMU states the 
adoption of the Euro came to be similar to the adoption of a foreign currency, so 
that in essence EMU states were downgraded to the status of developing 
countries (see for instance De Grauwe, 2011a).  With powerless national central 
banks, and no European institution willing to back them up by acting as a LLR, 
those economies came to be tremendously exposed to the sentiments of the 
financial market, and thus to institutions such as the CRAs.     
 
1.3 What is there to Learn out of this Thesis? 
 
 The contribution of this thesis is empirical and analytical in nature, and 
separates into three chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 7).  The first two of these 
chapters employ linear and non-linear panel data econometrics, while the third 
one sets-up a stock flow consistent macroeconomic model and runs a set of 
numerical simulations.  
To start with, Chapter 4 investigates econometrically the hypothesis that 
there exists a non-quantitative part behind CRAs’ analyses, related with 
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panicked reactions on their behalf.  The background idea draws on Keynesian 
theory.  In particular, given that Keynesian uncertainty creates the impossibility 
of accurate economic forecasting, due to the non-repetitive and non-uniform 
nature of economic events, and the subsequent inexistence of the required set 
of knowledge for conducting such forecasting, there is no reason why to think of 
CRAs as an exception.  Contrary to what they claim for themselves, and despite 
their possible access to relatively large amounts of data, CRAs are not capable of 
fully grasping and quantifying the uncertainties behind unfolding events.  Even 
more, if the argument is right, it also implies that there is no reason why not to 
think of CRAs as being potentially liable to feelings of euphoria and panic.   
Chapter 4 provides some important affirmative evidence for my 
hypothesis.  Focusing on the post-crisis period and on the European periphery4, 
I show how the actual sovereign rating downgrades of all three main rating 
agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) are found to be 
systematically exaggerated, as compared with the macroeconomic variables 
that are supposed to matter for CRAs.  My methodology involves fixed and 
random effects panel data econometrics, while for my purposes I utilize a 
number of benchmark models.   
 Following this, Chapter 5 employs a panel probit model and investigates 
the significance of sovereign ratings in triggering episodes of extreme capital 
flow movements.  In conjunction with Chapter 4, my emphasis is in exploring 
that part of sovereign rating movements that reflects exaggerated reactions by 
CRAs.  Results are affirmative for episodes of sudden stops of capital inflows, 
                                            
4 Throughout the current thesis, the term ‘European periphery’ refers to Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal.   
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and hold for all the three CRAs.  Moreover, they hold both for net and gross 
flows, while in contrasting total with non-FDI flows they appear to be stronger 
in the case of the latter.  In addition, they appear to be robust to a number of 
model specifications and tests.  Most notably, given the unavoidable 
arbitrariness that to an extent governs any definition of a binary variable, I set-
up two alternative specifications for the sudden stop variable, and repeat all 
relevant regressions.   
Furthermore, Chapter 7 establishes a two country open economy stock 
flow consistent model and provides the first attempt in literature to illustrate 
analytically the macroeconomic effects of sovereign ratings.  By building a 
framework that approximates the north and south dichotomy of the Eurozone, 
the model connects the movements of ratings with the dynamics of the financial 
market and the constraints for fiscal policy.  More specifically, the model 
encompasses an endogenous sovereign rating mechanism that links sovereign 
rating movements of the southern economy with the development of the 
country’s debt to GDP ratio and its accumulated GDP growth.  The southern 
economy also includes an endogenous fiscal policy, with its overall public 
expenditure being a function of its tax revenues and the amount of new debt it 
can issue.  Most importantly, my model shows how following a recessionary 
shock, a severe sovereign rating downgrade of the south can come to influence 
the liquidity preference of investors.  Such influence makes investors from both 
countries shift their wealth away from southern bills, and towards cash.  This 
move impedes the access of the government to financial resources and forces it 
to implement fiscal austerity, eventually deepening the ongoing recessionary 
spiral.  Interestingly, the recession is not only deepened as a result of the 
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downgrade but also comes to affect negatively both countries of the model.  
Besides the baseline scenario, a number of alternative closures are also 
considered: under the first one, households shift their wealth towards northern 
bills (instead of cash) when the southern bills get downgraded.  Moreover, 
following the insights of Chapter 4, another scenario allows CRAs to get 
exaggeratedly ‘nervous’ once the southern downgrade occurs.  Additionally, the 
chapter includes a sensitivity analysis of all key parameters of the model, while 
it also considers an extension of the model with fluctuating prices.    
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2 Chapter 2- Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have emerged as powerful institutions in 
the context of neoliberal capitalism.  With deregulated financial markets and 
globalised capital flow movements, and following their attachment with 
financial regulation, those institutions have risen as an important voice of 
authority, affecting the decision making of both borrowers and lenders.  While 
on one hand they have been performing the role of the gatekeeper for those 
seeking access to the financial market, they have also managed to create a false 
feeling of stability and security to investors. 
Although there is a plethora of CRAs across the globe (IMF, 2010 reports 
more than 70 credit rating entities), there are three major ‘players’ that 
dominate the market, namely Fitch Ratings (Fitch), Moody’s Investors Service 
(Moody’s), and Standard & Poor’s (S&P).  It is the implications of these three 
agencies that will be studied throughout this thesis.   
 All the three major agencies are private entities mainly belonging to US 
based corporations.  In particular S&P is part of McGraw Hill Financial, Moody’s 
belongs to Moody’s Corporation while Fitch belongs to Fitch Group, a jointly 
owned subsidiary of Paris- based Fimalac, S.A. and New York- based Hearst 
Corporation5.  Other than financial services, the above corporations are 
connected with the media industry (Hearst Corporation) as well as with 
education and book publication services (McGraw Hill).   
                                            
5 All information has been drawn from the agencies’ websites.  
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The three CRAs were initially established as evaluators of corporate debt 
(for a historical outline see White, 2013).  Indicatively, White (2013) writes that 
Moody’s started in 1909 by publishing a manual with ratings of US railroad 
bonds.  Similarly S&P and Fitch entered the corporate bond rating business 
shortly after.  In the post-war era their activities also came to encompass 
sovereign debt, with most of the countries obtaining a sovereign rating for the 
first time throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (for detailed evidence see the 
discussion below).   
The rest of this chapter goes deeper into the analysis of CRAs: it first 
outlines some of the most important technicalities related with sovereign 
ratings, while it then illustrates the mainstream perception on the emergence of 
CRAs.  Following it discusses the issues of conflict of interest and moral hazard 
as well as the corresponding critiques that CRAs faced after the outbreak of the 
2007 financial crisis.  It then presents a more complete account of how to view 
those agencies by means of history and power.  Lastly it discusses the particular 
importance of sovereign ratings and presents some supporting empirical 
evidence.   
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Table 2.1. Sovereign Credit Rating Categories 
Source: author's elaboration, based on S&P, Moody’s and Fitch websites  
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2.1 Methodology behind Sovereign Ratings 
 
CRAs claim that their aim is to provide investors and the public with an 
independent opinion about the quality of credit of individual sovereigns (S&P, 
2012).  Attaching alphabetical scores to sovereigns (see Table 2.1) and claiming 
to be forward looking, CRAs attempt to assert a sovereign’s capacity and 
willingness to pay in full and on time its existing and future debt obligations 
(see for instance Fitch, 2014).  Quoting Bhatia (2002), all three agencies define 
default as: 
 Failure to pay a material sum of interest or principal on a debt 
instrument on its due date or within applicable principal or interest 
grace periods, as stipulated in the governing debt structure; or  
 Rescheduling, exchange, or other restructuring of a debt instrument 
conducted in a manned deemed to be coercive, involuntary, and 
distressed, as determined on a case-by-case basis by each agency. 
In order to assess the creditworthiness of a sovereign issuer, CRAs 
estimate either the probability of default, or the expected loss in the case of 
such event (Fitch and S&P follow the former methodology, while Moody’s 
follows the latter; see S&P, 2002; Moody’s, 2008; Fitch, 2014).  For such 
purposes, CRAs employ a wide range of variables, including economic, political 
and institutional ones (for a summary see IMF, 2010).  For instance, S&P (S&P, 
2011) attaches a score to five different groups of variables.  These include: i) a 
political score, reflecting institutional effectiveness and political risk; ii) an 
economic score, which expresses the economic structure and growth prospects 
of the economy; iii) an external score, reflecting external liquidity and the 
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international investment position; iv) a fiscal score, standing for fiscal 
performance and flexibility; and v) a monetary score.  Furthermore, all three 
agencies emphasize the fact that their analysis is based upon both qualitative 
and quantitative considerations.   
CRAs provide separate ratings for both the short and the long run.  In 
addition, all of them provide ratings for sovereign debt denominated both in 
local and foreign currency6.  Moreover, they separate between issuer ratings 
(also known as sovereign ratings) and debt ratings, with the first evaluating the 
general credit quality of a sovereign and the second providing specific ratings 
for particular debt instruments (Bhatia, 2002).  Fitch also provides an extra 
category of ratings, named as ‘country ceilings’.  These aim to capture the 
‘transfer & convertibility’ risk, as related with the imposition of exchange 
controls upon the private sector (for more see Fitch, 2014).  Similar ratings are 
provided by S&P as well.  Apart from the above, the three agencies provide 
forward looking estimations of what rating changes to expect in the future, with 
the “review/ watch” notification reflecting possible developments within the 
next 90 days, and the “outlook” announcement providing a similar idea for a 
two years horizon (IMF, 2010).   
 
2.2 The Mainstream View 
 
 According to the mainstream perception, there are two kinds of benefits 
arising from the activities of CRAs.  The first has to do with the reduction of the 
                                            
6 However, Moody’s has recently asserted that the importance of distinguishing between local 
and foreign currency ratings has now faded away due to the process of financial integration (see 
Moody’s, 2012).  Similarly S&P (2013: 5) points out that local and foreign currency ratings are 
practically the same for members of a monetary union.  
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risk arising out of the information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, while the second is related to the ‘certification’ role that CRAs play 
in the market.   
 To begin with the logic of the first argument, relevant authors (Boot et 
al., 2006; IMF, 2010; Deb et al., 2011; Canuto et al., 2012) state that without 
CRAs there would be an adverse selection problem in capital markets (for some 
cornerstone papers on adverse selection see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 
Greenwald et al., 1984).  This would be the case because a borrower would 
generally be in a position to know more about the project (s)he would like to 
fund, as compared with the potential lender.  Under such circumstances, and in 
view of the high cost of individually collecting information about the borrower, 
the lender would either not participate in the market at all, or require a 
relatively high risk premium to compensate for the information asymmetry.  
Moreover, those who would be willing to pay high interest rates might do so 
because they might perceive the probability of paying back the loan to be quite 
low.  This means that the prevalence of high interest rates in the market might 
result in the overall worsening of the quality of borrowers (hence the term 
adverse selection). 
However, the picture can be quite different if all investors together pay 
somebody else to collect the necessary information for them.  This is where the 
CRAs step in, being taken as a ‘trusted and independent third party’ (Deb et al., 
2011: 5).  More specifically, by making use of economies of scale CRAs are in a 
position to collect information and monitor borrowers at a much lower cost 
than the individual investor.  As a result, it becomes easier for borrowers to 
issue debt- since investors will now require lower risk premia- while the 
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liquidity of the market increases thanks to the augmented number of lenders 
that is now willing to participate in funding activities (IMF, 2010)7.   
 According to the second argument, CRAs play the role of certification of 
debt instruments.  This is of course enforced by ratings’ hardwiring into the 
regulatory system (also see the discussion below).  In particular, by establishing 
different grades of ratings, such as the investment and speculative grades, CRAs 
set the standards for the liquidity requirements of financial institutions, the 
conditions for eligibility to access the capital market, the portfolio composition 
of hedge funds and so on (see Deb et al., 2011; Ryan, 2012).  In that sense, 
certification is thought to facilitate transactions by setting some clear standards 
and by promoting transparency.  Furthermore, as discussed by Deb et al., 
certification helps to solve a moral hazard between individual investors and the 
agents they appoint to manage their portfolios, since the former can now keep 
track of the latters’ investment actions based on some clear parameters.   
 
2.3 Conflicts of Interest and Moral Hazard 
 
Criticisms of CRAs are far from new.  Rather, CRAs were one of the first 
players to be blamed for the financial crisis of 2007/8.  For instance Crotty 
(2009) points out that the way ratings were attributed to Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS) and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)- with CRAs 
receiving an income fee from the issuers of such securities- gave rise to conflicts 
of interest.  Since CRAs’ income was streaming from the issuers, the agencies 
                                            
7 Interestingly, it can be seen that such a line of thought is identical with the way mainstream 
scholars view the usefulness of a bank in the case of banking credit (see for instance Diamond, 
1984; 1996).  
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had an incentive to be ‘nice’ to them by attributing inflated ratings to their 
securities (for a similar account see for instance Lannoo, 2015).   
As observed by White (2010), the ‘issuer pays’ scheme arose in the 
States during the early 1970s, replacing the previous ‘investor pays’ model.  
White lists a number of possible explanations as to why such a shift occurred.  
One scenario is that in view of the uprising widespread use of the photocopy 
machine, CRAs were afraid of a free riding behaviour on the part of the 
investors who would now be in a position to photocopy the rating manuals from 
their friends.  Another view is that CRAs might have realized that due to their 
incorporation into financial legislation, ratings were something like a ‘blessing’ 
for bond issuers.  This would imply that issuers would be happy to pay 
something in order to ensure the acceptability of their papers.   
 Whatever the cause of the switch of the CRAs’ payment scheme it is by 
now well established that credit ratings played a key role in fuelling of 
subprime mortgage lending (see for instance Crotty, 2009; White, 2010).  It was 
their triple-A status, standing as guarantees of their quality, that made those 
toxic securities marketable.  Nonetheless, as noticed by White (2010), in 
comparison with the traditional bond rating activities of CRAs, there were now 
three main differences.  First, the agencies themselves got actively involved into 
the design of the securities they rated by prescribing to the issuers what kind of 
mortgages and what size of tranches would earn favourable ratings.  Secondly, 
the oligopolistic structure of the mortgage-related securities market gave the 
issuers the power to threat the agency they were doing business with that they 
could easily move to one of its competitors.  Third, CRAs had no prior 
experience with the products they were asked to evaluate (on this also see 
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Arestis, 2009).  As a result CRAs failed to fully appreciate the correlations 
between the performances of the underlying assets in products such as MBSs.   
 Interestingly, there is now some analytical support for the notion that 
moral hazard arises under the ‘issuer pays’ scheme.  By building a mathematical 
model Bolton et al. (2012) show that competition in the ratings market can 
prove to be counterproductive since it can facilitate ‘rating-shopping’ for 
securities issuers.  In addition these authors point out that important issuers- 
either in terms of repetition or size of issues - tend to get inflated ratings.  The 
second point has also been supported econometrically.  Indicatively, Hau et al. 
(2013) show that bank characteristics exhibit a significant influence over the 
ratings received by banks.  In particular, Han and his colleagues show that there 
is a positive correlation between the size of banks and the ratings they earn.  
Secondly they show a positive link between the volumes of business related 
with asset-backed securities that banks give to CRAs and the ratings those 
banks obtain.  Efing and Hau (2013) extend such results for the ratings of the 
issued securities themselves.  As with the previous paper they point out the 
existence of more favourable ratings for the products of the big issuers.  They 
also show that such effects became more severe right before the financial crisis 
of 2007/8.   
 All things considered, the aforementioned critical voices against the 
CRAs are on the right side.  The accumulated evidence suggests that conflicts of 
interest were definitely a reality, and that the operations of CRAs in evaluating 
toxic securities had a clear impact on the financial crash of 2007/8.  However 
this narrative is to a certain extent incomplete.  The main logical implication of 
the discussion- as conducted so far- is that ratings ought to be earned in ‘fair’ 
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terms, rather than being bought.  Then one can go on arguing on how the 
regulatory framework needs to be reformed in order to achieve such an aim 
(see for instance the discussion in Chapter 8).  As developed so far however the 
narrative does not touch any of the deeper questions: Why do CRAs carry such 
an important weight as institutions?  Under what circumstances did CRAs come 
to be taken so seriously by market participants, and what were the processes 
underlying such a development?  Was it a technical or a socio-political process?  
Do CRAs reflect a neutral standpoint of economic knowledge, or do they act as 
the enforcer of a particular set of ideas?  Are sovereign ratings just another 
category of rating products, or are there any further implications to consider? 
 The rest of this chapter attempts to provide some reflections on the 
above questions.  This is done by allowing the concepts of history and power to 
enter the picture.   
 
2.4 An Alternative Perception of CRAs 
 
 As illustrated earlier, the mainstream view of CRAs as agents that can 
deal with information asymmetry issues has some merit if the question looking 
for an answer is what gives birth to those institutions.  However, grasping the 
full picture of CRAs requires an understanding of their development within a 
specific historical context.   
For purposes of this thesis, the historical context of interest is the 
neoliberal era.  As discussed amongst others by Harvey (2010), the starting 
point of neoliberalism is conventionally identified at the late 1970s and early 
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1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the US and 
the UK respectively, and the prevalence of ‘free market’ policies as the guide for 
macroeconomic management.  As pointed out by Harvey, some of the key 
features of neoliberalism included the direct confrontation with organized 
labour and the rolling back of the welfare state, the globalization of capitalist 
production and financial markets, the rise of privatisations of public assets, and 
the deindustrialisation of traditional production centres.  Moreover as noted in 
Fine (2012) and Bayliss et al. (2015), contrary to the popular free market 
rhetoric, state intervention was not reduced but rather transformed throughout 
the neoliberal era.  In that regard, the promotion of neoliberalism was greatly 
facilitated by the interference of the state in the economy.  Furthermore as 
argued by those authors, while neoliberalism has involved a common core of 
policies and features across countries, such as the trend for privatisations, its 
actual application has not been a homogenous and perfectly synchronized 
process, but has rather taken a wide variety of forms across time and space.   
As asserted by a number of authors (indicatively see FESSUD, 2011; Fine, 
2012; Bayliss et al., 2015) most dominant feature of the neoliberal era has been 
the process of financialization, a process broadly associated with the ‘increasing 
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’ 
(Epstein, 2005: 3).  As put forward by FESSUD (2011) and Fine (2012), besides 
the large-scale growth of financial markets, some of the most essential 
dimensions of financialization have included the deregulation of the financial 
sector (also see Blecker, 2005 and Harvey, 2010), the expansion of consumer 
credit (for further discussion see Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008), and the birth of 
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new and opaque financial products (see Varoufakis, 2011).  Financialization has 
also affected the priorities of non-financial corporations, by shifting their focus 
towards a short-term profit horizon, and by pushing them to derive a bigger 
part of their profits from financial rather than productive activities (such 
developments relate with what has come to be known as shareholder-value 
orientation; for some key articles, see Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008).  Furthermore, financial globalization 
has contributed towards the escalation of income inequality and the stagnation 
of the wage share of income across countries (for further discussion, see for 
instance ILO, 2008).   
FESSUD (2011) argues that although the experience of financialization 
was more evident in the Anglo-Saxon world, it nevertheless came to affect other 
parts of the world as well (for the case of Europe, see the discussion in the 
following chapter).  While the associated processes and transformations took 
place in a heterogeneous way across time and across the different geographical 
regions, Fine (2012) and Bayliss et al. (2015) point out the slowdown in 
economic growth as the most common outcome across advanced economies.  
It may come as no surprise that the importance of CRAs was augmented 
in the environment of neoliberal capitalism.  First, throughout the past few 
decades the rise of financial markets and the emergence of new financial 
products reduced the relative importance of traditional forms of credit creation 
through banks.  Often labelled as disintermediation, such transition took place 
on both sides of the balance sheet (see Sinclair, 2005 and Dymski, 2006).  On 
one hand it involved borrowers shifting from traditional loans to instruments 
such as bonds, while on the other it involved depositors moving away from the 
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traditional low-return deposits and towards more attractive destinations such 
as money- market mutual funds.  In that way however disintermediation 
created a gap on who was to evaluate and monitor potential and existing 
borrowers.  While in traditional banking the bank would establish a one to one 
relationship with each of its debtors, and would therefore operate itself a 
department that would complete such tasks, the same could not be done in 
financial markets.  Given the high degree of portfolio diversification in 
instruments such as mutual funds, and the short-term horizon of this kind of 
investments, the credit evaluation and monitoring costs would be prohibitive 
both for individual investors and fund managers.  In that way the ground 
became fertile for CRAs to appear as ‘neutral’ and ‘independent’ evaluators of 
debtors’ profiles (also see Sinclair, 2005).  
Nonetheless, it would be fair to argue that the connection between CRAs 
and financial markets is not a deterministic one, as implicitly assumed by the 
mainstream perspective outlined earlier.  As pointed out by Sinclair (2005) 
financial markets have survived and flourished in the past without attributing 
much importance to those institutions.  In that regard, Sinclair suggests that the 
increase in the volume of cross-country capital flow movements that took place 
since the 1980s can be seen as another factor behind the rise of CRAs’ 
importance.  At the same time, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system and 
the move towards a regime of floating exchange rates, re-exposed countries and 
firms to exchange rate volatility and further amplified the uncertainties 
surrounding cross-border capital movements (Dymski, 2010).  Furthermore, 
the opening of new countries to foreign capital as a means for attracting funding 
for development and infrastructure projects, created for investors the need for 
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further information with regards to the creditworthiness of previously 
unknown borrowers.  Such information was provided by CRAs (Sinclair, 2005).  
On top of the above, CRAs became hardwired into financial regulation, 
therefore affecting in a compulsory manner the behavior of individual and 
institutional investors.  Even though the process of connecting investment 
decisions with CRAs had started long ago, with the US regulators originally 
forcing banks to hold investment graded bonds during the 1930s, it was only 
after the mid-1970s that the three agencies were recognized as official 
indicators of creditworthiness in that country (see Sinclair, 2005; White, 2010).  
As outlined in White (2010), in 1975 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) announced the ‘nationally recognized statistical rating organization’ 
(NRSRO) which grouped together S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.  By that time, not 
only banks, but also insurance companies and broker-dealer institutions, such 
as securities firms, were required to use the ratings of the three CRAs as the 
benchmark for setting their minimum capital requirements.  Moreover, as of the 
early 1990s the regulatory scope of the SEC expanded by making the use of 
NRSRO ratings compulsory for money market mutual funds as well.   
At the level of international regulation, the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and the European Union (EU) have been incorporating ratings 
as determinants of the capital adequacy requirements for banks and other 
financial institutions since the establishment of Basel II in 2004 (for more 
details on European regulation see Lannoo, 2010 as well as the discussion in 
Chapter 8).   
All in all, the exposure of entire countries to the global financial markets 
also meant an exposure to those institutions that were now in a position to 
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influence the movements of capital flows, i.e. to the CRAs.  As a result there was 
an exponential increase in the amount of countries that started applying for 
sovereign ratings.  As shown in Figure 2.1 for the case of Moody’s, the total 
number of countries that obtained a sovereign rating for the first time over-
doubled throughout the 1980s, and reached record-highs during the decade of 
the 1990s.   
   
Figure 2.1. Number of Countries to obtain a sovereign rating from Moody's for the first 
time. 
notes: 1) between 1949 and 1985, 13 countries in total had started obtaining a rating; 2) 
Iran, Micronesia, Moldova and Turkmenistan withdrew from their ratings in 2001, 2003, 
2009 and 2010 respectively.   
Source: author's elaboration based on Moody's (2012)  
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account of crisis episodes of that era see Leijonhufvud, 2007 and Dymski, 2006; 
2010).  In those grounds CRAs came to be widely criticized, especially in the 
aftermath of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s (see for instance Ferri et al., 
1999).  Nonetheless those voices of critique did not manage to reduce the 
reliance on CRAs throughout the decade that followed. 
 
2.4.1 A New Source of Authority  
 
As a result of the above developments, CRAs have been placed in an 
authoritative position, affecting both borrowers and lenders.  While as pointed 
out by Sinclair (2005) such authority may have been ‘camouflaged’, as compared 
with other seemingly more imperative institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, due to the agencies’ existence as private entities, the unfolding of 
the processes of neoliberalism and financialization has given significant power 
to those agencies.  Needless to say, the recognition of such power does not aim 
to suggest CRAs as the new “commanders of the universe”, but rather to 
highlight their active participation to the otherwise complex and evolving nexus 
of authority. 
In order to understand CRAs’ power, it is important to conceptualize 
authority not only as a set of legally binding actions of governments, but also as 
a social process that involves intentionality and voluntary compliance (Sinclair, 
1994; 2005).  In that regard, Sinclair points out that a nongovernmental entity 
can acquire an authoritative status, pushing towards a situation of ‘governance 
without a government’, or even more towards a ‘government without a 
 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
governance’ (1994: 136).  Such a view suggests that CRAs’ importance goes 
beyond their usage as a point of reference in financial legislation.   
More specifically, it can be said that CRAs have been performing the role 
of the gatekeeper by exercising power over rated entities, based on the latters’ 
need to access the financial market.  As a consequence rated entities have not 
only found themselves in the need to comply with the agencies’ views, but have 
also re-shaped the way they think and act (also see Kundu, 2001 and Cooley, 
2003).  Based on the notion of structural power, this means that those in need of 
a favourable rating come to adopt the conceptual framework of CRAs and thus 
limit their range of choices in what would be considered to be acceptable 
(Sinclair, 1994).   
The above implies that CRAs do not only care about ‘getting the numbers 
right’, but also get involved in evaluating the overall effectiveness of 
management- with the term effectiveness linking here with financial prudence.  
From the side of borrowers it means that ‘[m]akers of public policy, like 
corporate executives that want access to cheap finance, must acknowledge the 
structural power of disintermediated finance and incorporate debt security 
markets into their policy agendas and market plans at the earliest stages, and 
not as an afterthought’ (Sinclair, 1994: 142).   
It would of course be fair to argue that before coming to seek for a 
favourable rating, potential borrowers were in the need of going through a 
similar process with the individual banks where they would apply for credit.  
Notice however that by the time the process of creditworthiness assessment 
shifts from banks to CRAs, a significant centralization of power comes to take 
place.  While in the first stage the evaluation of creditworthiness is something 
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that solely concerns one bank out of many on the one hand and the credit 
applicant on the other (assuming away the extreme cases of borrowers’ 
blacklisting), in the latter it comes to be conducted by a few institutions whose 
voice matters for a broader range of market participants.  Although in the prior 
case a rejection from a bank would not necessarily prevent a potential borrower 
from applying for credit elsewhere, in the case of CRAs, a bad rating can come to 
be seen as a sort of stigma and therefore place a more severe obstacle in 
accessing the financial market.   
On what has to do with lenders, other than the compulsory actions they 
would often have to take as a result of ratings’ attachment to financial 
regulation, their decision-making came to be affected by CRAs in one more way.  
This relates with the concept of Keynesian uncertainty and its associated 
implications.  In particular, as Keynesian uncertainty exists as something 
fundamentally different from calculable risk (see Keynes, 1936; 1937; also see 
the discussion in Chapter 4 of the current), it also creates the ground for the 
emergence of what Keynes labels as social conventions.  ‘[E]stablished as the 
outcome of the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals’ 
(Keynes, 1936: 154), social conventions are primarily constructed in order to 
satisfy peoples’ need for stability (also see Setterfield, 2003).  Being artificial and 
fragile in nature, those conventions are structured over the assumption that the 
normality of the past can be used to predict the future (Keynes, 1937).     
Based on such remarks, it can be argued that throughout the last few 
decades CRAs actively contributed to the maintenance of a deceptive feeling of 
safety and stability in the market.  In view of investors’ ignorance of what the 
future will bring, CRAs and their role as certifiers of the quality of credit 
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managed to fill this gap.  As a result, CRAs managed to make uncertainty look as 
if it could be converted to calculable risk, so that investors could choose the debt 
instruments to fund based on their ‘ratings preferences’ (also see Carruthers, 
2013).  As Carruthers writes, those agencies essentially managed to create the 
impression of homogeneity across all different debt instruments they rated, 
making a triple-A CDO to seem like a triple-A corporate bond.  In that regard 
CRAs masked the underlying uncertainty.  Nonetheless, it was precisely this 
uncertainty that became apparent in the 2007/08 crash- an uncertainty that 
‘lurked beneath the surface and undermined the equivalences rating agencies 
were trying to construct’ (Carruthers, 2013: 542).  
All in all, the rise of the influence of CRAs was neither a technical nor a 
neutral development.  By taking them into account borrowers and lenders also 
had to adopt the agencies’ understanding of the workings of the economy, in 
either an implicit or an explicit way.  Such an understanding was to a great 
extent underpinned by ideas related with neoliberalism, such as the ideas of 
balanced budgets, inflation targeting etc.8  In that regard, CRAs acted as an 
additional enforcer of neoliberalism, especially towards rated sovereigns (also 
see Sinclair, 2005 as well as the discussion below).   
One way of showing the attachment of CRAs to the set of neoliberal ideas 
is by observing and recording their reactions to events throughout real time.  
Probably the most straightforward way of doing that could be by observing how 
CRAs respond to governments that openly oppose neoliberal policies.  Here one 
of the most recent and indicative examples could be to see the reaction of CRAs 
                                            
8 While as pointed out by Bayliss et al. (2015) neoliberalism relates with a wide spectrum of 
ideas which are not always consistent with each other, it would be fair to argue that some of 
those ideas as for instance the ones outlined in the current text where at the core of the 
neoliberal ideology.   
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in the follow-up of the election of the anti-austerity SYRIZA government in 
Greece in January 20159.  In particular, shortly after its election, SYRIZA 
initiated a negotiation process with its European and international creditors 
aiming to terminate austerity and privatizations.  The government’s ambition 
was to re-establish some basic welfare provisions, such as free access to public 
hospitals, and put back in place some labour legislation aiming to support the 
employees and the unions (e.g. re-establishment of the minimum wage)10.  In 
view of such developments the reaction of all three CRAs was unanimous in 
downgrading the already low rating score of the country.  S&P downgraded 
Greece three times within five months (with the actual rating falling from B- to 
CCC-), while Moody’s and Fitch conducted two consecutive downgrades each 
throughout the same period (Moody’s rating score fall from Caa1 to Caa3; 
Fitch’s rating dropped from B to CC)11.  By the summer of 2015 all three CRAs 
had placed Greece’s rating score at the bottom of the speculative grade range, 
right above the default zone. 
Another way to show CRAs’ attachment to the neoliberal frame of 
thought is by looking at the variables those agencies use in order to derive their 
ratings.  For instance it can be easily shown that when designing sovereign 
ratings, the attitude of CRAs on several macroeconomic variables converges to 
that of mainstream economics.  Indicatively, inflation is constantly associated 
with structural problems in government’s finances, without any serious 
                                            
9 SYRIZA is an acronym standing for the words ‘Coalition of the Radical Left’ in Greek. 
10 For an indicative article on SYRIZA’s agenda, see ‘Hope begins today: the inside story to 
SYRIZA’s rise in power’, by Paul Mason, The Guardian online, accessed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/28/greek-people-wrote-history-how-syriza-
rose-to-power on the 15th of September 2015  
11 All information can be found in CRAs’ websites; for a quick overview see here 
http://countryeconomy.com/ratings/greece  
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consideration of the distributional benefits that might arise (for a relevant 
discussion, see S&P, 2011; Fitch, 2014; Moody’s, 2013; also see the evidence 
provided in Chapter 4).  Furthermore, there is a quite hostile view against 
budget deficits, which rather than being taken as a potential tool for stabilizing 
and stimulating the economy- as suggested for example by the functional 
finance literature (see Lerner, 1943; Arestis et al. 2001; Arestis and Sawyer, 
2013)- are constantly viewed as a reflection of government’s inability to tax its 
citizenry.  In that way however CRAs might be missing out the fact that the 
tolerance of a budget deficit in the short-run might be making public debt more 
sustainable in the medium to long-run due to the growth prospects it might be 
creating.  In a similar vein, Chapter 4 offers some new evidence showing how 
CRAs’ appreciation of public debt converges to the widely criticized perception 
of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) who identify it as a harmful determinant for 
economic growth, once its ratio over GDP exceeds the 90% threshold.   
 
2.5 The Particular Importance of Sovereign Ratings  
 
There are four distinct features of sovereign ratings.  First, sovereign 
ratings are closer to CRAs’ traditional activities, for instance in terms of 
opaqueness of the debt instruments that are rated.  Secondly, and related with 
the first, sovereign ratings provide us with a good opportunity to analyse an 
environment where the conflicts of interest discussed earlier do not exist (not 
on the same scale at least), therefore making it easier to draw conclusions about 
the way ratings can affect the macroeconomy even under the ‘good case 
scenario’ of no false incentives.  For instance with reference to the Eurozone 
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debt crisis, White (2013) states that the criticisms against CRAs have been 
distinctly different from the attacks the agencies faced in the aftermath of the 
2007/08 crash, so that rather than being criticized for being too generous CRAs 
came to be criticized for acting too precipitously.  Third, sovereign ratings 
provide a ceiling for the ratings of most of the entities existing in the country 
concerned (Lannoo, 2015).  This implies some strong correlation and causality 
from sovereign to all other ratings.  Fourth, as pointed out by Sinclair (1994), 
the lack of effective regulation at the international level implies that the 
agencies have to attribute a higher emphasis on sovereigns’ willingness to 
repay, rather than focusing exclusively on their capacity to do so (as a matter of 
fact there is a whole stream of literature focusing on the incentives of 
sovereigns not to repay their debt to international lenders; see for instance 
Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Eaton et al., 1986; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).   
As shown earlier the rise of CRAs’ importance has affected the mindset of 
market participants, with the agencies acting as an additional enforcer of 
neoliberalism.  At the level of public governance such development has come to 
threaten the degree of states’ independence, by narrowing down the range of 
public choices and hence limiting the idea of democracy itself.  Sinclair (2005) 
lists a number of relevant examples.  At the level of local government, he 
discusses the cases of Philadelphia, Detroit and the Australian states, all of 
which faced situations of financial distress during the early 1990s.   He points 
out that cuts in public spending and the encouragement of privatizations were 
common ground in all three cases.  In a similar fashion, considering the cases of 
Australia, Canada and Japan, Sinclair argues that in all three cases CRAs came to 
blame budget deficits as the primary cause of low growth rates and 
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unemployment.  To add a more recent example, Brazil was downgraded to junk 
(speculative) status by S&P in September 2015 (its rating dropped to BB+ from 
BBB-)12.  As in the above cases, S&P accompanied the downgrade with a report 
(S&P, 2015) that was essentially encouraging the Brazilian government to move 
towards further budget cuts.   
The discussion here is not meant to imply that governments and 
international institutions such as the ones that comprise the ‘Troika’ nowadays 
(IMF-ECB-EC) were relieved from any political responsibility.  Quite the 
opposite:  as mentioned by Sinclair (2005), governments often found 
downgrades to be a quite convenient political cover for applying austerity and 
privatization policies that they would not be able to promote otherwise.  
Furthermore one could argue that the consolidation of CRAs’ power was 
actually accelerated by those political forces that ideologically subscribe to 
neoliberal ideas and the perception that capital markets provide a more 
efficient means of public financing as compared with the national central bank 
(for instance Toporowski, 2010 mentions that such perception prevailed in the 
construction of the ECB). 
 
2.5.1 Empirical Evidence 
 
On what has to do with the actual pressure of sovereign ratings towards 
the state, this can mainly be felt at two levels, namely at the level of sovereign 
                                            
12 For a relevant report see ‘Brazil downgraded to junk rating by S&P, deepening woes’, by 
Walter Brandimarte, Reuters online, accessed at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/10/us-brazil-ratings-s-p-
idUSKCN0RA06120150910 on the 19th of September 2015 
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debt interest rates and the level of capital flows.  Before discussing the explicit 
empirical evidence, it is important to note that irrespectively of whether 
sovereign ratings lead or follow the market, their effects upon interest rates and 
capital flows could still be justified to the extent that their ‘certification role’ 
holds true, i.e. to the degree that prudential regulation requires several 
institutional investors such as pension funds to hold securities above a certain 
rating grade (usually above B++).  Amongst others, this is pointed out by 
Carruthers (2013) who argues that such regulation ‘led to unintended 
synchronization and correlation of the economic decisions of an otherwise 
uncoordinated set of actors’ (2013, 539; emphasis in the original). 
At the econometric terrain both the interest rate and capital flow 
channels have been investigated, with most of the scholars so far focusing on 
the link with interest rates.  To outline a few, Reisen and Maltzan (1999) 
investigate the connection between sovereign ratings and sovereign bond 
interest rates over the period 1989- 1997, with an emphasis given to emerging 
markets.  According to their findings although rating events do not exhibit any 
significance when the three main rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch) are considered in isolation, they come to be statistically significant 
when taken in conjunction.  Furthermore, the authors report an asymmetry 
between upgrades and downgrades, arguing that while in both cases the market 
leads the ratings, it is only in the case of downgrade announcements that the 
bond yields keep on responding to the event.  In a similar fashion, Gande and 
Parsley (2004a) identify asymmetric spillover effects, with upgrade events of a 
given country being statistically insignificant towards the sovereign credit 
spreads of other countries, and downgrades being associated with an increase 
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in spreads.  They also highlight the importance of cumulative rating events, 
arguing that rating announcements should not be considered in isolation across 
time.   
 Coming to more recent works and moving closer to the context of the 
Eurozone crisis, Arezki et al. (2011) confirm the existence of spillover effects of 
rating downgrades across European financial markets during the period 2007 
to 2010.  Moreover, by examining the case of Greece the researchers point out a 
qualitative difference across downgrades.  In particular, they argue that 
although in general spillovers depend on the type of the announcements, the 
source country experiencing the downgrade and the CRA from which the 
announcement comes from, such effects tend to become of a more systematic 
nature once the country’s rating reaches the speculative range (BB+ or lower).  
Furthermore, Afonso et al. (2011a) employ a dataset of daily observations for 
fifteen years (1995- 2010) for twenty four EU countries.  Similarly with the 
previous authors, their results suggest the existence of an asymmetry, with 
government bond yield spreads mainly reacting to downgrades.  In addition, 
they report a persistence effect in the sense that a country that was 
downgraded less than six months before face higher spreads than a country that 
has the same rating but without experiencing similar events during the 
previous six months period.  Moreover, De Santis (2012) focuses exclusively in 
the crisis period, employing daily observations from early September 2008 and 
up to early August 2011.  By studying the spillover effects arising from Greece, 
De Santis argues that the Greek downgrades have significantly contributed to 
the escalation of spreads of other European countries with weak fundamentals, 
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such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and France.  The author also reports some 
bidirectional effects between spreads and ratings. 
Regarding the connection between sovereign ratings and capital flows, 
Gande and Parsley (2004b) investigate the issue for the period 1996- 2002, by 
focusing exclusively on the reactions of net portfolio flows (the focus on 
portfolio flows has the merit that it allows the authors to run their regressions 
with monthly data).  Their findings suggest an asymmetric effect, with 
sovereign downgrades causing significant capital outflows from the country 
under consideration, but with upgrades remaining highly insignificant.  
Moreover, controlling for a number of surrounding factors, such as country size 
and legal traditions, Gande and Parsley report some importance for the level of 
corruption.  They therefore claim that the less corrupted the country, the 
smaller will be the negative implication of a downgrade upon the flows of 
capital.  More recently, Kim and Wu (2008) employ a dataset of 51 emerging 
countries, focusing on the time-span 1995- 2003.  Studying the effects of 
different kinds of sovereign ratings on capital flows in conjunction with their 
effects upon domestic financial development Kim and Wu report a positive link 
between foreign currency long-term ratings and international capital flows.  
However, their results are quite surprising when it comes to all the other 
categories of sovereign ratings.  In particular, the authors find a negative effect 
of local currency long-term ratings upon capital flows.  According to their 
explanation this is due to the fact that as the domestic financial market of a 
country improves, it comes to rely less on foreign capital flows.  Similarly, they 
report a negative link between capital flows and short-term ratings in both 
foreign and domestic currency.  This is in turn explained by arguing that an 
 
 
35 | P a g e  
 
improvement in short-term ratings encourages sovereigns to switch from long 
to short term finance, therefore creating a more fragile environment.   
Chapter 5 of the current further contributes to this stream of literature.  
By focusing on episodes of sudden stops of capital, the chapter offers new 
evidence regarding the influence of sovereign ratings on capital flow 
movements.  In comparison with the abovementioned papers, some of the key 
differences are the following: First, Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on EMU 
countries, and considers more recent dynamics, including the ones of the 
current crisis.  Secondly, rather than following Gande and Parsley (2004b) and 
Kim and Wu (2008) in examining continuous capital flow fluctuations, Chapter 
5 concentrates on the occurrence of sudden stop episodes.  As argued by Calvo 
et al. (2004) it is mainly this kind of capital flow movements that relate with 
financial crises.  Hence, by isolating the determinants of such events one might 
be able to detect some results that are otherwise camouflaged. 
In the broader picture, it is also interesting to note that the vast majority 
of the econometric work done so far comes from mainstream scholars, and 
there are no particular efforts to link any concrete empirical findings with the 
broader macroeconomic dynamics and constraints that arise.  In that sense, one 
of the innovative elements of this thesis is the attempt to couple the political 
economy considerations on CRAs with the associated econometric literature.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter surveys the methodology of CRAs in designing sovereign 
ratings, the mainstream view on what gives rise to those institutions, as well as 
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the existing critiques with regard to their role in the 2007/08 crisis.  It then 
provides a more complete account of CRAs, by grounding the discussion on the 
historical context of neoliberalism and financialization.   
Some of the key features that underpinned the rise of the importance of 
CRAs have been the process of disintermediation, with traditional forms of bank 
credit being replaced by new and often opaque financial instruments.  In 
addition the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system and the globalization of 
capital flow movements raised exchange rate volatility significantly and 
strengthened the uncertainties associated with international capital flow 
movements.  Those developments were also coupled with the attachment of 
CRAs to financial legislation, initially in the US, and then on a global scale. 
As a result of the above, CRAs came to influence the behaviour of both 
borrowers and lenders, often in a compulsory way.  By facing CRAs as the 
gatekeeper for accessing the financial market, rated entities were forced to 
adopt the conceptual framework of CRAs and in that sense limit their choices to 
what would be considered to be acceptable by those agencies.  At the same time, 
lenders came to rely on a deceptive feeling of safety and stability that was 
created by CRAs, whereby financial uncertainties were masked in a way that 
made them look similar with calculable risk.  
Furthermore, the chapter points out the particular significance of 
sovereign ratings.  Most notably, by providing a ceiling to all other categories of 
ratings within a country, sovereign ratings are linked directly with the 
macroeconomic environment.  In addition, they provide the clearest link 
between CRAs’ power and the state.  Given the role of CRAs as an enforcer of the 
neoliberal paradigm, such power has often translated into a contraction of the 
 
 
37 | P a g e  
 
range of public choices, and into significant financial constraints for national 
governments.  The latter is further explored in a more analytical manner in 
Chapter 7 of the current.  
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3 Chapter 3- Eurozone as a Case Study 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Following a period of fragile growth that started with the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999, Eurozone entered into a severe and still ongoing crisis that hit 
especially hard the peripheral countries of the monetary union.  As shown in 
Figures 3.1 to 3.6, the growth regime of the early 2000s was based on growing 
trade imbalances between EMU member states, with core countries such as 
Germany maintaining robust current account surpluses and periphery states 
such as Greece running permanent trade deficits (interestingly Germany was 
running a deficit from the introduction to the Euro in 1999 and up to the second 
quarter of 2001).  From the side of deficit countries, those imbalances were also 
reflected on rising external debt positions.  The crisis that followed involved the 
collapse of GDP growth and the sky-rocketing of unemployment.  Especially 
during the 2008/2009 period, it also comprised of mounting public debt to GDP 
ratios for the countries of the European periphery, as well as rising budget 
deficits, mainly as a result of governments’ efforts to support their banking 
systems.  As it can be seen in the figures below, despite the partial recovery in 
the post- 2009 era, real GDP growth is still stagnant for most European 
countries, while unemployment still remains at record heights, especially for 
Greece and Spain.   
A background of economic turbulence such as the above is highly 
important for a study that aims to study the macroeconomic effects of sovereign 
ratings.  This is because it is mainly during such periods that one can observe 
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clusters of sovereign rating movements.  In that regard, Eurozone offers us with 
an appealing and up-to-date case study.  While as outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, 
the literature on sovereign ratings has been so far focused mainly on developing 
countries, it is interesting to see how it can be extended at the terrain of Europe.   
Moreover, Eurozone offers us with an institutional set-up that puts EMU 
member states in a position that to a great degree resembles the status of 
developing countries.  With the control of the currency being detached from 
national central banks, and with no European institution functioning as a 
Lender of Last Resort (LLR) for member states, EMU countries are left exposed 
to the sentiment of the private market.  In conjunction with the discussion of 
Chapter 2, it can be said that as long as CRAs are important in affecting such 
sentiment, they also come to be important in dictating the terms of finance for 
those countries.   
The rest of the chapter goes deeper into the discussion of the causes of 
the Eurozone crisis, and the linkages with CRAs.  Contrasting the views of 
mainstream and heterodox scholars, the chapter suggests that the institutional 
developments of the EMU, as well as the experience of financialization in 
Europe have been two key factors that contributed to the observed imbalances 
and the subsequent crisis.   
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Figure 3.1. Real GDP growth of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; % units) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Total unemployment rate of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; % units) 
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Figure 3.3. Fiscal balance over GDP of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; % units) 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Public debt to GDP of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; % units) 
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Figure 3.5. Current Account Balance over GDP of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; 
% units) 
 
 
Figure 3.6. External Debt of selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat; % units) 
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3.2 Mainstream Reflections 
 
Mainstream accounts of the European crisis mainly emphasize the 
dynamics of financial integration that came along with the launch of the Euro 
project and the domestic weaknesses of deficit countries, most notably linking 
with the deterioration of their competitiveness positions.  Outlining here a few 
indicative papers, Hale and Obstfeld (2014) argue that a direct product of 
financial integration in the Euro area were the historically low interest rates for 
peripheral countries.  Those rates allowed peripheral member states to borrow 
funds from the banks of core European countries such as Germany, to a level 
that came to inflate their economies and generate credit booms.  Interestingly 
Hale and Obstfeld also show that the lending of banks of the European core 
towards the south was highly complemented by borrowing from outside the 
EMU so that in the overall those banks ended up with highly fragile balance 
sheets.  In a similar fashion, Lane (2013) argues that the creation of the Euro- 
the “vanguard of the financial globalization boom” as he calls it (2013: 2) - had a 
bigger impact on debt rather than equity capital movements.   
Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013) of the World Bank state that it was the 
demand booms in peripheral countries- initially generated by low interest 
rates- that primarily created the external imbalances in European periphery 
countries, rather than the fall of their competitiveness positions.  This is in 
agreement with Gros and Alcidi (2013) who mention that the falling 
competitiveness of peripheral countries was mostly a symptom of excessive 
credit supply from the core rather than the problem itself.   
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From their side Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) argue that although 
facilitated by European financial integration, capital flows were essentially 
driven by the falling saving rates in recipient countries.  At the same time 
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon assert that wage rigidity in peripheral countries 
contributed to current account deficit positions that were beyond what the 
fundamentals of those countries could justify.  Similarly Chen, Milesi-Ferretti 
and Tressel (2012) claim that the capital inflows towards the European deficit 
countries helped to sustain the appreciating real effective exchange rates (the 
reverse of competitiveness) of those countries rather than allowing them to 
adjust to levels that would ensure the sustainability of their external positions.  
In conjunction with the nominal and real appreciation of the Euro and in face of 
the augmented competition coming from Asian countries, especially from China, 
Chen and his colleagues assert that the result was a persistent deterioration in 
the exports performance of those countries.   
 
3.3 A Deeper Account of the Crisis 
 
 By contrasting the above narrative with the empirical reality, one can 
indeed spot such regularities across the deficit countries, namely historically 
low interest rates, credit booms, as well as deteriorating competitiveness 
positions.  Nonetheless there might be more to be said if one goes deeper into 
the European economic dynamics of the last few decades.  If that is true it 
means that what are observed at first sight might be the symptoms rather than 
the actual causes of the crisis. 
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 In what follows I move towards a broader discussion, separating it into 
three parts.  First I outline the institutional developments associated with the 
establishment of the Euro and the corresponding implications.  Following, I 
discuss the dimension of financialization into the European reality.  I then show 
how such developments contributed to the observed trade imbalances across 
Europe.   
 
3.3.1 Institutional Developments 
 
 Seen from a historical perspective, the creation of the Euro has been the 
most recent development of the process of economic and financial integration 
in Europe, a process that started with the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) during the 1950s (for an analytical historical account see 
Arestis et al., 2001).  Originally launched in 1999 when eleven EU member 
states locked their currencies against the Euro, the design of Eurozone has been 
based upon two pillars, namely the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that set the 
entrance criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 which 
established its operation rules.   
As outlined in Arestis et al. (2001), the Maastricht criteria embody the 
targets for exchange rate, inflation, interest rates and public finances, as 
perceived to be desirable by the EU.  For instance the inflation level of any 
candidate country must not exceed the average inflation rate of the three 
community nations with the lowest inflation by 1.5%, the budget deficit must be 
equal or lower than 3% of the country’s GDP, and the overall government debt 
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must not be greater than 60% of GDP.  In addition, the SGP guidelines set the 
following cornerstone rules: i) political independence of the ECB; ii) rule of no 
bailout of national government deficits; iii) prohibition of monetary financing of 
government deficits; and iv) member states to avoid ‘excessive’ budget deficits, 
with the term excessive connecting here with the Maastricht threshold of 3%.    
Although the above mentioned rules and guidelines might seem to be a 
technical issue, this is not the case.  In particular, as argued by a number of 
authors (e.g. Lucarelli, 2011/12; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013; Palley, 2013), the 
framework of Eurozone has been strongly biased in favour of the neoliberal 
ideology.  At a theoretical level, this means that Eurozone has been built upon a 
paradigm that views capitalism as an inherently stable system and markets as 
mechanisms capable of providing an efficient allocation of resources, of 
achieving full employment, and of maximizing social welfare- provided they are 
left to operate freely.   
In the context of Eurozone, Arestis et al. (2001) and Palley (2013) point 
out that following the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty and the formation 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), full employment has been lost as an 
explicit policy objective, and has been entirely replaced by the pursuing of low 
inflation.  Such shift has been a direct product of the perception of long-term 
unemployment as a supply side phenomenon, and the consequent degradation 
of the importance of demand side fiscal and monetary policies (Arestis et al., 
2001).  Moreover, such development has been greatly facilitated by the fact that 
the ECB has been granted independence from any sort of democratically elected 
authorities.   
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From a distributional perspective, the exclusive focus of the ECB upon 
low inflation and price stability has acted in favour of the interests of the 
financial sector by maintaining the real value of money (Lapavitsas et al., 
2010a).  From a policy effectiveness point of view, it has kept ECB’s attention 
away from controlling the expansion of credit and the creation of financial 
bubbles, therefore contributing to financial instability (De Grauwe, 2009).  
Moreover, rather than responding to the actual inflation rates of individual 
member states, the ECB has been designing policy responses based on the 
average inflation of the Euro area, therefore failing to address  the divergence in 
price and wage levels between Eurozone countries (Laski and Podkaminer, 
2012).  Such divergence has been further supported by the lack of coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policy at a European level (Panico and Purificato, 
2013), and by the absence of a political union capable of coordinating the 
various wage policies of the member states (De Grauwe, 2009).  In addition, the 
application of monetary policy by the ECB has remained highly uncoordinated 
with banking supervision which in turn has remained in the hands of national 
authorities (see De Grauwe, 2009; Chick and Dow, 2012).  As a result, De 
Grauwe points out a collective failure of European monetary policy in 
controlling the behaviour of the banking system, a failure that was further 
enforced by the process of financial deregulation (Chick and Dow, 2012).    
Additionally, it can be argued that the limitations posed by the 
Maastricht Treaty on government deficit and debt (3% and 60% respectively) 
are nothing but arbitrary figures (Arestis et al., 2001).  In effect, such figures 
impede the operation of automatic stabilizers (Arestis et al. 2001; Laski and 
Podkaminer, 2012), therefore leading to a weaker fiscal stabilization and 
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greater economic instability.  Even more, as mentioned by Toporowski (2010) 
and Bellofiore (2013) what matters is not the absolute or relative to GDP levels 
of public debt and deficit, but rather those levels that a Central Bank (CB) is 
willing to refinance.   
In that regard, it is apparent that the issue of monetary and fiscal 
independence is a function of the CB’s willingness to re-purchase public debt.  It 
can therefore be said that the most important drawback of the introduction of 
the Euro has been the subsequent loss of sovereignty for the Eurozone member 
states.  This means that national central banks cease to act as the manager of 
government’s debt, with no institutional substitute taking over at a central level 
(since the ECB is prohibited from acting as a lender of last resort (LLR) for 
member states).  Hence the actual probability of default, which would otherwise 
be either impossible or very remote, is brought into the picture (see for instance 
Lucarelli, 2011/12; Kelton and Wray, 2009).  The Euro comes to be a foreign 
currency for Eurozone member states (Wray, 2003; Papadimitriou et al., 2010); 
in that sense the latter are downgraded to the status of those developing 
countries that do not control the currency in which their debt is issued (De 
Grauwe, 2011a).  In view of such a setup, Eurozone member states can only 
raise funds via commercial banks and financial markets, which however cease 
to view those countries’ government debt as a necessarily safe asset (Chick and 
Dow, 2012).  In such an environment, financial markets acquire an enormous 
power vis-a-vis Eurozone governments, with the latters’ debt becoming prone 
to forces of contagion and self- fulfilling prophecies (De Grauwe, 2011a; 2011b).  
Moreover, to the extent that Chapter 2 is right in pointing out the amplified 
influence of CRAs over the past few decades, the power of financial markets 
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transmits towards those institutions as well.  For instance, if CRAs come to 
believe that the level of debt of a Eurozone member state is unsustainable they 
can react by downgrading that country.  Such event can in turn make investors 
withdraw their capital from the country, causing a liquidity crisis and an 
increase in interest rates (for some explicit evidence on the connection between 
ratings and capital flows, see Chapter 5 of the current).  Most importantly, as 
long as the ECB abstains from acting as an LLR, there is nothing to prevent the 
liquidity crisis from turning into a solvency crisis, so that investors can then 
claim that they were right to pull out their money (De Grauwe, 2011a).  In the 
words of De Grauwe (2011a: 7) ‘the country has become insolvent because 
investors fear insolvency’.   
All in all, the loss of EMU member states’ monetary autonomy and their 
subsequent downgrade to the level of developing countries bring into the fore a 
set of CRA related research questions that so far have been concentrated on 
developing countries.  What do European sovereign ratings reflect? How do 
they affect European cross border capital movements?  How do they constrain 
the policy making of European governments?  Reflections towards this direction 
are essential in order to fully understand the impact of Eurozone’s flawed 
institutional structure as well as the current European reality and constraints.  
In that sense the empirical and analytical contributions of this thesis (Chapters 
4,5 and 7), as well as the accompanying policy reflections (see Chapter 8) aim to 
add some value to the literature related with European developments.   
 
3.3.2 Financialization 
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 Although financialization has been more apparent in countries such as 
the US and the UK, similar developments have also been observed throughout 
continental Europe in the last three decades.  As in the US, financialization came 
to be stimulated by the prevalence of neoliberal policies.  In particular, as 
shown by Palley (2013), the introduction of the neoliberal paradigm since the 
early 1980s led to a significant decline of the wage share and to rising income 
inequality across Europe.  In such an environment, Palley asserts that amongst 
other factors, credit and asset price bubbles were one of the main means to 
sustain aggregate demand and postpone economic stagnation.   
 For Frangakis and Huffschmid (2006) the environment of declining 
growth and rising income inequality has also been an important factor relating 
to the financialization of the investment process.  In particular, as Frangakis and 
Huffschmid point out, such developments gave rise to the accumulation of 
profits which rather than being recycled in the real economy were either driven 
outside the country under consideration or invested in domestic financial 
assets.   
 Another dimension of financialization is pointed out by Frangakis (2009) 
who argues that since the early 1980s the European financial system has been 
turning from a traditional bank-based towards a market-led one, therefore 
coming closer to the Anglo-Saxon model.  As discussed by the author, financial 
markets did not only increase in absolute terms, but also in relation to GDP.  
According to her evidence the size of financial markets across the Eurozone 
increased by more than four times during the period 1980-2006.  Indicatively 
the stock of equities rose from 8% to 82% of GDP across the Eurozone  
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Table 3.1. Moody's and S&P: Branch Establishment in Europe 
 Moody’s Standard and Poor’s 
France (Paris) 1988 Affiliation 1990; 
acquired 1995 
Germany (Frankfurt) 1991 1992 
Italy (Milan) 1999 1999 
Spain (Madrid) 1993 Affiliation 1992; 
acquired 1994 
Ireland (Dublin) 2000  
Czech Republic Affiliation 2000  
Sweden (Stockholm)  Affiliation 1988; 
acquired 1990 
UK (London) 1986 1984 
Source: author’s elaboration based on Sinclair (2005: 28) 
 
between 1980 and 2006.  Similarly, the stock of government debt securities 
grew from 13% to 61% (Frangakis, 2009: 59).  Most importantly, the move 
towards a market-based financial system removed to a great extent the credit 
risk analysis function from banks by assigning it to CRAs, who now faced an 
increasing demand for their products (Lannoo, 2010; also see the discussion in 
Chapter 2 above).  A reflection of such a development is the fact that rating 
agencies started setting up their branches across continental Europe 
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throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, a period when the transition from 
bank-based to market-based finance was blooming (see Table 3.1).  
Interestingly, Frangakis and Huffschmid (2006) show how EU policies 
facilitated the rise in the importance and scope of the financial sector.  More 
specifically the process of privatization of financial institutions and of 
significant parts of public social security systems, along with the creation of a 
single European financial market managed to increase the attractiveness and 
range of speculative activities.  In addition, as pointed out earlier, the 
imposition of strict limits on public deficits and debt by the Maastricht treaty 
made it difficult for the member states to apply the fiscal policy required to 
absorb private sector surpluses, therefore pushing the latter to circulate into 
the financial sphere. 
All in all, as mentioned by Frangakis and Huffschmid (2006) the results 
of the above developments were: i) a shift of corporate financing towards a 
short-term horizon (also see the discussion in Chapter 2), ii) a significant rise in 
financial instability, which was further augmented by the intensified exposure 
of EU securities markets to US stock market fluctuations (see Toporowski, 
2009), and iii) the further enhancement of the political power of capital, which 
on the threat of leaving the country could push for lower taxes, cuts in social 
benefits, etc.  Moreover, as discussed by Toporowski (2009) the process of 
financial deregulation fostered cross country mergers and acquisitions of 
financial firms, therefore obscuring the task of national regulators.   
3.3.3 Trade Imbalances  
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 The institutional structure of the Eurozone, along with the process of 
financialization, resulted in increasing income inequality and the fall of the 
labour share of income across the continent.  Furthermore, although the 
introduction of the Euro integrated monetary policy, it did not manage to 
promote real economic convergence across member states (for further 
discussion see De Grauwe, 2009; Chick and Dow, 2012; Laski and Podkaminer, 
2013; Bellofiore, 2013).  In view of the countries’ heterogeneous production 
structures, such developments gave rise to either the accumulation of debt or 
the expansion of exports towards the debt-led countries (see for instance Sapir, 
2009; Lapavitsas et al., 2010a; Hein, 2011; Palley, 2013; Bellofiore, 2013).  In 
that regard, peripheral countries such as Greece and Spain came to follow a 
debt-led growth pattern, while core countries such as Germany came to pursue 
an export-led strategy.   
Out of the commonalities of the debt-led countries, Hein (2011) points 
out a relatively high real GDP growth, along with an increasingly negative 
financial balance of the private sector of each of those countries.  Furthermore, 
Hein writes that the public sector contributed negatively to the domestic 
financial balance in these countries, but to a different extent, namely more 
significantly in countries like Greece, but only marginally to countries like 
Ireland.  In addition, with the exception of Ireland, in all countries domestic 
growth of debt-led consumption was associated with a rise in current account 
deficits.    
On the other hand, a key difference across debt-led countries was the 
composition of their debt structures.  As pointed out by Lapavitsas et al. 
(2010b), while in Greece public debt had been continuously ballooning since 
 
 
54 | P a g e  
 
the introduction of the Euro, in Spain the prime accumulator of debt had been 
the private sector, with the country’s public debt remaining relatively flat up 
until the financial upheaval of 2008.  Furthermore although there was an 
increase in the proportion of debt hold by foreign investors in both countries, 
the trend was more intense in Greece with the portion of non-resident holders 
of (overall) debt reaching 51% in 2009 (see Lapavitsas et al., 2010b: 8, 21). 
Concerning the distinctive elements of the export-led countries, Hein 
(2011) states that all of these were linked with current account surpluses, while 
some countries such as Belgium and Sweden also demonstrated increases in 
wealth-income ratios and/or in residential property prices.  Moreover, the 
growth of domestic demand was either relatively moderate, as in the case of 
Austria and Belgium, or very weak as for example in Germany.  In that sense, 
Hein notices that the export-led regime came at a price, since- with the 
exception of Sweden- all other countries achieved lower real GDP growth rates 
than the debt-led ones.   
All in all, export-led countries have often been labelled as ‘free-riders’ 
(see for instance Horn et al., 2009; Bellofiore, 2013) in the sense that while 
achieving high competitiveness thanks to the depression of their domestic 
wages (Lucarelli, 2011/12; Bibow, 2012), they came to be dependent upon the 
absorbing capacity of debt-led countries, for the export of their commodities 
and capital.  As being the two sides of the same coin, the debt and export-led 
growth patterns came to be mutually reinforced and sustained (Horn et al., 
2009).   
 
 
 
55 | P a g e  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlines some key stylized facts associated with the 
dynamics of Eurozone and the recent crisis.  Stagnant and falling GDP growth, 
and huge rises in unemployment have been two of the most prominent post-
crisis developments, especially for the countries of the European periphery.  
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the causes of the recent European malaise, 
as seen from different perspectives.  While mainstream accounts focus on the 
dynamics of financial integration that followed the establishment of the Euro 
and on domestic weaknesses of particular EMU countries, heterodox scholars 
go deeper into the institutional and macroeconomic developments of recent 
decades.  Most notably the flawed institutional set-up of the monetary union 
along with the process of financialization contributed to the emergence of 
significant trade imbalances across Europe and to the crisis that followed.   
With regards to CRAs, the economic turbulence in Europe and the lack of 
an LLR institution for the governments of Eurozone member states provide us 
with an interesting case study and bring to the fore a topic which so far has 
been mainly explored in relation to the developing countries.  
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4 Chapter 4- Crises, Panics, and Credit Rating 
Agencies: Evidence from Europe 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Although widely criticized for their involvement in the 2007/08 financial 
crash, the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the Eurozone crisis has 
received relatively little attention. This chapter attempts to close this gap by 
focusing attention on the behaviour of CRAs in the build-up and playing-out of 
the Eurozone crisis.  In particular, the key hypothesis of this chapter is that in 
face of uncertainty- understood here in the Keynesian sense- there is no reason 
why CRAs should not be thought to be liable to feelings of euphoria and panic, 
similar with all other economic agents.  Based on such a perspective, this 
chapter contributes to existing literature by showing that since the commence 
of the European crisis in 2009, the downgrades of the sovereign ratings of the 
crisis-hit peripheral countries of Eurozone have been highly exaggerated, as 
compared with the macroeconomic variables CRAs are supposed to follow.   
The methodology employed involves linear panel data models for the 
original twelve countries of Eurozone and for the time span 1999 to 2012.  
Moreover the focus of the chapter is on the three main rating agencies, namely 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch.  The key part of the results 
obtained holds across a number of model specifications.  Such results are quite 
similar across all the three CRAs, while they also pass a number of robustness 
checks. 
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 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:  the next section outlines 
the literature and the theory related with the project, while section three 
outlines the relevant data.  Following, section four discusses the econometric 
methodology employed.  Section five presents the main body of the results.  It 
also includes a number of robustness checks.  Section six concludes.  Across all 
the regressions of the current, the software employed is “StataSE 12”.   
 
4.2 Literature Review & Theoretical Background 
 
 There has already been a voluminous literature studying the 
determinants of sovereign ratings.  So far this literature has been mainly 
focused on developing countries, due to the rich amount of rating fluctuations 
recorded there.  Presented here with a chronological order, Cantor and Packer 
(1996) is the first and most cornerstone piece in this stream of papers.  Using a 
sample of forty-nine countries, Cantor and Packer report eight variables as the 
most significant determinants of sovereign ratings, namely per capita income, 
GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt, economic 
development and default history.  Applying standard OLS techniques the 
authors report some 𝑅2 measurements close to 90%.  Such results are taken up 
by Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) who focusing on the countries affected by the 
East Asian crisis, extend the list of explanatory variables by adding short-term 
external debt as another possible determinant.  Further supporting evidence is 
provided by Afonso (2003), who studies the ratings of eighty-one countries for 
2001.  Interestingly, Afonso conducts both a linear and a logarithmic 
transformation of the alphabetical scores of the ratings.  His rationale is that 
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rating scores can improve more easily at the bottom of the scale, compared with 
the higher notches where a further increase comes to be more demanding.   
Other papers include Eliasson (2002) and Alexe et al. (2003), with the 
second incorporating public debt, domestic credit and foreign reserves, as well 
as political variables such as government effectiveness and political stability.  
Following, Borio and Packer (2004) stress the importance of external debt and 
the implications that arise in conjunction with the size and the default history of 
a country.  Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) studies a sample of ninety-five 
countries in the context of an ordered response model.  Other than the 
introduction of labour market variables (unemployment, unit labour costs), 
what stands out in his work is his finding that the relevance and significance of 
the reported variables differ as one moves from higher to lower rated countries.  
The ordered response model is taken up by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2005) 
who also include the number of mobile phones of a country as an index of 
technological development.  Sutton (2005) focuses on thirty-two developing 
countries and incorporates a European Union dummy in his regressions.  
Moreover, Butler and Fauver (2006) provide a thorough account of legal and 
political variables that matter in rating scores.  Other than the government 
effectiveness and political stability variables discussed earlier, Butler and 
Fauver also incorporate corruption, regulatory quality, voice of the people and 
the rule of law in their regressions.  These variables are part of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators database constructed by the World Bank and are 
available online13. 
                                            
13 See here http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
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More recently, Afonso and Gomes (2010) study the importance of fiscal 
imbalances in shaping sovereign ratings.  Employing both a linear and an 
ordered response model, their results come to the affirmative but with 
significant differences across countries.  Based on a similar methodology, 
Afonso et al. (2007; 2011b) separate between the short and long run 
determinants of sovereign ratings.  Their results suggest fluctuations of 
variables such as GDP per capita and public debt as important short-run 
variables, while variables like government effectiveness and foreign reserves 
stand as long term determinants.  In addition, Canuto et al. (2012) confirm the 
importance of domestic credit and trade openness.  Furthermore, Gartner et al. 
(2011), Eissfeller et al. (2014) and Vernazza and Nielsen (2015) provide 
evidence supporting the idea that the sovereign ratings of the Eurozone 
periphery have been exaggeratedly downgraded since the outbreak of the crisis 
in 2009, without however supplementing it with a theoretical narrative as to 
what might explain the systematic appearance of such results across the 
different countries. 
Of all the papers cited in the above literature, the Ferri et al. (1999) 
paper is the one that provides the ground for the research question of the 
current chapter.  This is because Ferri and his colleagues are the first to 
investigate the possibility of procyclicality in sovereign ratings.  More 
specifically, while they recognize that quantitative and qualitative elements can 
inform the formation of actual sovereign ratings, only the quantitative factors 
can be captured econometrically.  Qualitative factors, while they may be 
important, may reflect any sort of ad hoc country-specific information.  Their 
results come to be on the affirmative for countries that were hit by the East 
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Asian crisis (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia), implying that rating agencies had a 
tendency to provide inflated ratings prior to the crisis and to exaggeratedly 
downgrade those countries following the crisis’ outbreak.  For all those 
countries, they also report a convergence between actual and generated ratings 
for the post-crisis period.  This development is explained in terms of the 
counter-effects that rating downgrades can have on the macroeconomic 
fundamentals as a result of their incorporation in financial legislation and is 
related with the idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism.  In the broader 
picture, the econometric evidence is used by the writers to suggest that CRAs 
tend to attach a higher weight to the qualitative segment of their analysis.  Even 
more, they claim that such procyclicality can be understood in terms of CRAs’ 
incentive to become more conservative after failing to predict the crisis, so as to 
rebuild their reputation.   
The Ferri et al. (1999) paper is strongly criticized by Mora (2006).  In 
particular, by extending the Ferri et alia sample Mora argues that sovereign 
ratings tend to be sticky rather than procyclical.  Although her results confirm 
the inflation of ratings prior to the East Asian crisis, the author points out that 
there is no empirical support for the idea that CRAs tend to exaggeratedly 
downgrade countries during the crisis period.  From a technical perspective, 
Mora criticizes the work of Ferri et al. for their choice to use Random Effects in 
their panel data regressions, a methodology which as the author argues is hard 
to justify in view of the possible correlation of the country specific effect with 
the regressors (also see the discussion in Appendix B).  Furthermore she 
questions their choice of using the minimum rather than the average rating of 
each time period as their left-hand variable, pointing out the loss of information 
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and the mismatch with right-hand variables that occurs.  In addition she states 
that in those cases where the ratings generated by the model of Ferri et alia 
differ from the actual ones, there might be some misspecification issues such as 
non-linearity of the regressors, data-timing problems or omitted variables. 
The above points of critique are very important since they reveal the 
weaknesses in the methodology that guides this empirical project.  In this sense, 
my prime concern is to safeguard my approach against them.  Coming to the 
theoretical terrain, what makes my approach different from previous papers is 
my understanding of what is reflected on the qualitative part of CRAs analysis.  
Most notably, in contrast with Ferri et al. (1999) who link the qualitative part 
and therefore the exaggerated mood of CRAs with false incentives, my 
suggestion is that CRAs’ temper is better viewed as a function of Keynesian 
uncertainty and its associated implications. 
To begin with, it is essential to show how Keynesian uncertainty is a 
concept fundamentally different from calculable risk.  Pointing out Keynes’s 
own definition, Keynes writes (1937, 241): 
 
‘By “uncertain” knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to 
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.  The game 
of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of 
a Victory bond being drawn.  Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly 
uncertain.  Even the weather is only moderately uncertain.  The sense in 
which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is 
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, 
or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-
owners in the social system in 1970.  About these matters there is no 
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scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.  We 
simply do not know.’  
 
Shackle (1955) would identify cases such as the game of the roulette as 
repetitive and uniform performances.  What is common in those cases is that we 
can obtain knowledge by observing the outcomes of a numerous series of 
events.  Such knowledge can take the form of frequency ratios, and can be 
applied whenever the decision-maker is about to re-conduct the experiment.  In 
contrast however with such performances, Shackle points out the possibility of 
having to decide in a ‘crucial’, or else ‘non-divisible non-seriable’ experiment.  In 
this case, the experiment can never be repeated under identical circumstances 
because its performance cannot exclude the possibility of permanently altering 
the surrounding environment (Shackle points the example of a chess move).  
Here, the employment of frequency ratios can be of no help, and thus no 
calculations of future scenarios’ pros and cons can be conducted in a genuine 
way (also see Lawson, 1988).  This is the sort of experiments associated with 
what Shackle labels as ‘true uncertainty’.  It is what Keynes has in mind when he 
talks about the prospect of a European war and the price of copper after twenty 
years.  Such experiments are the most relevant with real economic life, and with 
actions like investment (for further discussion also see Carvalho, 1988; Crotty, 
1994).  Although the true nature of such experiments might manage to get 
camouflaged during tranquil periods, episodes of crisis act in a revealing way for 
the uncertainty that lies beneath them (Carruthers, 2013).   
Even more, the existence of uncertainty gives rise to what Keynes calls 
‘animal spirits’ (see Keynes, 1936, 1937, and in particular the celebrated 
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Chapter 12 of the General Theory).  ‘Animal spirits’ is a term that links with the 
idea that people often follow their instinct when making investment choices.  
Or, as expressed by Keynes it is a term that relates with acting based on 
spontaneous optimism, rather than on mathematical expectations.  Put in a 
social context, ‘animal spirits’ correspond to the idea that investors and the 
public are liable to feelings of euphoria and panic.  
If the above thoughts have some merit, they can also be applied to the 
case of CRAs.  More precisely, it can be claimed that there is no reason why 
CRAs’ judgments should be thought capable of escaping the implications of 
Keynesian uncertainty.  Similar with all other economic agents, CRAs also face 
the impossibility of accurately providing forecasts of the future.  Although 
possibly capable of collecting larger sets of information than individual 
investors, CRAs are still unable to fully grasp the information that would be 
required for generating probability estimates of future default episodes, 
irrespectively of what they claim for themselves.  Given the non-uniform and 
non-repetitive nature of economic defaults, the quintessence of uncertainty 
implies that such probabilities do not exist, neither in advance nor in posteriori.   
In that regard, my hypothesis is that due to the existence of Keynesian 
uncertainty, there is nothing to prevent CRAs from getting excessively excited 
and depressed as with everybody else.  Hence, my proposition is that any 
systematic evidence of exaggerated reactions on behalf of CRAs can be 
interpreted as a reflection of amplified feelings of euphoria and panic, or as 
Michailidou et al. (2012) put it, as evidence of ‘animal spirits’.   
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4.3 Data Outline 
 
 For the purposes of the current I construct a panel wherein the space 
dimension includes the original twelve Eurozone countries while the time 
dimension runs from 1999q1 to 2012q4.  Both the time and the country 
dimensions are selected in a way that allows the minimization of the relative 
heterogeneity of my database in terms of prevailing institutions and economic 
development (e.g. the first quarter of 1999 coincides with the introduction of 
the Euro in all countries of the sample but Greece14).   
 There are several reasons why the case study of Eurozone is of special 
interest.  First, there is a gap in literature in that most of the abovementioned 
studies either focus on developing entities or amalgamate developing and 
developed countries in their samples.  Although CRAs claim that they apply the 
same model for all sovereigns (see discussion below), it would make sense to 
expect the weights of the different variables to vary across different families of 
countries and throughout different time periods, therefore making the study of 
Eurozone dynamics of special interest. 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 3 the institutional set-up of the 
Eurozone offers us a peculiar case of a monetary union without a corresponding 
fiscal and political integration.  Along with the prohibition of the ECB to act as 
an LLR for sovereign debt, such reality downgrades Eurozone states to the 
status of developing countries (De Grauwe, 2011a), so that a research topic 
which has so far focused on developing economies now becomes relevant 
within a European context too.   
                                            
14 While Greece officially joined the Euro in 2001, the Drachma to Euro exchange rate was 
permanently fixed on the 19th of June 2000.   
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 In conjunction with the above, the Eurozone provides us with one of the 
most recent and important crisis episodes.  As pointed out earlier, incorporating 
crisis episodes is crucial for the project due to the fact that outside a crisis 
rating fluctuations are scarce.  Furthermore, since the vast majority of 
downgrades have clustered around peripheral countries, it is these countries 
that are especially important for the current project (for an illustration of the 
S&P ratings see Figure 4.1)15.   
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
4.4.1 Econometric Methodology  
 
 In the context of panel data methods, it is quite common amongst the 
studies explaining sovereign ratings to employ either Fixed Effects (FE) or 
Random Effects (RE) to capture the country specific heterogeneity.  A brief 
illustration of the two estimators is offered in Appendix B of the current 
chapter.  When working with panel data, the routine way of choosing between 
FE and RE is fitting both and then conducting the Hausman Test.  This test looks 
at the difference between the coefficients estimates of the two models.  If the RE 
assumption of independence of the country specific effects from the regressors 
holds true, the two estimators should not differ significantly (𝐻𝑜).  In contrast if 
there is a difference, the RE method is rejected.  With this said, it is often the 
case that the Hausman test rejects the RE approach, so that the only way to  
                                            
15 The ratings of Moody’s and Fitch provide a similar picture.  For an illustration of the Moody’s 
ratings for a selection of Eurozone countries, see Figure 7.1 in chapter 7.    
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Figure 4.1. Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings for the original twelve Eurozone countries (1999- 2012); elaboration is based on the numerical 
transformation of ratings to a 1-17 scale, with 17 corresponding to AAA and 1 corresponding to any rating from CCC+ and below (source: S&P websites and 
author’s elaboration) 
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avoid rejecting it is by modifying it.  A way of doing so is by introducing the 
time-averages of the regressors in the initial equation.  This is originally done 
by Mundlak (1978).  More recently, it has been generalized by Hadjivassiliou 
(2011), while it has been brought into the context of sovereign rating 
determinants by Afonso et al. (2011b).  In particular, following here the 
methodology of Afonso et al. (2011b), if the original RE equation we want to 
estimate is  
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑍𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (4.1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the quantitative measurement of the rating, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  and 𝑍𝑖  are the sets 
of time varying and time invariant variables respectively, 𝑎𝑖  is the country 
specific error, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is the independent across time and space disturbance, the 
idea is to express 𝑎𝑖  as 
 𝑎𝑖 = 𝜂?̅?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (4.2) 
 
where by definition 𝜀𝑖  is uncorrelated with the regressors.  Now we can re-
write the original equation as  
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑍𝑖 + 𝜂?̅?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (4.3) 
 
which can then be re-written as 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜂 + 𝛽)?̅?𝑖 + 𝜆𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (4.4) 
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Afonso and his colleagues claim that under this specification 𝛿 = 𝜂 + 𝛽 
can be interpreted as expressing the long term effect of the regressors upon the 
ratings, while 𝛽 can be seen as capturing the short-term effects.  Moreover, as 
the authors write, this transformation can be considered to be successful if the 
coefficients 𝜂 are significant and if the new equation satisfies the Hausman test, 
i.e. if there is no more correlation between the regressors and the new country 
specific error 𝜀𝑖 .  
 Satisfying the Hausman test means of course that the vector of 
coefficients 𝛽 comes to be the same both for FE and the modified RE.  This 
supports Mundlak (1978) who argues that the choice between FE and RE is 
essentially an imaginary dilemma which evaporates once RE is properly 
modified.  Hence the only difference between the two approaches is the fact that 
the modified RE explains the country specific heterogeneity by the time-
averages of the regressors, while in the case of FE all heterogeneity is 
amalgamated in one country specific term.  In addition RE provides the 
advantage that it allows us to include any sort of additional time invariant 
measurements we might wish to test. 
 Although in the models of the current chapter I mainly include time-
varying regressors, I want to preserve the space for time invariant 
measurements too.  Hence in what follows I run the regressions using both 
methods and jointly report their results.   
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4.4.2 Model Specification Strategy 
 
Since the purpose of the chapter is to test for evidence of amplified 
movements of sovereign ratings, I need to keep a certain measurement of 
reality as fixed and contrast the ratings against it.  Notice however that what I 
need to specify is not a model that reflects the social and economic reality in 
terms of how I do conceptualize it, but rather in terms of what variables, criteria 
and rules are supposed to matter for CRAs (this is a methodological mistake 
that can be found for instance in Eissfeller et al., 2014).  It would also be futile to 
aim for a model specification that would follow the routine path of maximizing 
the fitness of the econometric model to the actual ratings, since in that case I 
would be essentially adjusting the image of the real world to the image of the 
ratings.  On the other hand, it is still important to come up with some 
reasonable degree of fitness (captured here by the ‘𝑅2- within’ measurement), 
so as to protect the results against the potential issue of omitted variables.  
Although CRAs often publish and update documents that provide key 
insights of how they derive their sovereign ratings (see for example Fitch, 2014; 
Moody’s, 2013; S&P, 2013), they never reveal the precise model they follow.  
This is instead approximated by the literature reported above that aims to 
capture the variables that matter for sovereign ratings.  Given the relatively 
high 𝑅2 values reported in most of those articles, and the meaningful economic 
significance for the variables they incorporate, I use some of the most 
cornerstone and recent of those papers as my benchmark.  Against such 
benchmark I then contrast the actual ratings produced by the three CRAs.  My 
strategy involves the adoption of three different models for sovereign ratings.  
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Since any benchmark model is to an extent arbitrary, the idea of using more 
than one model specifications simply intends to provide some robustness for 
the results.  Based on the above: 
o I first specify the Basic Model, based on Cantor and Packer (1996), the first 
and most cornerstone paper of the relevant literature.  This model includes 
six time-varying explanatory variables:  per capita income, real GDP growth, 
inflation, fiscal balance, external balance and external debt.   
o I update the model by considering an extra set of six explanatory variables, 
based on two of the most recent and complete papers of that literature 
(Afonso et al., 2011b and Canuto et al., 2012).  The new model is labelled as 
the Extended Model; on top of the abovementioned six variables, it also 
includes public debt, foreign reserves, trade openness, unemployment, 
domestic credit and government effectiveness.  Other than the fact that this 
model includes what other scholars have found to be significant, it is also 
worth mentioning that this specification encompasses variables from all the 
families of variables that CRAs claim to use for their analyses.  Note that the 
precise categorizations are similar but not identical; for instance S&P, 2013 
uses a classification of five families, separating between political, economic, 
external, fiscal, and monetary variables. 
o I narrow down the Extended Model by dropping out those variables that are 
statistically insignificant and that exhibit high levels of multicollinearity; the 
main criterion used to detect multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation 
Factor, VIF; following Baum, 2006 10 is taken as the threshold VIF value.  
The new model is named as the Specific Model.  In conjunction with what 
was discussed above, it is important to mention that this Specific Model does 
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not aim to be “the model” for Eurozone ratings, but simply to remove the 
unnecessary noise of the Extended Model so as to produce more accurate 
standard errors for the regressors already suggested.   
Let me also note that the three papers utilized for these models also 
incorporate some time-invariant measurements, namely the level of economic 
development of each country, countries’ default history as well as some 
dummies that account for geographical discrepancies.  Those variables were not 
taken up in the current case simply because my area of investigation is the 
Eurozone, which is by definition a set of developed countries (at least up to the 
crisis), with no recent defaults occurring for any of the member-states since the 
formation of the EU in 1991.  To account for geographical heterogeneity I 
included a dummy for European periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal), which nonetheless did not exhibit any remarkable level of 
statistical significance (see below). 
In all the regressions, all right hand variables are included with a lag, so 
as to tackle contemporaneous endogeneity. 16  Moreover, I use the Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity robust estimator.  Note that when the robust option is 
included in Stata, observations are also automatically clustered by country.  
Furthermore, all regressions are repeated for all the three main CRAs (S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch). 
Essentially, the approach developed aims in capturing evidence of 
exaggerated downgrades in sovereign ratings based on the residuals of the 
above models and interpret such evidence as a reflection of panicked behaviour 
                                            
16 For the sake of completeness I also tried to run a FE GMM version of the Specific Model, using 
the six dimensions of public governance of the World Bank as instruments for the budget deficit 
and the public debt.  For an analytical discussion and illustration of the results see Appendix C 
in the end of the chapter.    
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from the side of CRAs.  In that sense the key criterion for confirmative evidence 
is the following 
 
 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 > 0 (4.5) 
 
Having established such condition, it is quite straightforward to see that the 
bigger the continuous time interval the condition is satisfied in a country, the 
more systematic the evidence in support of the hypothesis.   
A note of caution should be added here: it would be fair to argue that 
trying to give a reading to the residuals of a model can be questioned on the 
grounds that we cannot really know what lies behind them.  At the same time, it 
is known from theory that the phenomena linked with uncertainty are by 
definition unmeasurable, so that any attempt to quantify and plug them into an 
econometric model would create a serious issue of inconsistency.  Hence, 
although my methodology can empirically support the existence of exaggerated 
drops in European sovereign ratings, it cannot exclude any alternative 
interpretation of the results.   
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide the pairs of correlations and the summary 
statistics of all the explanatory variables.  The precise description of all the 
variables along with the related data sources are reported in Appendix A of the 
chapter.  
 
4.4.3 Numerical Transformation of Ratings 
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Table 4.1. Correlation Matrix 
  Per Capita 
Income 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Inflation 
Rate 
Fiscal 
Balance 
External 
Balance 
External 
Debt  
Public 
Debt 
Reser
ves 
Unemplo
yment 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Trade 
Openness 
Credit 
to GDP  
Liabilities of 
MFIs to NCB  
Per Capita 
Income 
1.00             
Real GDP 
Growth 
0.08 1.00            
Inflation Rate -0.02 0.31 1.00           
Fiscal Balance 0.29 0.41 0.26 1.00          
External 
Balance 
0.63 0.19 -0.21 0.44 1.00         
External Debt  0.31 -0.28 -0.03 -0.51 -0.30 1.00        
Public Debt -0.57 -0.34 -0.07 -0.53 -0.40 0.01 1.00       
Reserves -0.56 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.23 -0.33 0.33 1.00      
Unemployment -0.41 -0.28 -0.16 -0.53 -0.35 0.25 0.45 0.16 1.00     
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.38 0.27 -0.15 0.50 0.64 -0.38 -0.63 -0.23 -0.41 1.00    
Trade Openness 0.92 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.47 0.46 -0.54 -0.52 -0.32 0.24 1.00   
Domestic Credit 0.28 -0.33 -0.20 -0.37 -0.04 0.47 -0.23 -0.31 0.14 -0.08 0.30 1.00  
Liabilities of 
MFIs to NCB  
-0.04 -0.44 -0.16 -0.46 -0.11 0.49 0.44 -0.11 0.57 -0.31 0.03 0.23 1.00 
Source: Eurostat, IMF IFS and author’s elaboration  
 
 
 
74 | P a g e  
 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample (1999q1- 2012q4) Pre-Crisis Sub-Sample (1999q1- 2008q3) Post-Crisis Sub-Sample (2008q4- 2012q4) 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Per Capita Income 672 29.53 13.26 468 28.04 12.19 204 32.93 14.92 
Real GDP Growth 660 0.40 0.71 456 0.65 0.56 204 -0.14 0.71 
Inflation Rate 660 0.57 0.27 456 0.62 0.23 204 0.46 0.31 
Fiscal Balance 672 -2.51 4.33 468 -1.06 3.11 204 -5.82 4.91 
External Balance 660 0.05 5.94 456 0.12 6.12 204 -0.11 5.54 
External Debt  648 368.34 159.36 444 330.88 132.90 204 449.86 180.70 
Public Debt 624 67.35 31.82 420 61.03 29.02 204 80.36 33.41 
Reserves 660 9.67 7.67 456 9.82 8.11 204 9.35 6.59 
Unemployment 672 7.97 3.84 468 7.20 2.66 204 9.73 5.29 
Government Effectiveness 672 1.48 0.51 468 1.54 0.50 204 1.36 0.51 
Trade Openness 660 172.96 216.98 456 167.00 207.73 204 186.28 236.33 
Domestic Credit 664 118.51 42.47 460 106.24 33.69 204 146.17 47.07 
Liabilities of MFIs to NCB  659 3.19 4.34 455 2.03 1.39 204 5.78 6.85 
  Full Sample (1999q1- 2012q4) Periphery Countries Subsample (1999q1- 2012q4) Core Countries Subsample (1999q1- 2012q4) 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Per Capita Income 672 29.53 13.26 280 22.23 7.92 392 34.74 13.84 
Real GDP Growth 660 0.40 0.71 275 0.35 0.84 385 0.45 0.61 
Inflation Rate 660 0.57 0.27 275 0.65 0.31 385 0.52 0.22 
Fiscal Balance 672 -2.51 4.33 280 -4.57 5.07 392 -1.03 2.95 
External Balance 660 0.05 5.94 280 -5.03 4.34 380 3.79 3.81 
External Debt  648 368.34 159.36 280 432.18 156.54 368 319.76 143.76 
Public Debt 624 67.35 31.82 260 79.83 34.68 364 58.44 26.23 
Reserves 660 9.67 7.67 280 11.43 9.79 380 8.37 5.27 
Unemployment 672 7.97 3.84 280 9.94 4.55 392 6.56 2.39 
Government Effectiveness 672 1.48 0.51 280 1.03 0.45 392 1.80 0.23 
Trade Openness 660 172.96 216.98 280 102.76 72.34 380 224.68 267.74 
Domestic Credit 664 118.51 42.47 272 128.51 48.20 392 111.57 36.48 
Liabilities of MFIs to NCB  659 3.19 4.34 267 4.38 6.31 392 2.38 1.73 
Source: Eurostat, IMF IFS and author’s elaboration  
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As shown earlier, sovereign ratings are reported in alphabetical scores 
by all three CRAs.  Thus, in order to be able to use them for my analysis I need to 
convert them into numbers.  This is usually done by using some sort of linear  
numerical scales. 17  The precise configuration (i.e. whether it is going to be 1 to 
17 or 5 to 100) does not matter since the numbers are of an ordinal nature.  
However there can be some issues related with the efficiency of econometric 
estimations.  This is pointed out by Afonso et al. (2007) who suggest putting all 
observations below B- into the same category.  As they note, due to the relevant 
scarcity of such observations it can be hard to estimate efficiently the threshold 
points between these bottom rating categories.   
In the case of the current project, it can be seen that there are indeed 
very few observations below B- (based on the average ratings of the three 
agencies, there are only 7 out of the 576 observations where the ratings are in 
the ‘substantial credit risk’ territory or below).  Hence, following Afonso and his 
colleagues, I also adopt the 1 to 17 scale for my estimations (see Table 4.3).   
Other than that, I also utilize the credit outlook and ‘watch’ scores 
provided by CRAs.  These are forward looking estimations of what rating 
changes to expect in the future, with the “review/ watch” notifications reflecting 
possible developments within the next 90 days, and the “outlook” 
announcements providing a similar idea for a two years horizon.  For my 
purposes I convert outlook scores into an extra 0.5 point which is added or 
subtracted to the actual rating.  Similarly the review/ watch notifications 
correspond to an extra 0.25.  Whenever outlook and credit watch scores  
                                            
17 Non-linear numerical transformations can also be found in literature (see for instance Ferri et 
al., 1999, Afonso, 2003 and Afonso et al., 2007).  However as Afonso et al. (2007) report, results 
do not change much compared as with the linear specification.   
 
 
76 | P a g e  
 
Table 4.3.  Numerical Transformation of Sovereign Ratings 
credit quality S&P Moody's Fitch  1-17 scale 
  long term  long term  long term   
highest AAA Aaa AAA 17 
very high  AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
  AA Aa2 AA 15 
  AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
high A+ A1 A+ 13 
  A A2 A 12 
  A- A3 A- 11 
good BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
  BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
  BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
speculative BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
  BB Ba2 BB 6 
  BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
highly speculative B+ B1 B+ 4 
  B B2 B 3 
  B- B3 B- 2 
substantial credit risk CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 1 
  CCC Caa2 CCC 
  CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
very high level of credit risk CC Ca CC 
exceptionally high levels of credit risk C C C 
Selective/ Restricted Default SD   RD 
Default D   D 
     
Outlook/ Watch conversion      
Positive Outlook 0.5    
Credit Watch- Developing 0.25    
Stable 0    
Credit Watch- Negative -0.25    
Negative Outlook -0.5    
Source: CRAs’ websites and author’s elaboration  
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Table 4.4. Basic Model 
  S&P RE S&P FE Moody’s RE Moody’s FE Fitch RE Fitch FE 
Per Capita Income 0.051 0.05 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.06 
  (0.9) (0.87) (0.9) (0.89) (1.01) (1.02) 
Real GDP Growth 0.794** 0.785* 0.900* 0.891* 0.725* 0.710*   
  (1.99) (2.02) (1.88) (1.9) (1.93) (1.96) 
Inflation -1.158** -1.142* -1.496** -1.482* -0.982 -0.968 
  (-2.00) (-1.97) (-2.13) (-2.11) (-1.64) (-1.60)    
Fiscal Balance 0.063 0.056 0.091 0.084 0.072 0.063 
  (0.82) (0.72) (1.06) (0.97) (0.94) (0.8) 
External Balance -0.260*** -0.260** -0.335*** -0.334** -0.286*** -0.284**  
  (-2.79) (-2.79) (-2.68) (-2.69) (-2.87) (-2.88)    
External Debt -0.008** -0.008** -0.006* -0.007* -0.006** -0.007*   
  (-2.33) (-2.40) (-1.71) (-1.80) (-2.07) (-2.20)    
Per Capita Income 
(Time Average) 
0.006   0.02   0.014                 
  (0.05)   (0.17)   (0.1)                 
Real GDP Growth 
(Time Average) 
2.558   0.845   1.854                 
  (1.12)   (0.44)   (0.87)                 
Inflation (Time 
Average) 
-7.503   -6.409   -8.229                 
  (-1.33)   (-1.28)   (-1.43)                 
Fiscal Balance (Time 
Average) 
0.049   0.056   0.104                 
  (0.21)   (0.28)   (0.45)                 
External Balance 
(Time Average) 
0.261   0.284*   0.223                 
  (1.45)   (1.71)   (1.1)                 
External Debt (Time 
Average) 
0.003   0.001   0.001                 
  (0.43)   (0.15)   (0.2)                 
Constant 19.456*** 17.327*** 19.587*** 17.036*** 19.996*** 16.655*** 
  (7.71) (16.08) (8.83) (12.66) (7.98) (14.63) 
N 626 626 626 626 626 626 
rho 0 0.746 0 0.688 0 0.756 
r2_overall 0.659 0.102 0.587 0.05 0.642 0.067 
r2_between 0.843 0.005 0.846 0.133 0.814 0.053 
r2_within 0.404 0.404 0.364 0.364 0.397 0.397 
Notes: The dependent variable is the numerical equivalent of the sovereign rating of the respective CRA; RE 
and FE stand for Random and Fixed Effects respectively; regressions are based on the xtreg routine in STATA; 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; all variables are defined in Appendix A; all time varying 
right hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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overlap, I only take into account the former since, as pointed out by the three 
CRAs, it is supposed to be of a more enduring nature. 18    
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Basic Model 
 
 
 Starting with the Basic Model, we can see in Table 4.4 that the overall 
fitness of the model ranges from 0.36 to 0.4 (throughout all comparisons I use 
the ‘𝑅2-within’ of each FE model as a measurement of fitness).  In addition, as 
discussed in the methodology section earlier, both the modified RE and the FE 
models give almost identical results.  Concerning the signs and significances, we 
can see that for all specifications real GDP growth, inflation, external balance 
and external debt are the most significant variables.  Furthermore, we observe 
that with the exception of external balance, the signs of all other variables are 
meaningful.   
 Most interestingly, we can observe in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 that for all 
peripheral countries of Eurozone the model supports the hypothesis that the 
panic element of CRAs’ behaviour has played an active role behind the recent 
downgrades of their sovereign ratings.  In particular we can see that for Greece 
and Portugal the actual ratings of all three rating agencies were significantly 
inflated prior to the crisis, followed by an exaggerated panic once the Eurozone  
                                            
18 Note that in the case of Moody’s publicly available credit outlook and watch scores are only 
reported from 2003 and on.  Nonetheless, due to the relevant stability of European ratings in 
the 1999- 2002 period this lack of data should not have an important implication on my results.  
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Figure 4.2. Comparison of the basic model for the three rating agencies (dashed lines) with the actual ratings for Greece (source: CRAs’ websites and 
author’s elaboration) 
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Figure 4.3. Comparison of the basic model for the three rating agencies (dashed lines) with the actual ratings for four peripheral countries (source: CRAs’ 
websites and author’s elaboration) 
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crisis broke out.  For the other three countries, namely Italy, Ireland and Spain it 
seems that although there was no remarkable inflation of their rating scores 
before 2009, the outburst of the crisis triggered a similarly amplified reaction of 
CRAs against them.  Of course such results are quite preliminary in the sense 
that the gap between actual and generated ratings can be due to a 
misspecification of the model.  However their systematic repetition across all 
crisis-hit countries can be taken as a first indication in support of my 
hypothesis.   
 
4.5.2 Extended & Specific Models 
 
Given that their overall specifications are quite similar, the Extended and 
Specific models are jointly reported here (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6 respectively).  
As mentioned earlier, the only difference between the two is that in the Specific 
model the most insignificant and correlated variables are dropped out.  To start 
with, we can see that for all three rating agencies, the fitness of these models is 
significantly improved compared with the Basic one, driving the 𝑅2-within to 
values between 0.81 and 0.85 (the reduction of 𝑅2-within is quite minimal 
when we move from the Extended to the Specific model).   
The question of primary interest here is to check whether the post-crisis 
gap between the actual and generated ratings reported above narrows down as 
a result of the specification improvement.  As illustrated in Figures 4.4 to 4.9, 
despite the fact that the gap partly shrinks, the models still offer robust 
evidence to the affirmative of my hypothesis.  This can be easily seen in the 
cases of Greece, Spain and Italy, where the actual ratings are significantly lower  
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Table 4.5. Extended Model 
 S&P RE S&P FE Moody’s RE Moody’s FE Fitch RE Fitch FE 
Per Capita Income -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 0.014 0.014 
 (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.41) (0.42) 
Real GDP Growth 0.425*** 0.425** 0.472** 0.472** 0.375** 0.375**  
 (2.66) (2.68) (2.29) (2.32) (2.43) (2.45) 
Inflation -0.822*** -0.822*** -1.226*** -1.226*** -0.817** -0.817**  
 (-3.91) (-3.94) (-3.30) (-3.34) (-2.34) (-2.36)    
Fiscal Balance -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.161*** -0.161** -0.132** -0.132**  
 (-4.01) (-4.05) (-2.91) (-2.94) (-2.45) (-2.48)    
External Balance 0.046 0.046 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.09) (1.1) (0.14) (0.14) (-0.02) (-0.02)    
External Debt 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.45) (0.45) (0.19) (0.19)    
Public Debt -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 (-7.63) (-7.70) (-8.05) (-8.13) (-7.32) (-7.39)    
Foreign Reserves -0.019 -0.019 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019 -0.019 
 (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.56) (-0.56)    
Unemployment -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.311*** -0.311*** 
 (-4.83) (-4.88) (-4.08) (-4.12) (-3.71) (-3.75)    
Government 
Effectiveness 
1.164 1.164 0.612 0.612 0.472 0.472 
 (1.4) (1.41) (0.76) (0.76) (0.72) (0.73) 
Trade Openness 0.006** 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.004* 0.004 
 (2.06) (2.08) (1.95) (1.97) (1.67) (1.68) 
Domestic Credit 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Per Capita Income 
(Time Average) 
0.512***  0.519***  0.490***                 
 (11.82)  (8.63)  (12.86)                 
Real GDP Growth 
(Time Average) 
-7.821***  -8.426***  -7.764***                 
 (-4.89)  (-5.15)  (-4.88)                 
Inflation (Time 
Average) 
1.538***  2.720***  1.615***                 
 (4.24)  (5.04)  (3.95)                 
Fiscal Balance 
(Time Average) 
-0.655***  -0.553***  -0.627***                 
 (-6.14)  (-4.76)  (-5.43)                 
External Balance 
(Time Average) 
-0.429***  -0.415***  -0.404***                 
 (-6.63)  (-5.84)  (-7.56)                 
External Debt 
(Time Average) 
-0.022***  -0.024***  -0.022***                 
 (-5.54)  (-5.73)  (-5.91)                 
Public Debt (Time 
Average) 
0.045*  0.055**  0.026                 
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 (1.71)  (2.11)  (1.03)                 
Foreign Reserves 
(Time Average) 
0.087  0.105  0.1                 
 (1.27)  (1.48)  (1.54)                 
Unemployment 
(Time Average) 
0.622***  0.628***  0.549***                 
 (6.03)  (4.85)  (4.51)                 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(Time Average) 
2.137***  2.102***  2.093***                 
 (2.69)  (3.13)  (3.57)                 
Openness (Time 
Average) 
-0.011***  -0.012***  -0.010***                 
 (-3.42)  (-3.35)  (-3.58)                 
Domestic Credit 
(Time Average) 
(omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)                 
                      
Constant 5.047 21.466*** 6.535 23.411*** 7.751 21.932*** 
 (0.95) (14.2) (1.26) (12.64) (1.52) (20.35) 
N 592 592 592 592 592 592 
rho 0 0.958 0 0.949 0 0.931 
r2_overall 0.937 0.512 0.899 0.4 0.919 0.499 
r2_between 1 0.488 1 0.361 1 0.451 
r2_within 0.851 0.851 0.816 0.816 0.815 0.815 
Notes: The dependent variable is the numerical equivalent of the sovereign rating of the respective CRA; RE 
and FE stand for Random and Fixed Effects respectively; regressions are based on the xtreg routine in STATA; 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; all variables are defined in Appendix A; all time varying 
right hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 4.6. Specific Model 
 S&P RE S&P FE Moody’s RE Moody’s FE Fitch RE Fitch FE 
Real GDP Growth 0.550*** 0.546*** 0.471*** 0.467** 0.395*** 0.391**  
 (3.33) (3.29) (2.89) (2.89) (2.92) (2.92) 
Inflation -0.907*** -0.875*** -1.372*** -1.337** -0.843** -0.809*   
 (-3.72) (-3.61) (-3.06) (-3.04) (-2.15) (-2.11)    
Fiscal Balance -0.128*** -0.132*** -0.165*** -0.169*** -0.127** -0.132**  
 (-3.69) (-3.79) (-3.34) (-3.41) (-2.47) (-2.54)    
Public Debt -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (-7.33) (-7.31) (-8.25) (-8.52) (-7.44) (-7.68)    
Unemployment -0.301*** -0.302*** -0.377*** -0.376*** -0.317*** -0.317*** 
 (-6.61) (-6.44) (-5.27) (-5.35) (-4.97) (-5.00)    
Trade Openness 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.82) (3.91) (4.31) (4.38) (5.05) (5.07) 
Periphery Dummy -1.152*  -0.767  -0.626                 
 (-1.74)  (-1.15)  (-0.93)                 
Real GDP Growth 
(Time Average) 
0.985  -0.377  -0.116                 
 (0.76)  (-0.30)  (-0.09)                 
Inflation (Time 
Average) 
-7.759**  -6.679*  -8.084**                 
 (-2.07)  (-1.86)  (-2.15)                 
Fiscal Balance (Time 
Average) 
0.248  0.350*  0.275                 
 (1.26)  (1.75)  (1.35)                 
Public Debt (Time 
Average) 
0.057***  0.070***  0.044***                 
 (3.37)  (5.07)  (3.22)                 
Unemployment (Time 
Average) 
0.315***  0.381***  0.310***                 
 (3.42)  (4.54)  (3.77)                 
Openness (Time 
Average) 
-0.006**  -0.006**  -0.006***                 
 (-2.32)  (-2.57)  (-2.60)                 
Constant 22.666*** 22.840*** 22.910*** 24.449*** 23.863*** 22.623*** 
 (9.85) (38.47) (10.4) (33.31) (10.57) (41.52) 
N 604 604 604 604 604 604 
rho 0 0.939 0 0.934 0 0.931 
r2_overall 0.87 0.477 0.841 0.426 0.854 0.46 
r2_between 0.893 0.404 0.876 0.373 0.885 0.397 
r2_within 0.837 0.837 0.811 0.811 0.812 0.812 
Notes: The dependent variable is the numerical equivalent of the sovereign rating of the respective CRA; RE 
and FE stand for Random and Fixed Effects respectively;regressions are based on the xtreg routine in STATA; 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; all variables are defined in Appendix A; all time varying 
right hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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than the econometrically generated ones, while also exhibiting sharper 
movements.  Similarly we can also observe an important difference in the 
slopes of the ratings of Portugal and Ireland, with the actual ones being 
significantly steeper in most of the cases.  It is also worth noting that the results 
are highly similar across all three rating agencies.   
Those findings give rise to some important insights.  Based on them we 
can claim that CRAs have indeed exhibited significantly panicked reactions 
since the outset of the Eurozone crisis in 2009.  In particular, the downgrades of 
the peripheral Eurozone states have clearly been more exaggerated compared 
to what macro ‘fundamentals’ would justify.  This observation holds true both in 
terms of actual volume as well as speed (slope) of downgrading activity. 
These results seem to confirm on one hand the findings of Ferri et al. 
(1999) on the procyclicality of sovereign ratings.  In addition their systematic 
appearance is consistent with the hypothesis of the chapter in terms of 
interpreting them:  if it is true that Keynesian uncertainty exists and if it 
therefore holds that people tend to exhibit feelings of panic, there is no reason 
why CRAs should not be suspected of doing the same.  In the absence of the full 
set of information required for conducting accurate forecasting, CRAs are liable 
to panicked reactions same with every other economic agent.  Although such 
behaviour might not be observable at first sight during periods of tranquillity, 
my results show that it becomes conspicuous during times of crisis and 
economic turbulence.   
Concerning the models’ coefficients and signs, it is mainly the Specific 
Model that can offer some reliable insights, since it is much clearer in terms of 
multicollinearity than the extended one (under the Specific Model all variables 
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hold VIF values below 10; see Table 4.7).  Thus, other than the fact that all six 
time-varying variables of the Specific Model exhibit some robust significance, 
we can also see that five of them appear with meaningful signs.   
 
Table 4.7. Levels of Multicollinearity Across the Different Models 
  Basic Model Extended Model Specific Model Bonus Model 
External Debt 21.68 27.8     
Per Capita Income 20.77 57.08     
Inflation 5.54 7.78 5.77 5.82 
External Balance 3.48 3.87     
Fiscal Balance 3.03 4.62 2.57 2.57 
Real GDP Growth 1.66 1.8 1.67 1.78 
Government 
Effectiveness 
  15.34     
Trade Openness   14.63 1.68 1.88 
Domestic Credit   14.34     
Public Debt   12.15 7.81 12.81 
Unemployment   8.99 6.58 8.45 
Foreign Reserves   4.09     
MFI Liabilities to 
NCB 
      2.97 
RR Public Debt       2.97 
          
          
Mean VIF 9.36 14.37 4.34 4.91 
Notes: based on FE regressions on the S&P ratings; multicollinearity measured by the Variance Inflation 
Factor- VIF; the value of 10 is used as a threshold (see Baum, 2006) 
Source: Eurostat, IMF IFS and author’s elaboration  
 
Only exception is fiscal balance that systematically appears with a minus19.  
Although surprising at first sight, such result might be due to the fact that even 
triple-A countries such as Germany had been occasionally running increasing 
budget deficits (see above).  Furthermore, out of all the variables related with 
external trade that had been included in the Extended Model (namely, external 
                                            
19 In view of the relatively high correlation between fiscal balance and public debt I also tried to 
run the model without the latter.  However the sign of fiscal balance did not change.   
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Standard and Poor’s ratings for Greece (source: S&P website and 
author’s elaboration)
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Figure 4.5. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Standard and Poor’s ratings for four peripheral countries (source: 
S&P website and author’s elaboration)
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Moody’s ratings for Greece (source: Moody’s website and 
author’s elaboration) 
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Figure 4.7. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Moody’s ratings for four peripheral countries (source: Moody’s 
website and author’s elaboration) 
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Figure 4.8. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Fitch ratings for Greece (source: Fitch website and author’s 
elaboration) 
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Figure 4.9. Comparison of the basic, extended, specific and bonus models with the actual Fitch ratings for four peripheral countries (source: Fitch website 
and author’s elaboration) 
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balance, external debt, and trade openness), it was only openness that retained 
its statistical significance.   This might be a reflection of the fact that although 
individual Eurozone member states have been quite open to international trade, 
Eurozone as a whole has been a relatively closed economy, with most of the 
trade conducted amongst member states.  Lastly the periphery dummy, 
although with a negative sign as expected, did not exhibit any noteworthy 
significance.  This might be because as discussed in Chapter 3, despite all five 
peripheral countries being in a debt crisis, it was different categories of debt 
that were ballooning in each country prior to 2009. 
 
4.5.3 Further Robustness Checks 
 
Two robustness checks are conducted here in order to further test the 
validity of the above results.  First I try to see if the gap between actual and 
generated ratings is retained when I introduce two new variables into the 
specified models.  Secondly, I test whether the results change significantly once 
I control for cross-sectional dependence (in its strong form). 
 
4.5.3.1 Additional Insights from the Post Crisis World 
 
Other than seeking for evidence of panicked reactions, there is also the 
interesting question of what else might matter for sovereign ratings.  To answer 
the question I consider two variables that have not been taken up in relevant 
literature yet.  In that fashion I expand the Specific Model by introducing i) an 
interactive term between public debt and a dummy that takes the value of 1 
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when public debt is higher than 90% of GDP (labelled as RR Public Debt)20, and 
ii) a variable measuring the proportion of financial institutions’ liabilities to the 
National Central Bank (NCB) in each country over the amount of total assets of 
such institutions (hereafter labelled as LiabToNCB).  The intuition behind RR 
Public Debt reflects the hypothesis that CRAs do not necessarily follow some 
objective scientific measurements of the macroeconomy21, but are liable to 
certain habits of thought possibly related with what Keynes describes as social 
conventions.  In that regard it connects with the discussion conducted in 
Chapter 2.  Concerning the second variable, it will be shown that LiabToNCB can 
be taken as a multi-faceted variable, associated with financial distress, public 
interventions and political turmoil at the same time.   
First, the perception that public debt is harmful for economic growth if 
exceeding the Reinhart and Rogoff threshold of 90% has not been proven to lie 
upon any objective scientific basis.  Other than the celebrated critique of 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s paper by Herndon et al. (2014), there remain three issues 
to point out.  First correlation does not in any sense prove causality.  Hence 
even if the negative correlation between public debt and growth was 
empirically robust, it would still be possible to use it in favour of conflicting 
narratives.  That is, there is no reason why a high debt ratio should cause low 
growth, and not the other way around, i.e. low growth resulting in a high public 
debt ratio.  Secondly, even if there were such threshold in public debt, there is 
no economic theory to justify a certain figure against another (i.e. why should 
the turning point be close to 90% and not let’s say to 110%).  Third, it can even 
                                            
20 I’m grateful to Prof. Malcolm Sawyer for pointing out the idea to construct such measurement. 
21 There can of course be the question of whether such measurements exist at the first place. 
 
 
95 | P a g e  
 
be claimed that budget deficits, and correspondingly an increasing public debt 
are necessary for getting out of a recessionary spiral due to the state’s capacity 
to run in a counter-cyclical manner (see for instance Lerner, 1943; 
Papadimitriou et al., 2010; Arestis and Sawyer, 2013).  It is in that sense that I 
argue that the perception of public debt as being harmful for growth once it 
exceeds 90% of GDP is nothing but a habit of thought.   
Coming to the inclusion of the LiabToNCB variable I claim that such 
variable captures some key dynamics that are related with a crisis and a 
recession.  Literally speaking LiabToNCB measures the liquidity provisions or 
else bailouts conducted by national and international authorities to support the 
domestic banking systems22.  Interestingly such provisions have not only been a 
feature of the crisis hit peripheral countries, but were also part of the rescue 
packages towards banks of core Eurozone countries during the 2008/9 phase 
(see Figure 4.10).   
Seen in the broader picture though, LiabToNCB does not only capture 
banking bailouts, but also reflects situations of financial distress that precede 
liquidity provisions, as well as the political cost that usually comes along for 
national governments (for a detailed outline of the recent financial distress 
experienced by European banks, see Van Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013).  
Moreover, in view of the central importance of the banking sector behind the 
recent economic turbulence, one can argue that those dynamics have been a key 
feature of the European crisis.   As such they are also reflected- at least  
                                            
22 Note that in the case of countries under the so called ‘Troika’ (IMF-ECB-EC) mechanism, 
liquidity provisions are channelled to banks through the National Central Banks of Eurozone 
member states.  
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Figure 4.10.  Liabilities of MFIs to National Central Banks over MFIs' total assets for 
selected EMU countries (source: Eurostat and author’s calculations) 
 
 
indirectly- on real GDP growth.  Hence the significant negative correlation 
(close to -0.4) that LiabToNCB exhibits with real GDP growth should come as no 
surprise (see the correlation matrix above).  Nonetheless I argue here that 
compared with GDP growth, which by construction amalgamates the dynamics 
of the entire economy, LiabToNCB offers a better trade-off between the general 
and the specific.  
But how does LiabToNCB relate with the determinants of sovereign 
ratings?  A way to interpret some possible significance here could be to state 
that it is a variable that CRAs look at before attributing their ratings.  However 
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it seems to be more plausible to argue that it is the abovementioned package of 
information that CRAs look at.  Although it is relatively straightforward that 
financial distress should be associated with uneasy feelings on the side of CRAs, 
the interesting question is to see how those agencies react to public 
interventions aiming to rescue and support domestic banking institutions.  
Here, S&P (2013: 22) notes that in view of the associated political cost required 
for such interventions, the overall success of such projects is far from obvious23.  
Hence a negative sign of LiabToNCB would be an indicator that CRAs are not 
convinced by the projects and trajectories announced by European and 
international authorities, such as the ECB and the IMF, at least at the time when 
these become effective.  This should not necessarily be taken as an indication 
that CRAs follow a different economic paradigm, but rather that those agencies 
are more “nervous” about the actual course of events. 
Let me label the new model as ‘Bonus Model’.  As shown by Table 4.8, 
both variables prove to be highly significant and with the anticipated signs 
(minus for both)24.  These results are consistent across all three CRAs.  
Moreover, under all three agencies the 𝑅2-within now gets values that range 
from 0.88 to 0.90.  In particular, the fact that public debt’s importance is 
aggravated once its ratio over GDP exceeds the 90% Reinhart and Rogoff 
threshold allows us to suspect that CRAs are indeed liable to habits of thought.   
 
                                            
23 The success of bailout projects, and especially the political terms they come along, can of 
course be questioned in several fronts, such as the implications and effectiveness of the 
associated austerity measures.  However in the current chapter I limit the discussion on how 
such projects are perceived by CRAs.  
24 For the economy of space Table 4.8 only reports the modified RE regressions for each rating 
agency.  I also tried to introduce the two new variables into broader econometric specifications 
such as the Extended Model.  In all cases the variables retained their significances and signs.    
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Table 4.8. Bonus Model 
 S&P RE Moody’s RE Fitch RE 
  w Cr. Sect. 
Averages 
 w Cr. Sect. 
Averages 
 w Cr. Sect. 
Averages 
Real GDP Growth 0.200*** 0.410*** 0.068 0.169 0.026 0.180*   
 (3.21) (2.77) (0.6) (0.83) (0.3) (1.76) 
Inflation -0.784*** -0.162 -1.276*** -0.635** -0.756*** -0.227 
 (-4.46) (-0.74) (-5.19) (-2.54) (-4.02) (-0.96)    
Fiscal Balance -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.088** -0.048 -0.053 -0.024 
 (-2.93) (-3.21) (-2.49) (-1.52) (-1.45) (-0.96)    
Public Debt -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.046*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.032*** 
 (-3.73) (-2.81) (-3.89) (-3.60) (-3.11) (-3.13)    
Unemployment -0.180*** -0.164*** -0.248*** -0.208*** -0.190*** -0.158*** 
 (-3.36) (-3.96) (-4.64) (-5.00) (-4.91) (-4.61)    
Trade Openness 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.002**  
 (1.26) (2.9) (0.69) (1.87) (1.39) (2.27) 
MFI Liabilities to NCB -0.195*** -0.184*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.200*** -0.196*** 
 (-8.74) (-8.10) (-5.35) (-5.60) (-8.88) (-9.66)    
RR Public Debt -0.013** -0.014** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.34) (-3.73) (-3.81) (-3.00) (-3.01)    
Periphery Dummy -1.117** -1.049** -0.633* -0.575* -0.585 -0.537 
 (-2.52) (-2.30) (-1.81) (-1.69) (-1.60) (-1.49)    
Real GDP Growth (Time Average) 5.419*** 5.359*** 4.055*** 4.033*** 4.365*** 4.279*** 
 (3.95) (3.73) (3.44) (3.34) (3.63) (3.5) 
Inflation (Time Average) -5.795** -6.494** -3.996* -4.812** -5.519** -6.192**  
 (-1.99) (-2.11) (-1.72) (-2.00) (-2.20) (-2.36)    
Fiscal Balance (Time Average) -0.07 -0.063 0.082 0.041 -0.027 -0.057 
 (-0.42) (-0.41) (0.63) (0.34) (-0.19) (-0.42)    
Public Debt (Time Average) 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 
 (4.46) (4) (6.58) (5.09) (5.21) (5.7) 
Unemployment (Time Average) 0.303*** 0.285*** 0.363*** 0.322*** 0.297*** 0.262*** 
 (2.79) (2.77) (4.38) (4.39) (3.86) (3.56) 
Openness (Time Average) 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (1.09) (-0.42) (1.58) (1.14) (1.38) (0.87) 
MFI Liabilities to NCB (Time 
Average) 
-0.376** -0.385** -0.351*** -0.350*** -0.377*** -0.380*** 
 (-2.32) (-2.35) (-2.84) (-2.78) (-2.81) (-2.82)    
Real GDP Growth (Cross-Section 
Average) 
 -0.138*  0.181  0.056 
  (-1.73)  (1.04)  (0.47) 
Inflation (Cross-Section Average)  -0.824**  -0.629*  -0.847**  
  (-2.38)  (-1.76)  (-2.48)    
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Fiscal Balance (Cross-Section 
Average) 
 -0.051  -0.195***  -0.114**  
  (-1.28)  (-2.64)  (-2.08)    
Public Debt (Cross-Section 
Average) 
 -0.004  -0.027  -0.005 
  (-0.19)  (-1.50)  (-0.32)    
Unemployment (Cross-Section 
Average) 
 -0.104  -0.064  -0.04 
  (-0.55)  (-0.65)  (-0.37)    
Openness (Cross-Section Average)  -0.011  0.003  0 
  (-1.40)  (0.58)  (0.03)    
MFI Liabilities to NCB (Cross 
Section Average) 
 -0.008  -0.019  -0.036 
  (-0.18)  (-0.39)  (-0.68)    
Constant 16.670*** 19.985*** 15.782**
* 
17.575*** 17.124*** 18.157*** 
 (9.01) (8.34) (9.61) (8.46) (9.84) (9.17) 
N 595 595 595 595 595 595 
rho 0 0 0 0 0 0 
r2_overall 0.936 0.942 0.922 0.929 0.936 0.941 
r2_between 0.964 0.964 0.971 0.971 0.972 0.972 
r2_within 0.9 0.913 0.881 0.895 0.89 0.901 
Notes: The dependent variable is the numerical equivalent of the sovereign rating of the respective CRA; RE stands for 
Random Effects ;regressions are based on the xtreg routine in STATA; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; 
all variables are defined in Appendix A; all time varying right hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in 
parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
  
 
Furthermore, the systematically high statistical significance of LiabToNCB 
indicates that all three CRAs have been disputing the capacity of the EU and the 
IMF to successfully contain the European crisis.   
In conjunction with the results of the previous section, we can observe 
that the gap and the difference in slopes between actual and generated ratings 
do not change much for the peripheral countries of Eurozone (see the Bonus 
Model projections in the main graphs).  This means that the results obtained 
earlier, supporting the hypothesis of panicked and exaggerated reactions on 
behalf of CRAs, are robust under the Bonus Model.  Moreover it is interesting to 
notice that the inclusion of the two variables entirely removes the statistical 
significance from trade openness for all three CRAs, while it also removes the 
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significance of real GDP growth from the models of Moody’s and Fitch.  This can 
be seen as a result of the important correlations between public debt and trade 
openness on one hand and real GDP growth and LiabToNCB on the other (see 
the correlation matrix).   
 
4.5.3.2 Controlling for Cross- Sectional Dependence  
 
Table 4.9. Cross-Sectional Dependence Test 
  Basic Model   Extended Model   
  chi2(66)  Prob. chi2(66)  Prob. 
S&P 881.45 0 374.90 0 
Moody's 842.61 0 412.76 0 
Fitch 767.18 0 402.59 0 
  Specific Model   Bonus Model   
  chi2(66)  Prob. chi2(66)  Prob. 
S&P 425.88 0 326.32 0 
Moody's 365.02 0 341.82 0 
Fitch 396.53 0 293.91 0 
based on the Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional correlation (see Baum, 2001); Ho: No 
Cross-Sectional Dependence 
 
 
To test for cross-sectional dependence I conduct the Breusch-Pagan LM 
test.  As Table 4.9 indicates, the null hypothesis of no dependence is clearly 
rejected for all models and all rating agencies.  For that reason, Table 4.8 also 
reports the results of the Bonus Model when controlling for strong cross-
sectional dependence.  The approach follows the insights of Pesaran (2006) and 
Bailey et al. (2014) and involves the incorporation of the cross- sectional 
averages in the RE regressions of all three rating agencies.  As it can be seen, 
most of the results remain qualitatively similar for every rating agency.  In 
addition there is only a slight improvement in the 𝑅2-within measurement of 
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the relevant regressions.  From their side, both RR Public Debt and LiabToNCB 
manage to retain their signs and significances.  Furthermore, we can observe 
that only the cross-section average of inflation is found to be systematically 
significant across all three CRAs25. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Despite their widely acknowledged contribution to the 2007/08 financial 
crash, CRAs’ role in the context of the Eurozone crisis has not received much 
attention.  This gap is filled in the present chapter by studying the movements 
of sovereign ratings for the Eurozone peripheral countries.  The flawed 
institutional structure of the monetary union, with no institution capable of 
acting as a LLR for member states, and the continuing European crisis underpin 
the power of CRAs towards EMU member states and bring into the fore a topic 
that so far has been mainly explored in relation to developing countries. 
 Key hypothesis is the idea that CRAs do not only conduct a technical 
analysis of the macroeconomy but also exhibit feelings of euphoria and panic.  
Such a hypothesis arises from the concept of fundamental uncertainty.  Put 
simply, if it is true that in the face of uncertainty it is impossible to conduct 
accurate forecasting due to the a priori non-existence of the required set of 
knowledge, there is no reason to exempt CRAs from such reasoning.  Hence, like 
all other economic agents, CRAs can get excessively excited and depressed.    
                                            
25 I also repeated the regressions by including the cross-section averages for the post crisis era 
only (using an interacting dummy that takes the value of 1 for all periods after 2008q3), so as to 
see whether they would pick up some further statistical significance.  Nonetheless, the results 
were similar to the original specification.   
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At the methodological level, the chapter attempts to capture such 
exaggerated reactions by means of linear panel data econometrics.  Using a 
number of benchmark models that aim at incorporating the key macroeconomic 
variables that are associated with CRAs’ analyses, it seeks for evidence of 
systematic discrepancies between the econometric and the actual ratings of the 
crisis-hit EMU peripheral countries.  To the extent that actual ratings are found 
to be systematically lower than the estimated ones throughout the post-crisis 
period, such evidence is taken as supportive of the hypothesis.   
The chapter shows that since 2009 the sovereign rating downgrades of 
peripheral states have indeed been systematically exaggerated as compared 
with the macroeconomic ‘fundamentals’ that are supposed to matter for CRAs.  
While part of the gap might be dependent on the precise model configuration, 
the overall evidence is robust in the sense that the actual ratings of EMU 
periphery are systematically found to be too low under all specifications.  
Furthermore, results hold for all three CRAs and they pass a number of 
robustness checks.  More specifically, the chapter shows how the discrepancy 
between actual and econometric ratings is retained even after accounting for 
two innovative variables into the model.  These include an interactive term 
between public debt to GDP and a dummy that takes the value of one once the 
debt to GDP ratio exceeds the 90% threshold, and a variable measuring the 
proportion of domestic MFIs’ liabilities to the central bank.  An extension of the 
model with cross-sectional averages is also considered so as to account for 
cross-sectional dependence. 
All in all, the findings of the present can be used in a number of ways.  
First it is interesting to see to what extent the component of panicked reactions 
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matters for financial instability.  This is taken up in the following chapter that 
focuses on extreme capital flow movements.  Secondly, if it is true that 
exaggerated reactions of CRAs are a result of fundamental uncertainty, and not 
an outcome of false incentives as suggested by existing literature (e.g. Ferri et 
al., 1999), there are different policy implications to consider.  This issue is 
further discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.  
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4.7 Appendix A- Variables Description  
 Description Unit Source 
Sovereign Ratings Long Term Foreign Currency Ratings Index numbers S&P, Moody's and Fitch 
websites 
Per Capita Income GDP at Mkt Prices/ Population; 
quarterly figures are seasonally 
adjusted and multiplied by 4 
Thousands of Euros Eurostat 
Real GDP Growth Real GDP = Nom GDP/GDP Deflator * 
100; seasonally adjusted 
% Eurostat 
Inflation Rate Inflation Growth Rate; Harmonized 
Consumer Price Index used; 
seasonally adjusted 
% International Financial 
Statistics IMF 
Fiscal Balance [(Total Public Revenues- Total Public 
Expenses)/ GDP]*100 
% Eurostat 
External Balance (Current Account Balance/GDP)*100 % Eurostat 
External Debt  (External Debt/ Total Exports)*100; 
External Debt is approximated by 
(portfolio account, debt instrument 
liabilities+other investment, 
liabilities); Total Exports are the 
summary of (goods, credit+ services, 
credit+ income, credit); quarterly 
ratio divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Public Debt (Generan Government Debt/ 
GDP)*100; Maastricht Debt used; 
ratio divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Reserves (Foreign Reserves/ Imports)*100; 
divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Unemployment Total Unemployment Rate; 
seasonally adjusted 
% Eurostat 
Government Effectiveness;  
Voice and Accountability;  
Political Stability  
and Absence of Violence;  
Regulatory Quality;  
Rule of Law;  
Evidence of Corruption  
Indices reported in the World 
Governance Indicator Database; 
interpolated from annual to quarterly 
frequency; used 1998 as the entrance 
scores for 1999; copy pasted the 
2000 values in 2001 cause the latter 
were missing 
Index Numbers World Bank 
Trade Openness Measured as [(Exports+Imports)/ 
GDP]*100 
% Eurostat 
Domestic Credit  (Credit/ GDP)*100; Credit 
approximated by the "MFI claims on 
Other Sectors" account; national 
residency criterion used 
% International Financial 
Statistics IMF 
Liabilities of MFIs to NCB  (Liabilities of MFIs to NCB/ Total 
Assets)*100; MFIs include all 
Domestic Monetary Financial 
Institutions (MFIs) other than the 
National Central Bank (NCB);Total 
Assets include: MFI claims on NCB; 
MFI Claims on Depository 
corporations in other EA countries; 
MFI claims on non-EA Residents; MFI 
claims on General Government and 
MFI Claims on Other Sectors (this 
classification follows the listing of 
data in the IMF IFS Database).  
National Residency applied in all 
cases. 
% International Financial 
Statistics IMF 
Periphery Dummy Taking the value of 1 for Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal 
0 or 1 Constructed by the 
author 
* Methodology applied for seasonal adjustment: weighted moving averages (1/9)*x(t-2) + (2/9)*x(t-1) + (1/3)*x(t) + 
(2/9)*x(t+1) + (1/9)*x(t+2)  
** Divisions/ Multiplications by 4 have been done so as to bring the variables in the same scale with the corresponding 
annual ones 
*** All growth rates have been computed based on the formula ΔΧt/ Xt-1 
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4.8 Appendix B- Main Features of the Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects Estimators 
 
I briefly illustrate the main aspects of the Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects estimators here.  Following Wooldridge (2002) and Baum (2006) let us 
assume the following panel data equation: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑘 + 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.6) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 1 ∗ 𝑘 vector of variables that vary over country and time, 𝛽 is the 
𝑘 ∗ 1 vector of coefficients on 𝑥, 𝑧𝑖 is a 1 ∗ 𝑝 vector of time-invariant variables 
that vary only over countries, 𝛿 is the 𝑝 ∗ 1 vector of coefficients on 𝑧, 𝑢𝑖  is the 
country-specific effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the disturbance term.  With this as given, the 
essential difference between FE and RE is how to model the country-specific 
effect.  Thus if 𝑢𝑖  depends on the regressors 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑖, it is best captured by FE.  
In contrast if it is thought to be independent, it is said to be random and hence 
RE is the most suitable method.  
 To illustrate how the FE estimator is derived, a within transformation 
can be conducted that removes the time invariant variables as well as the 
country specific effects: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦?̅? = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥?̅?)𝛽𝑘 + (𝑧𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖)𝛿 + (𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅? (4.7) 
 
where 𝑦?̅? = (
1
𝑇
)∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑥?̅? = (
1
𝑇
)∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , and 𝜀?̅? = (
1
𝑇
)∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 .  This 
equation can also be labelled as 
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 𝑦𝑖?̃? = (𝑥𝑖?̃?)𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖?̃?   (4.8) 
 
The FE estimator is nothing but the OLS estimator of the above equation: 
 
 
𝛽𝐹𝐸 = (∑ 𝑋?̃?′𝑋?̃?
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑ 𝑋?̃?′𝑦𝑖?̃?
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 
  (4.9) 
 
Such estimator essentially comes to be equivalent with a Pooled-OLS regression 
where 𝑁 country specific dummies are included.  Furthermore, as Baum (2006) 
writes FE will have explanatory power only if each country’s fluctuations of 𝑦 
around its mean are significantly correlated with the fluctuation of the country’s 
𝑥 variables around their means.   
 In the case of RE, the assumption of independence of the country specific 
effect from the regressors is of the utmost importance.  Based on this 
assumption, and assuming mean zero processes and homoscedasticity both for 
𝑢𝑖  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, as well as zero correlation between them and over time, we get the 
composite error process 
 𝜂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.10) 
 
with conditional variance  
 𝐸(𝜂𝑖𝑡
2 |𝑥) = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2  (4.11) 
 
and conditional covariance within a unit of  
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 𝐸(𝜂𝑖𝑡𝜂𝑖𝑠|𝑥) = 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠   (4.12) 
 
The covariance matrix of these 𝑇 errors can be written as  
 
 𝛴 = 𝜎𝜀
2𝛪𝛵 + 𝜎𝑢
2𝑗𝑇′𝑗𝑇    (4.13) 
 
so that the estimator for RE is the GLS estimator: 
 
 
𝛽𝑅𝐸 = (∑ 𝑋𝑖′𝛴
−1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛸𝜄)
−1
(∑ 𝑋𝑖′
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛴−1𝑦𝑖) 
  (4.14) 
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4.9 Appendix C- a Fixed Effects GMM version of the Specific 
Model  
 
From a theoretical viewpoint one could suspect that the future values of 
the explanatory variables, and especially of the variables related with public 
finances (budget deficit and public debt) could be affected by sovereign rating 
fluctuations, therefore violating the strict exogeneity assumption required by 
FE and RE.  Here the apparent alternative would be to try out some 
Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques.  However it seems to be quite impossible 
to find some instruments that can be thought of as independent from sovereign 
ratings- both in terms of lags and leads as required by strict exogeneity- and 
that can at the same time explain the associated macroeconomic variables in a 
satisfying manner (without finding shelter to frivolous instruments such as the 
number of mobile phones or the number of ice-creams in a country).   
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness I report here the results of the 
Fixed Effects General Method of Moments (GMM) regression of the Specific 
Model, where the budget deficit and the public debt are instrumented on the six 
dimensions of public governance reported by the World Bank, namely i) Voice 
and Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, iii) Regulatory 
Quality, iv) Government Effectiveness, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Evidence of 
Corruption.  From a theoretical viewpoint one could expect such measurements 
to be capable of explaining public finance variables since the latter can also be 
thought to be a reflection of the quality of public governance.  At the empirical 
level such hypothesis is clearly supported by the correlation figures reported in 
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Table 4.10. Correlation Matrix for Pubic Finance and Public Governance Variables 
  Fiscal 
Balance  
Public 
Debt 
Corrupti
on  
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
                  
Fiscal Balance  1.00               
Public Debt -0.54 1.00             
Corruption  0.48 -0.71 1.00           
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.51 -0.63 0.92 1.00         
Political Stability 0.49 -0.53 0.70 0.64 1.00       
Regulatory Quality 0.46 -0.75 0.88 0.82 0.69 1.00     
Rule of Law 0.38 -0.70 0.95 0.90 0.68 0.88 1.00   
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.50 -0.70 0.89 0.85 0.73 0.88 0.86 1.00 
Source: Eurostat, WGI and author’s elaboration  
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Table 4.11. FE GMM version of the Specific Model for S&P ratings 
 
First- Stage Regressions 
     
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F(6,   594) P-value 
Public Debt 0.1792 0.1785 20.79 0 
Fiscal Balance 0.1805 0.1798 16.61 0 
     
Underidentification tests 
Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified) 
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-sq(5)=81.83 P-val=0.0000  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic Chi-sq(5)=128.34 P-val=0.0000  
     
Weak identification test 
Ho: equation is weakly identified    
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic                21.04   
     
Weak-instrument-robust inference 
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation 
Ho: B1=0 and overidentifying restrictions are valid 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(6,594)= 31.43 F(6,594)= 14.50  F(6,594)= 16.93 
  P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(6)=191.78 Chi-sq(6)=88.46  Chi-sq(6)=103.32 
  P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Chi-sq(6)=100.93  Chi-sq(6)=73.22   Chi-sq(6)=77.51  
  P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 P-val=0.0000 
Notes: when results are not presented separately for each CRA it is because they are identical 
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2nd step GMM estimation 
 S&P FE Moody's FE Fitch FE 
Fiscal Balance -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
 (-14.95) (-12.81) (-13.05) 
Public Debt -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.31*** 
  (-7.97) (-7.29) (-9.28) 
Real GDP Growth 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 
 (3.82) (3.53) (4.18) 
Inflation -0.01 -0.48** -0.01 
 (-0.05) (-2.28) (-0.06) 
Unemployment -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.28*** 
 (-4.92) (-6.08) (-6.19) 
Trade Openness 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (8.12) (9.48) (9.56) 
    
N 616 616 616 
Centered R2  0.7523 0.7762 0.7355 
    
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) 
Chi-sq(4) 61.6 20.047 23.358 
P-val  0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the numerical equivalent of the sovereign rating of the respective CRA; FE stands for Fixed 
Effects; regressions are based on the xtivreg2 routine in STATA; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; all 
variables are defined in Appendix A; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively.  
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Table 4.10, which range from 0.37 to 0.75 in absolute terms.  Other than that, 
one could also expect the World Bank variables to be relatively more detached 
from the effects of sovereign ratings, therefore acting as good instruments.  
Nonetheless, as it can be seen from the results above, although the six 
instruments perform well in explaining the public finance variables, they are 
still endogenous to the overall specification. 
In particular, the first part of Table 4.11 reports the summary statistics 
for the first-stage regressions, while the second part reports the results 
generated for the actual model.  As it can be seen by the summary statistics of 
the first regressions, the selected instruments perform well in explaining the 
public finance variables.  In particular, the Shea partial 𝑅2 and the partial 𝑅2 are 
quite similar while the 𝐹 statistics in both cases are above the threshold of 10 
(my interpretation is based on the rules of thumb suggested by Baum, 2006).  In 
addition the underidentification tests clearly reject the null of under-
identification, while the results for the weak identification test allow me to 
reject the null of weak identification at the 5% level.  Coming to the second 
regression, it can be seen that with the exception of inflation all other variables 
manage to retain their signs and significances for all three CRAs.  𝑅2 ranges 
from 0.73 to 0.77, which although lower than the 𝑅2- within of the original 
version of the model is still at a satisfying level.  Nonetheless, across all 
regressions the Hansen 𝐽 statistic clearly rejects the null hypothesis that all 
instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance process, therefore implying 
 
 
113 | P a g e  
 
the endogeneity of the public governance indicators26.  Results are highly 
similar across all three rating agencies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
26 I also tried to run the model without the included instruments and the results of the Hansen 
statistic were quite similar in rejecting Ho. 
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5 Chapter 5- Rating Downgrades and Sudden 
Stops of Capital: the Eurozone Experience 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Throughout the last decade there has been a voluminous literature 
focusing on the macroeconomic determinants of episodes of extreme capital 
flow movements.  Until recently such literature has mainly focused on 
developing countries (e.g. Calvo et al., 2004) due to the vulnerability of those 
states to sudden movements of foreign capital and the corresponding richness 
of crisis episodes that were recorded.  Interestingly, there is now a shift of 
attention towards the developed world, and more specifically towards the Euro 
area (see for instance Forbes and Warnock, 2012a).  
Along that line, this chapter investigates the importance of sovereign 
ratings in explaining episodes of extreme capital flow movements in the 
Eurozone, and especially sudden stop events.  Following the research findings 
of Chapter 4 my main interest is in exploring the implications of that part of 
sovereign ratings which reflects exaggerated reactions by Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs).  For the purposes of the current, I employ a Panel probit 
model with random effects for the baseline regressions.  My focus is on the 
original twelve countries of the Eurozone, on the time span 1999 to 2012 (in 
quarterly frequency) and on the long-term sovereign ratings provided by the 
three main CRAs (these include S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). 
Illustrated in a nutshell, my findings suggest that exaggerated 
fluctuations of sovereign ratings are indeed important in determining episodes 
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of sudden stops of capital flows in Eurozone, irrespectively of the CRA under 
consideration.  While the results appear to be consistent both for total and non-
FDI flows, it is in the case of the second where they become more conspicuous.  
Other than exhibiting consistency across regressions based on different sets of 
control variables, the results also satisfy a list of robustness checks.    
The chapter contributes to existing literature in a twofold way.  First, it is 
to the best of my knowledge the first work within the extreme capital flow 
literature that explicitly focuses on the economic and statistical significance of 
sovereign rating movements.  Given the influence of CRAs in European financial 
markets discussed earlier, there is a gap that the current study aims to fill.  
Moreover the affirmative evidence offered by the chapter adds to the political 
economy literature outlined in Chapter 2 that critically reflects on the role of 
CRAs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:  the next section reviews 
in detail the econometric literature on episodes of extreme capital flows.  
Following, section three outlines the relevant data and discusses in detail my 
approach in constructing the necessary binary variables.  The subsequent part 
presents the econometric methodology and my approach in capturing the 
effects of sovereign ratings.  This is followed by the results section which other 
than the baseline regressions also reports a number of robustness checks for 
my findings.  The last section concludes.   
All regressions of the chapter are based on the “StataSE 12” software.   
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5.2 Literature Review 
 
 There has been a voluminous econometric literature studying the 
occurrence of episodes of capital flow reversals and sudden stops.  This 
literature treats those episodes as something qualitatively different from 
continuous capital flow fluctuations.  Hence rather than employing a standard 
linear model that would amalgamate all kinds of capital flow movements, 
papers in this literature typically opt for binary response models.  Here the 
most common approach is to employ a panel probit model with random effects.  
An advantage of this approach is the fact that binary response models allow for 
non-linear effects, so that a certain variable can have a different impact at 
different levels of the response variable (also see the discussion on the 
Econometric Methodology section of the current chapter).  An obvious puzzle is 
how one goes on to define episodes of extreme capital flow movements.  In 
particular, it is easy to notice that any definition cannot but be arbitrary to an 
extent so that different definitions can give rise to different results.   
With the above being said, we can see that although there are several 
modifications, most of the papers presented below adopt a variant of the 
definition given by Calvo et al. (2004), as being one of the first and most 
cornerstone papers of that stream.  In particular, the basic version of their 
definition (Calvo et al., 2004: 14) flags a sudden stop as a ‘phase that meets the 
following conditions: 
 It contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital 
flows lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean (this 
addresses the “unexpected” requirement of a sudden stop). 
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 The sudden stop phase ends once the annual change in capital flows 
exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean. This will 
generally introduce persistence, a common fact of sudden stops. 
 Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start of a sudden stop phase is 
determined by the first time the annual change in capital flows falls one 
standard deviation below the mean.’  
At the empirical level, stressing the fact that sudden stops are mainly an 
emerging market phenomenon, Calvo and his colleagues point out trade 
openness and domestic liabilities denominated in US dollars as the two key 
factors explaining such episodes.  Furthermore, they link those variables with 
domestic fiscal and monetary policies, arguing that the deepest cause of such 
episodes comes from within rather than outside a country.  Following the 
approach taken in the Calvo et al. paper Broner and Rigobon (2005) show that 
capital flow volatility is associated with underdeveloped domestic financial 
markets, weak institutions and low income per capita of the recipient countries.  
Using a definition of sudden stops similar to that in Calvo et al., Frankel and 
Carvallo (2008) also investigate the importance of trade openness, claiming that 
a higher degree of international trade helps countries become less vulnerable to 
sudden stops.  Similarly, Edwards (2005) explores whether capital mobility 
augments the probability of crisis episodes.  Although he claims that evidence 
supports the absence of such a link, he writes that once a crisis has occurred 
more open countries are more likely to face a higher cost in terms of foregone 
economic growth.  Moreover in a more recent paper (Edwards, 2007) he states 
that even though there appears to be some significant effect of capital mobility 
upon crisis episodes, this is nonetheless very small.  Furthermore, Eichengreen 
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et al. (2006) assert that while sudden stops are fewer and less severe in 
countries under IMF intervention, the Fund’s programs do not seem to mitigate 
the negative output effects if an episode does indeed take place.   
Agosin and Huaita (2011), in turn, utilize a Minskyan conceptual 
framework to cast doubt on the results of Calvo et al..  They argue that it is not 
domestic factors but rather capital inflows themselves; when these are large 
compared with the size of the recipient country’s financial system, they 
constitute the most important explanatory variable behind crisis episodes.  In 
addition the authors show that the share of non-FDI flows and the size of the 
current account deficit are also important factors in explaining crises in 
emerging countries.   
 Coming to more recent literature, a number of authors have broadened 
their scope by including advanced countries into their analyses (see for instance 
Forbes and Warnock, 2012a, 2012b; Obstfeld, 2012; Lane, 2013).  This shift has 
underlined the need to focus on gross rather than net capital flows27.  As 
pointed out by Forbes and Warnock (2012a, 2012b), using gross flows makes it 
possible to differentiate the behaviour of domestic and foreign investors.  In 
that sense, Forbes and Warnock (2012b:4) identify four kinds of capital flow 
episodes, namely: 
 ““Surges”: a sharp increase in gross capital inflows; 
 “Stops”: a sharp decrease in gross capital inflows; 
 “Flight”: a sharp increase in gross capital outflows; and 
 “Retrenchment”: a sharp decrease in gross capital outflows”. 
                                            
27 Gross flows imply a separation between gross inflows and gross outflows of capital.     
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It becomes apparent that the two first kinds of episodes are driven by foreign 
investors, whereas the other two are related with domestic ones.  Moreover 
based on this distinction it becomes possible to identify episodes that would 
otherwise be missed, as for instance in the case wherein a “stop” is 
counterbalanced by a “retrenchment” occurring at the same time.  In this 
context, Lane (2013) points out the experience of Iceland arguing that domestic 
financial risks can be intensified even if capital inflows are fully recycled into 
capital outflows.   
 On the econometric front, by utilizing an innovative set of variables 
Forbes and Warnock (2011, 2012) show that global and contagion factors are 
more important than domestic variables (for more discussion on contagion 
effects also see Forbes, 2012).  Most importantly they point out that highly 
significant variables such as global risk (approximated by the authors by 
employing the Volatility Index (VXO) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange) 
can appear to be unimportant if regressions are based on net rather than gross 
flows.  Moreover they show that most of the extreme episodes of capital flow 
movements are associated with debt rather with equity flows.   
In contrast with the above scholars, Catao and Milesi-Ferretti (2013) find 
that it is the net external debt of a country that mostly matters, pointing out that 
distinguishing between gross assets and liabilities does not add much 
explanatory power in predicting crisis episodes.  At the same time they confirm 
the fact that most of such episodes are related with debt rather than equity 
flows.  Furthermore, Schmidt and Zwick (2013) provide a more detailed 
assessment of uncertainty’s impact on gross capital flows, by considering a 
number of different proxy variables.  Contrary to Forbes and Warnock, the 
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authors’ results suggest that domestic factors seem to play a more important 
role in explaining extreme capital flows.   
Lastly, there is a clear gap in this literature regarding sovereign ratings.  
Apart from Forbes and Warnock (2012a), who consider ratings as an additional 
control variable in their robustness checks, no one has attempted to explicitly 
investigate their potential significance in a panel probit context.   
 
5.3 Data Outline 
 
My panel consists of the twelve original countries of the Eurozone, and 
runs from 1999q1 and up to 2012q4 (quarterly frequency).  Throughout this 
era the composition of international capital flows across Eurozone countries 
consisted mainly of non-FDI flows.  Consider the contrast depicted in Figures 
5.1 to 5.3 between the total gross positions28 of FDI and portfolio investment 
stocks for an indicative set of countries, namely Greece, Germany and Ireland.  
In all three cases, portfolio investment has been the dominant sort of flow since 
the establishment of the Euro.  This development is particularly important in 
terms of macroeconomic stability due to the volatile and short-term nature of 
this kind of capital (for further discussion see Agosin and Huaita, 2011).   
Coming to the specification of the capital flow variables, following the 
most recent developments of the relevant literature (see above), I employ both 
net and gross flows.  In addition I distinguish between total and non-FDI flows, 
with the first including foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment 
and other investment, and the second consisting of portfolio and other  
                                            
28 Here, total gross position equals assets plus liabilities. 
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Figure 5.1.  Total Gross FDI and Portfolio Investment Positions for Greece (source: Eurostat, 
IMF IFS, and author's calculations) 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Total Gross FDI and Portfolio Investment Positions for Germany (source: 
Eurostat, IMF IFS, and author's calculations) 
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Figure 5.3.  Total Gross FDI and Portfolio Investment Positions for Ireland (source: 
Eurostat, IMF IFS, and author's calculations) 
 
investment only29.  Taken in conjunction, my approach gives rise to six different 
series of flows, namely net total flows, net non-FDI flows, total inflows, total 
outflows, non-FDI inflows and non-FDI outflows (see the Appendix for more 
details).    
In order to construct the binary variables necessary for the probit model, 
I follow closely the approach developed by Forbes and Warnock (2012a; 
2012b).  More specifically, I take the 4-quarter moving sums for each of the 
above series of capital flows (𝐹𝑡 = ∑ 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡−𝑖
3
𝑖=0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 =
1999𝑞1, 1999𝑞2,… 2012𝑞4), and then compute the year-over-year changes 
(𝛥𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡−4 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2000𝑞1, 2000𝑞2, …2012𝑞4).  Following this, I derive 
moving averages and standard deviations, using a 5 year window (this is  
                                            
29 Foreign Reserves are not taken into account since my focus is on the dynamics of the private 
sector.  
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Table 5.1. Summary Statistics of year over year changes of (moving sums) 
of Capital Flows 
  Full Sample (1999q1- 2012q4)     
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Net Total Flows 598 1119.84 27302.72 -136115.00 215642.00 
Total Inflows 598 -3645.35 116810.20 -709282.00 444119.00 
Total Outflows 592 -4288.77 118176.40 -718749.00 424577.00 
Non-FDI Inflows 598 -4945.62 108832.00 -655478.00 413390.00 
Non-FDI Outflows 598 -5115.55 107046.60 -606145.00 386519.00 
Net non-FDI Flows 598 131.67 36783.35 -141648.00 167207.00 
            
  Pre-Crisis Sub-Sample (1999q1- 2008q3)   
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Net Total Flows 394 2096.40 23514.87 -91721.00 215642.00 
Total Inflows 394 10948.80 75910.38 -264983.00 282216.00 
Total Outflows 388 8965.79 73439.33 -301024.00 296264.00 
Non-FDI Inflows 394 7881.20 71764.93 -283221.00 244747.00 
Non-FDI Outflows 394 4904.62 65747.70 -368820.00 246734.00 
Net non-FDI Flows 394 2972.59 32619.05 -141648.00 141734.00 
            
  Post-Crisis Sub-Sample (2008q4- 2012q4)   
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Net Total Flows 204 -766.25 33411.64 -136115.00 150354.00 
Total Inflows 204 -31832.10 166612.60 -709282.00 444119.00 
Total Outflows 204 -29498.40 171471.10 -718749.00 424577.00 
Non-FDI Inflows 204 -29719.00 154681.50 -655478.00 413390.00 
Non-FDI Outflows 204 -24468.20 157351.80 -606145.00 386519.00 
Net non-FDI Flows 204 -5355.20 43281.37 -139954.00 167207.00 
Source: Eurostat and author's calculations 
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Figure 5.4.  Year over Year change in Net Total Capital Flows for Greece (source: Eurostat, 
IMF IFS, and author’s calculations) 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Year over Year change in Net Total Capital Flows for Spain (source: Eurostat, 
IMF IFS, and author’s calculations) 
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equivalent with 20 quarters, so that my computations employ 19 lags and the 
current value for each statistic). 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for each of the six series 
constructed for the full sample as well as for two sub-samples based on the split 
between the pre and post crisis era (the cut-off point used here is the third 
quarter of 2008).  In addition, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 give an idea of the 
fluctuations of the year-over-year changes in net total flows (labelled as 
‘DTOTALNET’) for Greece and Spain.  
Given the above, I now move to the construction of the binary variables.  
In principle, other than following the guidelines established in relevant 
literature (see for instance Calvo et al., 2004; Forbes and Warnock, 2012a; 
2012b), the idea is to construct those variables based on simple rules.  More 
specifically, given the separation between gross inflows and gross outflows, and 
the consequent distinction between four kinds of episodes (surges, sudden 
stops, flight, and retrenchment; also see above), the binary variables are based 
on the following rules: 
 
Sud. Stop or Retrenchment=
{
 
 
 
 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖) 𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑡 < 𝛥𝐹𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝜎𝛥𝐹𝑖;   𝑖𝑖) 𝑖𝑓𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑡 < 𝛥𝐹𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ − 2𝜎𝛥𝐹𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 
𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 1𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 2 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 
 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Surge or Flight= 
{
 
 
 
 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖) 𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑡 > 𝛥𝐹𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜎𝛥𝐹𝑖 ;  𝑖𝑖)  𝑖𝑓𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑡 > 𝛥𝐹𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ + 2𝜎𝛥𝐹𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 1𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 2 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 
 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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where 𝛥𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the year-over-year change of the flow under consideration (based 
on the moving sums of the quarterly observations) for the country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 
and 𝛥𝐹𝑖̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝜎𝛥𝐹𝑖are the 5 years moving average and standard deviation values 
respectively.  Also note that in the case of outflows I have reversed the Balance 
of Payments accounting signs by multiplying all figures with -1 (so that an 
outflow of domestic capital appears with a plus rather than a minus).  Given the 
above definitions, I derive twelve different binary variables, whose summary 
statistics are illustrated in Table 5.2.  The Appendix of the chapter reports the 
precise starting and ending point of each kind of episode per country.    As can 
be seen, there are significantly fewer episodes recorded when net flows are 
used, while in the case of gross flows the biggest amount of episodes is recorded 
for sudden stop and retrenchment events.  For instance episodes of sudden 
stops of net total flows cover approximately 10% of the observations of the 
sample, whereas sudden stops of gross total inflows round up to about 15%.   
 Regarding the right hand variables, my focus is on testing the economic 
and statistical significance of the long term sovereign ratings provided by the 
three main CRAs (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch).  Due the 
alphabetical ordering of those scores, a standard approach in empirical studies 
is to convert them into a certain arithmetical scale.  In my case, following the 
methodology developed in Chapter 4, I convert ratings into a 1 to 17 scale.  As 
with before, 17 corresponds to AAA, 16 translates into AA+ and so on, while all 
credit scores below B- are given the score 1.  In addition I utilize the credit 
outlook and watch scores provided by the three CRAs by turning them into 0.25 
and 0.5 points.   
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Table 5.2. Summary Statistics of Binary Variables 
Variable         Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    
SSTNETm 588 0.10 0.30 
SURGENETm 588 0.07 0.26 
SSNFNETm 588 0.09 0.29 
SURGENFNETm 588 0.10 0.30 
SSTINm 588 0.15 0.36 
    
SURGETINm 588 0.09 0.28 
FLTOUTm 588 0.09 0.29 
RTTOUTm 588 0.14 0.35 
SSNFINm 588 0.15 0.36 
SURGENFINm 588 0.10 0.30 
    
FLNFOUTm 588 0.08 0.27 
RTNFOUTm 588 0.17 0.37 
Notes: SSTNETm and SSNFNETm denote Sudden Stop episodes based on Net Total and non-FDI flows 
respectively, SSTINm and SSNFINm denote Sudden Stop episodes for gross Total and non-FDI inflows, 
SURGETNETm and SURGENFNETm stand for Surge episodes of Net Total and non-FDI flows, SURGETINm and 
SURGENFINm denote Surge episodes for gross Total and non-FDI inflows, FLTOUTm and FLNFOUTm stand 
for Flight episodes of gross Total and non-FDI outflows, and RTTOUTm and RTNFOUTm stand for 
Retrenchment episodes of gross Total and non-FDI outflows; source: Eurostat and author's calculations 
Source: Eurostat and author’s elaboration 
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Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income 672 29.53 13.26 10.55 82.3 
Real GDP Growth 660 0.4 0.71 -2.23 2.49 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 660 0.18 1.21 -6.97 7.35 
Inflation (divergence from Eurozone average) 660 0.16 0.13 0 0.84 
Interest Rate Spread  
672 0.42 2.42 -2.01 23.58 
(based on the US long term rate) 
External Balance 660 0.05 5.94 -15.53 14.85 
External Debt 648 368.34 159.36 143.94 889.83 
Non-FDI share of Total Inflows 635 0.77 0.27 0 1 
Trade Openness 660 172.96 216.98 49.47 1072.91 
Foreign Reserves 660 9.67 7.67 -0.03 61.31 
Fiscal Balance 672 -2.51 4.33 -27.65 6.75 
Public Debt 624 67.35 31.82 5.42 174.41 
Credit Growth 652 1.88 2.07 -3.25 13.01 
Velocity 664 1.06 0.42 0.14 2.15 
Economic Sentiment Indicator 616 100.37 10.04 68.5 118.6 
              
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 VIX 672 21.86 8.19 11.39 44.14 
US long term interest rate 672 4.14 1.14 1.64 6.48 
G7 GDP growth 672 1.7 1.56 -3.39 3.68 
Sources: Eurostat, IMF IFS, CBOE 
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Table 5.4.  Correlation Matrix of Control Variables 
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Per Capita 
Income 
1.00                                   
Real GDP 
Growth 
0.08 1.00                                 
REER 0.08 0.10 1.00                               
Inflation  -0.09 -0.02 0.00 1.00                             
Interest Rate 
Spread  
-0.17 -0.54 -0.27 0.10 1.00                           
External 
Balance 
0.66 0.22 0.04 -0.12 -0.23 1.00                         
External Debt 
0.30 -0.28 -0.12 0.14 0.36 -0.30 1.00                       
Share of non-
FDI flows 
-0.21 0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.19 0.03 1.00                     
Trade 
Openness 
0.93 0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.48 0.47 -0.19 1.00                   
Foreign 
Reserves 
-0.54 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.12 -0.27 -0.27 0.12 -0.52 1.00                 
Fiscal Balance 0.39 0.40 0.15 0.00 -0.38 0.57 -0.46 -0.07 0.32 -0.11 1.00               
Public Debt -0.57 -0.32 -0.15 -0.05 0.49 -0.46 0.01 0.09 -0.56 0.30 -0.59 1.00             
Credit Growth 0.03 0.40 0.14 0.23 -0.36 -0.13 0.04 0.17 0.12 -0.13 0.32 -0.25 1.00           
Velocity -0.55 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.55 0.17 -0.65 0.50 0.17 0.28 0.08 1.00         
ESI -0.03 0.74 0.07 -0.03 -0.47 0.09 -0.34 0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.40 -0.19 0.44 0.25 1.00       
VIX 
-0.01 -0.49 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 -0.10 0.01 -0.22 -0.05 -0.42 1.00     
US long term 
interest rate 
-0.21 0.50 0.10 0.16 -0.45 -0.01 -0.31 0.15 -0.10 0.07 0.38 -0.23 0.48 0.33 0.60 -0.18 1.00   
G7 GDP 
growth 
-0.09 0.61 -0.13 0.03 -0.14 0.09 -0.22 0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.26 -0.03 0.28 0.19 0.62 -0.53 0.35 1.00 
Sources: Eurostat, IMF IFS, CBOE and author’s calculations
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Other than sovereign ratings, I also control for those domestic and global 
factors that are usually employed in relevant literature (see for instance Agosin 
and Huaita, 2011; Forbes and Warnock, 2012a; Schmidt and Zwick, 2013).  
More precisely, the list of domestic variables includes per capita income, real 
GDP growth, real effective exchange rate (REER), inflation (measured in terms 
of divergence from the Eurozone average inflation at each point of time), 
interest rate spread (using the long term US interest rate as the basis so as to 
include Germany as well), external balance, gross external debt (measured over 
total exports), the share of non-FDI inflows, trade openness, foreign reserves 
(measured as a ratio of imports), fiscal balance, public debt, credit growth, 
velocity of money, and the economic sentiment indicator (ESI) provided by 
Eurostat.  Out of the global variables I have included the VIX volatility index as 
published by the Chicago Board of Exchange, the average G7 GDP growth rate, 
and the US long term interest rate.  Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report the summary 
statistics and the correlation matrix of the relevant variables.  The precise 
configuration behind each measurement is outlined in the Appendix of the 
current chapter, as are all data resources. 
 
5.4 Econometric Methodology 
 
 The estimation method deployed here, a panel probit model with 
random effects, has been widely used in recent relevant literature.  Illustrated in 
a nutshell (based on Wooldridge, 2002), the panel probit is a special form of the 
binary response model and takes the form  
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Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1| 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑐𝑖) = 𝛷(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖),   𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑇 (5.1) 
 
where 𝛷 ⋲ [0, 1] is the cumulative density function (cdf) of the normal 
distribution30, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the binary variable of interest, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the set of right hand 
variables, and 𝑐𝑖 is the unobserved country specific effect.  In principle, the main 
idea in binary response models is to constrain the possible outcomes of the 
model between zero and one without restricting the range of the right hand 
variables (which would be the case if I wanted to estimate a probability based 
on the standard linear model), and to allow for the regressors to exhibit non-
linear effects upon the response probability.  In terms of interpretation, it is 
important to note that the partial effect of a certain (continuous) explanatory 
variable (let’s call it 𝑥𝑗) is not simply given by the respective coefficient 𝛽𝑗 , but 
rather by the interactive term 𝜑(𝑥𝛽) ∗ 𝛽𝑗 , where 𝜑(𝑥𝛽) is the first derivative of 
𝛷.  Hence it can be easily seen that the partial effect of 𝑥𝑗  depends on the values 
of the rest of the right hand variables as well.  The model is estimated using the 
Maximum Likelihood method.   
 Coming to the estimation strategy, my goal is to measure the importance 
of sovereign ratings in explaining episodes of capital flow reversals.  For a 
starter, Table 5.5 below shows that ratings are indeed not irrelevant in 
explaining episodes of sudden stops.  Moreover all rating variables appear with 
a minus, which is in accordance with what we would expect (a higher rating 
should correspond to a lower probability of a sudden stop).      
                                            
30 Other transformational forms of the 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖  data into the [0,1] interval have also been 
considered in relevant literature.  Most notably, some of the most recent papers (Forbes and 
Warnock, 2012a; 2012b; Schmidt and Zwick, 2013) use a complementary logarithmic (or 
cloglog) framework which assumes an extreme value distribution so that it is thought to be 
more suitable for episodes of capital flow reversals.  In this chapter the utilization of this sort of 
transformation is left as a robustness check of the main results.   
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An obvious check of robustness here would be to see how well the 
ratings behave when they are included into a broader macroeconomic model, 
controlling for the domestic and global factors outlined earlier.  Note however 
that this raises a fundamental estimation issue: how we can put sovereign 
ratings together with domestic macroeconomic factors at the right hand of the 
equation.  This problem arises because sovereign ratings are by construction 
measurements that, to a great extent reflect the macroeconomic environment of 
a country at a certain point of time; thus putting them together with 
macroeconomic variables would create a serious issue of multicollinearity.  
Nonetheless, as argued in Chapter 4, sovereign ratings do not only reflect 
the macroeconomic conditions of a state; they also include feelings of euphoria 
and panic.  At the econometric level, I showed in the previous chapter that one 
way to approximate such feelings is by regressing sovereign ratings to the 
macroeconomic variables they are supposed to reflect and then store the 
residuals of the model.  It is those residuals that capture that portion of the 
ratings that cannot be explained by a purely technical analysis of the 
macroeconomy, and which therefore link with the exaggerated feelings of 
euphoria and panic from the side of CRAs.  Even more, it is this part of sovereign 
ratings whose importance and implications for capital flows I am interested in 
exploring.  Hence I opt for the following methodology:  
 I first regress sovereign ratings on the set of the most important 
macroeconomic variables, using the Fixed Effects ‘Specific Model’ 
developed in Chapter 4.  Table 5.6 summarizes the results, while Figure 
5.6 below illustrates the residuals of S&P sovereign ratings for a 
selection of EMU countries.  A positive (negative) residual implies a 
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rating score that is higher (lower) from what macroeconomic variables 
would justify, which as such can be attributed to a feeling of euphoria 
(panic) from the side of the related CRA.  
 I keep the residuals of the model for each rating agency, and plug them 
(separately) in the probit model as an additional explanatory variable 
along with all other domestic and global variables reported above.  As it 
can be seen from Table 5.7, the levels of correlation between the ratings 
and the rest of the explanatory variables are significantly reduced when 
the residuals are considered for each agency instead of their actual 
ratings.   
 I control for excessive multicollinearity by dropping the macroeconomic 
variables that still exhibit significant correlations between them (see 
Table 5.4) and repeat my estimations. 
With the multicollinearity noise being brought to a minimum, there can 
now be some confidence about the clarity of inference.  In the overall, I run each 
model separately for each credit rating agency.  I also repeat the regressions by 
replacing the individual ratings with the additive scores of the three CRAs so as 
to see if there is any extra significance arising when these are taken together 
(the hypothesis here would be that if a country is downgraded by all agencies at 
the same time, the overall downgrade’s effect could be greater than the sum of 
the isolated effects).  Furthermore, I repeat the above process for all twelve 
binary variables I constructed earlier.  Throughout all the specifications I 
introduce all the rating and control variables with a lag so as to tackle the issue  
of endogeneity.  
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Table 5.5.  Basic Regressions based on Actual Ratings and Net Flows 
 S&P Moody's Fitch 
 SSTNETm SSNFNETm SSTNETm SSNFNETm SSTNETm SSNFNETm 
Rating -0.099*** -0.112**  -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.113**  
 (-2.68) (-2.37)    (-3.11) (-2.62)    (-2.72) (-2.45)    
VIX 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.05) (-1.27)    (0.04) (-1.31)    (0.00) (-1.29)    
US interest rate 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 
 (0.45) (0.53) (0.63) (0.6) (0.31) (0.43) 
G7 GDP growth -0.158*** -0.257*** -0.177*** -0.270*** -0.164*** -0.262*** 
 (-3.06) (-4.66)    (-3.32) (-4.78)    (-3.13) (-4.71)    
constant 0.22 0.62 0.34 0.57 0.36 0.73 
 (0.41) (1.01) (0.64) (0.99) (0.65) (1.15) 
N 588 588 588 588 588 588 
sigma_u 0.23 0.55 0.24 0.54 0.23 0.54 
rho 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; 
SSTNETm and SSNFNETm stand for episodes of Sudden Stops in net Total and non-FDI flows respectively; 
regressions are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right 
hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.6.  Fixed Effects Panel Data Model for Sovereign Ratings 
 S&P Moody's Fitch 
Real GDP Growth 0.546*** 0.467** 0.391**  
 (3.29) (2.89) (2.92) 
Inflation -0.875*** -1.337** -0.809*   
 (-3.61) (-3.04) (-2.11)    
Fiscal Balance -0.132*** -0.169*** -0.132**  
 (-3.79) (-3.41) (-2.54)    
Public Debt -0.090*** -0.100*** -0.082*** 
 (-7.31) (-8.52) (-7.68)    
Unemployment -0.302*** -0.376*** -0.317*** 
 (-6.44) (-5.35) (-5.00)    
Trade Openness 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.91) (4.38) (5.07) 
Constant 22.840*** 24.449*** 22.623*** 
 (38.47) (33.31) (41.52) 
    
N 604 604 604 
rho 0.939 0.934 0.931 
r2_overall 0.477 0.426 0.46 
r2_between 0.404 0.373 0.397 
r2_within 0.837 0.811 0.812 
Notes: The above regressions are a replication of what is labelled as 'Specific Model' in Chapter 4; the 
(numerical equivalent) of the agency’s sovereign rating is on the left hand of the regression; fixed effects and 
robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors are used; xtreg routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the 
Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote 
significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Figure 5.6. Standard and Poor's Residuals for selected EMU countries (source: S&P’s website and author’s elaboration)  
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Table 5.7.  Ratings and Ratings' Residuals Correlation Pairs 
  Actual Ratings Residual Ratings 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
Sum of the 3 Rating  
Scores 
S&P Moody's  Fitch  
Sum of the 3 Rating 
Scores  
Per Capita Income 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.36 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Real GDP Growth 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.08 
Inflation (divergence from Eurozone average) -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.11 
Interest Rate Spread (based on the US long term rate) -0.8 -0.84 -0.8 -0.82 -0.34 -0.26 -0.31 -0.32 
External Balance 0.52 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.03 0 -0.02 0 
External Debt -0.47 -0.42 -0.44 -0.45 -0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Non-FDI share of Total Inflows -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Trade Openness 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Foreign Reserves -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.19 0 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
Fiscal Balance 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.01 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 
Public Debt -0.71 -0.67 -0.71 -0.7 -0.04 0.01 0 -0.01 
Credit Growth 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Velocity 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0 0.02 
Economic Sentiment Indicator 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
VIX 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.06 0.07 
US long term interest rate 0.31 0.3 0.27 0.29 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 
G7 GDP growth 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
Source: Eurostat, IMF, CBOE, CRAs' websites and author's elaboration 
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Table 5.8.  Models for Sudden Stops based on net Total Flows 
  S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating -0.161* -0.03 -0.09 -0.204** -0.288** -0.165*   -0.187* -0.220* -0.15 -0.076** -0.079* -0.06 
  (-1.67) (-0.27) (-0.84)    (-2.47) (-2.45) (-1.80)    (-1.96) (-1.69) (-1.35)    (-2.27) (-1.71) (-1.52)    
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.14) (0.87) (0.16)    (0.07) (0.98) (0.33)    (0.01) (0.94) (0.23)    (0.05) (0.96) (0.22)    
US interest rate -0.06 0.761***                 -0.07 0.710**                 -0.07 0.716**                 -0.06 0.691**                 
 (-0.75) (2.66)                 (-0.84) (-2.49)                 (-0.92) (2.55)                 (-0.77) (2.47)                 
G7 GDP growth -0.132*** 0.00 -0.07 -0.145*** 0.00 -0.07 -0.138*** 0.00 -0.07 -0.141*** -0.01 -0.07 
 (-2.61) (0.01) (-1.04)    (-2.82) (0.01) (-1.08)    (-2.71) (0.04) (-1.03)    (-2.76) (-0.06) (-1.03)    
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  0.105*                  0.093*                  0.094*                  0.09                 
  (1.83)                  (1.7)                  (1.72)                  (1.61)                 
GDP Growth  -0.18 -0.419**   -0.20 -0.457***  -0.22 -0.443**   -0.21 -0.448**  
  (-0.65) (-2.40)     (-0.72) (-2.58)     (-0.79) (-2.51)     (-0.76) (-2.54)    
REER  -0.11 -0.179**   -0.11 -0.185***  -0.11 -0.180**   -0.11 -0.181**  
  (-1.41) (-2.51)     (-1.40) (-2.59)     (-1.38) (-2.52)     (-1.43) (-2.54)    
Inflation  -2.491** -1.885***  -2.538** -1.861***  -2.715*** -1.991***  -2.591*** -1.923*** 
  (-2.51) (-2.79)     (-2.49) (-2.73)     (-2.70) (-2.90)     (-2.60) (-2.82)    
US spread  0.10 0.02  0.04 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.05 0.01 
  (1.53) (0.6)  (0.56) (0.18)  (0.87) (0.34)  (0.75) (0.21) 
Exterbal Balance  0.086** 0.039**   0.106** 0.037**   0.095** 0.037**   0.098** 0.037**  
  (1.99) (2.11)  (2.3) (1.98)  (2.16) (1.99)  (2.21) (2.02) 
External Debt  0.004**                  0.005**                  0.005**                  0.005**                 
  (2.16)                  (2.49)                  (2.33)                  (2.35)                 
Share of Non-FDI  -0.524* -0.29  -0.583* -0.29  -0.552* -0.28  -0.575* -0.29 
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  (-1.65) (-1.07)     (-1.83) (-1.07)     (-1.75) (-1.04)     (-1.81) (-1.10)    
Openness  -0.009**                  -0.009**                  -0.008**                  -0.008**                 
  (-2.28)                  (-2.37)                  (-2.30)                  (-2.21)                 
Reserves  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01 
  (0.66) (0.82)  (0.6) (0.8)  (0.72) (0.73)  (0.68) (0.79) 
Fiscal Balance  -0.07 -0.071**   -0.07 -0.072**   -0.07 -0.073***  -0.07 -0.073*** 
  (-1.11) (-2.52)     (-1.12) (-2.56)     (-1.19) (-2.59)     (-1.13) (-2.59)    
Public Debt  0.01                  0.01                  0.01                  0.01                 
  (0.82)                  (1.1)                  (0.92)                  (0.97)                 
Credit Growth  0.122* 0.161***  0.114* 0.161***  0.114* 0.161***  0.114* 0.160*** 
  (1.92) (3.29)  (1.76) (3.27)  (1.79) (3.28)  (1.78) (3.26) 
Velocity  -0.98                  -1.03                  -0.93                  -0.87                 
  (-1.48)                  (-1.56)                  (-1.47)                  (-1.39)                 
ESI  -0.01                  -0.01                  -0.01                  -0.01                 
  (-0.59)                  (-0.39)                  (-0.46)                  (-0.41)                 
Constant -0.920** -6.250*** -1.199*** -0.844** -6.540*** -1.147*** -0.837** -6.301*** -1.158*** -0.889** -6.236*** -1.164*** 
 (2.21) (2.65) (2.92)    (2.05) (2.70) (2.77)    (2.04) (2.65) (2.81)    (2.15) (2.63) (2.82)    
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.16 0.57 0.00 0.17 0.61 0.00 0.16 0.55 0.00 0.16 0.55 0.00 
 rho 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.00 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively  
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Table 5.9.  Models for Sudden Stops based on net non-FDI Flows 
  S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating -0.377*** -0.16 -0.349**  -0.285*** -0.18 -0.186*   -0.329*** -0.11 -0.239*   -0.129*** -0.06 -0.100**  
  (-3.33) (-0.78) (-2.57)    (-3.19) (-0.97) (-1.80)    (-3.11) (-0.57) (-1.88)    (-3.48) (-0.87) (-2.26)    
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 (-1.40) (-0.77) (0.21) (-1.51) (-0.63) (0.03) (-1.48) (-0.73) (0.12) (-1.45) (-0.67) (0.13) 
US interest rate -0.05 1.720***                 -0.05 1.757***                 -0.06 1.731***                 -0.05 1.738***                 
 (-0.51) (3.59)                 (-0.59) (3.67)                 (-0.71) (3.59)                 (-0.49) (3.63)                 
G7 GDP growth -0.255*** -0.496*** -0.451*** -0.257*** -0.464** -0.447*** -0.258*** -0.483** -0.451*** -0.263*** -0.477** -0.453*** 
 (-4.57) (-2.65) (-5.25)    (-4.58) (-2.47) (-5.25)    (-4.61) (-2.57) (-5.28)    (-4.64) (-2.55) (-5.26)    
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  -0.10                  -0.10                  -0.09                  -0.10                 
  (-0.66)                  (-0.60)                  (-0.54)                  (-0.60)                 
GDP Growth  2.424*** 1.045***  2.285*** 1.035***  2.417*** 1.049***  2.345*** 1.041*** 
  (3.28) (3.71)  (3.02) (3.70)  (3.25) (3.76)  (3.12) (3.71) 
REER  0.09 0.14  0.10 0.11  0.09 0.11  0.10 0.12 
  (0.58) (1.29)  (0.65) (1.09)  (0.57) (1.10)  (0.62) (1.15) 
Inflation  -3.850* -1.760*    -3.874* -1.604*    -3.874* -1.758*    -3.898* -1.685*   
  (-1.86) (-1.83)     (-1.86) (-1.69)     (-1.84) (-1.85)     (-1.87) (-1.77)    
US spread  1.214*** 0.170***  1.150*** 0.182***  1.225*** 0.177***  1.182*** 0.170*** 
  (3.72) (3.15)  (3.48) (3.46)  (3.76) (3.33)  (3.58) (3.19) 
Exterbal Balance  0.160* 0.03  0.168* 0.02  0.164* 0.02  0.162* 0.02 
  (1.77) (0.7)  (1.86) (0.38)  (1.81) (0.36)  (1.80) (0.48) 
External Debt  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (0.21)                  (0.10)                  (0.22)                  (0.14)                 
Share of Non-FDI  -0.08 -0.16  -0.08 -0.11  -0.05 -0.11  -0.07 -0.12 
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  (-0.16) (-0.46)     (-0.16) (-0.32)     (-0.10) (-0.34)     (-0.15) (-0.34)    
Openness  0.01                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (0.36)                  (0.31)                  (0.28)                  (0.31)                 
Reserves  -0.04 -0.01  -0.04 -0.01  -0.04 -0.01  -0.04 -0.01 
  (-0.68) (-0.25)     (-0.61) (-0.22)     (-0.61) (-0.22)     (-0.59) (-0.20)    
Fiscal Balance  -0.271** 0.05  -0.253** 0.06  -0.270** 0.05  -0.264** 0.05 
  (-2.32) (1.2)  (-2.18) (1.37)  (-2.33) (1.26)  (-2.28) (1.31) 
Public Debt  -0.140***                  -0.134***                  -0.144***                  -0.137***                 
  (-3.01)                  (-2.84)                  (-3.10)                  (-2.92)                 
Credit Growth  -0.396** -0.223**   -0.402** -0.201*    -0.391** -0.204*    -0.397** -0.210**  
  (-2.20) (-2.05)     (-2.23) (-1.89)     (-2.19) (-1.92)     (-2.22) (-1.97)    
Velocity  -5.420***                  -5.719***                  -5.590***                  -5.504***                 
  (-3.20)                  (-3.45)                  (-3.35)                  (-3.30)                 
ESI  -0.067**                  -0.064**                  -0.067**                  -0.065**                 
  (-2.23)                  (-2.12)                  (-2.20)                  (-2.15)                 
Constant -0.64 13.727** -0.74 -0.58 12.936* -0.74 -0.55 13.708* -0.74 -0.63 12.974* -0.75 
 (-1.33) (1.96) (-1.23)    (-1.23) (1.8) (-1.25)    (-1.16) (1.91) (-1.26)    (-1.31) (1.81) (-1.26)    
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.45 6.72 0.78 0.46 6.61 0.72 0.47 6.79 0.72 0.47 6.64 0.74 
 rho 0.17 0.98 0.38 0.18 0.98 0.34 0.18 0.98 0.34 0.18 0.98 0.35 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.10.  Models for Sudden Stops based on gross Total Inflows 
  S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating -0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.29 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 
  (-0.65) (-0.40) (0.52) (-0.82) (-0.44) (0.01) (-0.67) (-1.32) (0.25) (-0.79) (-0.85) (0.27) 
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX 0.039*** 0.00 0.01 0.039*** 0.00 0.01 0.039*** 0.00 0.01 0.039*** 0.00 0.01 
 (4.44) (0.04) (1.17) (4.39) (0.01) (1.21) (4.41) (0.08) (1.19) (4.42) (0.01) (1.19) 
US interest rate 0.250*** 0.710**  0.244*** 0.713**  0.244*** 0.625**  0.246*** 0.647**  
 (3.01) (2.29)  (2.96) (2.34)  (2.95) (2.04)  (2.98) (2.06)  
G7 GDP growth -0.186*** -0.10 -0.03 -0.186*** -0.10 -0.02 -0.186*** -0.13 -0.03 -0.187*** -0.12 -0.03 
 (-3.89) (-0.94) (-0.37) (-3.90) (-0.93) (-0.34) (-3.89) (-1.17) (-0.35) (-3.90) (-1.06) (-0.35) 
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  0.14   0.13   0.08   0.10  
  (1.00)   (0.90)   (0.54)   (0.68)  
GDP Growth  -2.703*** -1.313***  -2.692*** -1.313***  -2.767*** -1.317***  -2.734*** -1.317*** 
  (-4.86) (-6.07)  (-4.88) (-6.05)  (-4.97) (-6.07)  (-4.91) (-6.07) 
REER  0.13 0.01  0.13 0.01  0.14 0.01  0.13 0.01 
  (1.27) (0.14)  (1.26) (0.16)  (1.31) (0.16)  (1.27) (0.16) 
Inflation  -2.633** -0.39  -2.572** -0.40  -2.749** -0.39  -2.583** -0.40 
  (-2.28) (-0.58)  (-2.20) (-0.59)  (-2.38) (-0.57)  (-2.24) (-0.59) 
US spread  0.13 -0.07  0.13 -0.09  0.07 -0.08  0.09 -0.08 
  (1.16) (-1.27)  (1.09) (-1.55)  (0.52) (-1.44)  (0.68) (-1.40) 
Exterbal Balance  -0.230*** -0.074***  -0.227*** -0.071***  -0.223*** -0.072***  -0.222*** -0.072*** 
  (-3.34) (-2.64)  (-3.28) (-2.61)  (-3.27) (-2.64)  (-3.22) (-2.62) 
External Debt  0.029***   0.029***   0.031***   0.030***  
  (4.64)   (4.65)   (4.74)   (4.68)  
Share of Non-FDI  -1.053** -0.46  -1.048** -0.47  -1.133** -0.47  -1.099** -0.47 
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  (-2.42) (-1.53)  (-2.42) (-1.58)  (-2.55) (-1.57)  (-2.49) (-1.57) 
Openness  0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01  
  (0.75)   (0.78)   (1.07)   (0.93)  
Reserves  0.181*** 0.035*  0.179*** 0.034*  0.172*** 0.035*  0.174*** 0.035* 
  (3.91) (1.71)  (3.82) (1.65)  (3.69) (1.69)  (3.73) (1.69) 
Fiscal Balance  0.234*** 0.121***  0.233*** 0.119***  0.242*** 0.121***  0.241*** 0.121*** 
  (2.96) (3.34)  (2.98) (3.28)  (3.04) (3.29)  (3.02) (3.30) 
Public Debt  0.02   0.02   0.03   0.02  
  (0.89)   (0.97)   (1.13)   (1.03)  
Credit Growth  0.20 0.123**  0.20 0.117*  0.18 0.120*  0.19 0.120* 
  (1.55) (1.98)  (1.59) (1.91)  (1.44) (1.94)  (1.49) (1.94) 
Velocity  10.082***   9.987***   10.504***   10.247***  
  (3.87)   (3.88)   (4.06)   (3.96)  
ESI  0.02   0.02   0.03   0.03  
  (0.94)   (0.96)   (1.24)   (1.10)  
Constant -2.745*** -35.058*** -0.996** -2.709*** -35.175*** -0.969** -2.714*** -35.929*** -0.977** -2.721*** -35.185*** -0.980** 
 (-6.39) (-3.69) (-2.11) (-6.33) (-3.71) (-2.07) (-6.33) (-3.80) (-2.08) (-6.36) (-3.74) (-2.09) 
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.22 6.13 0.52 0.22 6.20 0.50 0.22 6.53 0.51 0.22 6.31 0.51 
 rho 0.05 0.97 0.21 0.05 0.98 0.20 0.05 0.98 0.21 0.05 0.98 0.21 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.11.  Models for Sudden Stops based on gross non-FDI Inflows 
  S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating -0.216** -0.20 -0.207*   -0.172** -0.474*** -0.212**  -0.189** -0.468*** -0.229*   -0.077** -0.171*** -0.090**  
  (-2.17) (-1.36) (-1.71)    (-2.19) (-3.01) (-2.11)    (-2.04) (-2.74) (-1.94)    (-2.35) (-2.70) (-2.14)    
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX 0.036*** 0.02 0.023**  0.035*** 0.02 0.023**  0.035*** 0.02 0.023**  0.036*** 0.02 0.023**  
 (4.03) (1.35) (2.04) (3.90) (1.31) (2.00) (3.93) (1.38) (2.07) (3.95) (1.36) (2.04) 
US interest rate 0.06 0.529***                 0.05 0.417**                 0.05 0.457**                 0.05 0.429**                 
 (0.73) (2.84)                 (0.59) (2.14)                 (0.55) (2.36)                 (0.63) (2.19)                 
G7 GDP growth -0.249*** -0.05 -0.157**  -0.248*** -0.05 -0.163**  -0.247*** -0.05 -0.159**  -0.251*** -0.06 -0.160**  
 (-5.22) (-0.63) (-2.38)    (-5.20) (-0.59) (-2.46)    (-5.19) (-0.55) (-2.40)    (-5.23) (-0.65) (-2.41)    
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  0.083*                  0.087*                  0.085*                  0.08                 
  (1.80)                  (1.75)                  (1.69)                  (1.59)                 
GDP Growth  -1.265*** -0.908***  -1.423*** -0.881***  -1.373*** -0.883***  -1.397*** -0.900*** 
  (-4.49) (-4.53)     (-4.55) (-4.49)     (-4.58) (-4.48)     (-4.60) (-4.53)    
REER  -0.03 -0.04  -0.08 -0.05  -0.06 -0.05  -0.07 -0.05 
  (-0.33) (-0.54)     (-0.79) (-0.71)     (-0.65) (-0.66)     (-0.68) (-0.66)    
Inflation  -3.417*** -0.60  -3.505*** -0.46  -3.826*** -0.66  -3.631*** -0.57 
  (-3.53) (-0.93)     (-3.39) (-0.70)     (-3.71) (-1.02)     (-3.55) (-0.87)    
US spread  -0.10 -0.04  -0.220** -0.04  -0.184* -0.04  -0.211** -0.05 
  (-1.16) (-0.85)     (-2.15) (-0.88)     (-1.94) (-0.88)     (-2.05) (-1.03)    
Exterbal Balance  0.00 -0.03  0.01 -0.03  0.00 -0.03  0.01 -0.03 
  (0.08) (-1.22)     (0.16) (-1.38)     (0.08) (-1.38)     (0.24) (-1.30)    
External Debt  0.006***                  0.007***                  0.007***                  0.007***                 
  (3.04)                  (3.26)                  (3.02)                  (3.08)                 
Share of Non-FDI  -0.659* -0.44  -0.722** -0.43  -0.709** -0.43  -0.748** -0.44 
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  (-1.92) (-1.47)     (-2.08) (-1.44)     (-2.05) (-1.44)     (-2.14) (-1.48)    
Openness  -0.008***                  -0.008***                  -0.008***                  -0.008***                 
  (-2.98)                  (-2.92)                  (-2.87)                  (-2.78)                 
Reserves  0.03 -0.03  0.03 -0.03  0.03 -0.03  0.03 -0.03 
  (1.51) (-1.37)     (1.09) (-1.60)     (1.19) (-1.58)     (1.22) (-1.53)    
Fiscal Balance  0.186*** 0.098***  0.189*** 0.097***  0.181*** 0.094***  0.192*** 0.095*** 
  (3.15) (2.93)  (3.06) (2.96)  (2.96) (2.85)  (3.09) (2.88) 
Public Debt  -0.01                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (-0.68)                  (0.08)                  (0.35)                  (0.19)                 
Credit Growth  0.07 0.08  0.07 0.08  0.07 0.08  0.06 0.08 
  (1.17) (1.55)  (1.07) (1.59)  (1.05) (1.58)  (0.98) (1.51) 
Velocity  -1.238*                  -1.17                  -1.13                  -1.03                 
  (-1.89)                  (-1.56)                  (-1.44)                  (-1.27)                 
ESI  -0.02                  -0.01                  -0.02                  -0.01                 
  (-1.04)                  (-0.62)                  (-0.84)                  (-0.81)                 
Constant -1.871*** -2.58 -0.50 -1.799*** -3.58 -0.49 -1.794*** -3.08 -0.49 -1.823*** -3.12 -0.48 
 (-4.41) (-1.12) (-1.10)    (-4.29) (-1.37) (-1.07)    (-4.26) (-1.16) (-1.08)    (-4.33) (-1.17) (-1.05)    
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.29 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.42 0.45 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.30 0.41 0.46 
 rho 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.17 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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5.5 Results 
 
 Starting with sudden stop episodes, we can see in the above tables that 
the results confirm the significant role that sovereign ratings play in these 
events.  In particular, we observe that out of the four ways to capture sudden 
stop events (can be done in terms of i) net total flows, ii) net non-FDI flows, iii) 
gross total inflows and iv) gross non-FDI inflows), sovereign ratings appear to 
be statistically significant in three configurations (see Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.11).  
More specifically, when measured in terms of net total flows (Table 5.9), the 
sovereign ratings of Moody’s and Fitch appear to be significant at the 5% and 
10% levels respectively, when all other variables are included into this model.  
Although there is a drop of the significance when the model is adjusted for 
multicollinearity, Moody’s ratings manage to retain the biggest part of their 
significance (the relevant t- statistic is -1.80).   
Furthermore, we can see that the statistical significance of the ratings is 
further consolidated when sudden stop episodes are measured in terms of non-
FDI flows (see Tables 5.9 and 5.11).  First, in the case of net non-FDI flows the 
evidence suggests that the ratings of all three rating agencies, along with their 
aggregate score are significant in either the 5% or the 10% levels when 
included in the multicollinearity-clear model.  Most notably, the significance of 
all possible specifications is raised when sudden stop episodes are considered 
within the frame of gross non-FDI Inflows.  As reported in Table 5.11 the rating 
scores of all CRAs appear significant with t-statistics between -1.71 and -2.14 
under the multicollinearity- clear model.  In addition the statistical significance 
of Moody’s and Fitch ratings reaches the 1% level under the all-inclusive model 
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(in the case of Moody’s the t-statistic is higher than 3 in absolute terms).  
Throughout all the above specifications ratings are also economically 
meaningful in the sense that they consistently appear with a minus.   
With regards to the remaining variables in these models, we can observe 
that out of the global factors the global uncertainty index VIX appears to be 
insignificant; this is in accordance with Schmidt and Zwick, 2013.  In contrast, 
the G7 GDP growth rate appears to be the only noteworthy global determinant 
of sudden stop episodes.  However its significance varies according to 
specification, so that overall we can conclude that global factors are not very 
important in shaping sudden stops.  Out of the domestic factors, real GDP 
growth seems to be one of the most important factors, while credit growth also 
appears to be playing a role in fuelling the dynamics that lead to a sudden stop.  
Additionally, the analysis undertaken here shows that when included in the 
specification, external debt is highly significant and with a positive sign for 
three out of the four ways of measuring sudden stops.  Similarly trade openness 
exhibits some noteworthy significance in two out of the four specifications, 
while appearing with a minus.   
Out of the regressions conducted for surge, retrenchment and flight 
episodes, there is some evidence suggesting that sovereign ratings might matter 
for capital surge and retrenchment events.  In particular as shown in Table 5.12, 
when the model is based upon gross total inflows, ratings appear to play a role 
in encouraging capital surges.  More precisely, both the ratings of S&P and Fitch, 
as well as the aggregate rating seem to be significant at either the 5% or the 1% 
level across all different specifications of the model.  In addition all rating 
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Table 5.12.  Model for Capital Surges based on gross Total Inflows 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating 0.304** 0.576** 0.472**  0.13 0.341* 0.26 0.338** 0.730*** 0.582*** 0.096** 0.210*** 0.163**  
  (2.20) (2.47) (2.44) (1.16) (1.77) (1.63) (2.25) (2.97) (2.76) (1.99) (2.59) (2.41) 
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX -0.024* 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.022* 0.02 0.02 -0.022* 0.02 0.02 
 (-1.82) (1.08) (0.79) (-1.56) (1.33) (0.91) (-1.68) (1.38) (0.96) (-1.70) (1.25) (0.86) 
US interest rate 0.12 0.11                 0.13 0.07                 0.14 0.08                 0.13 0.09                 
 (1.25) (0.47)                 (1.37) (0.30)                 (1.50) (0.33)                 (1.35) (0.38)                 
G7 GDP growth 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.15 
 (1.56) (1.37) (1.26) (1.58) (1.10) (1.28) (1.52) (1.01) (1.25) (1.56) (1.06) (1.22) 
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  0.03                  0.01                  0.03                  0.03                 
  (0.51)                  (0.12)                  (0.61)                  (0.49)                 
GDP Growth  0.16 0.18  0.28 0.18  0.32 0.15  0.30 0.19 
  (0.36) (0.58)  (0.62) (0.61)  (0.67) (0.50)  (0.64) (0.63) 
REER  0.308*** 0.313***  0.325*** 0.340***  0.327*** 0.339***  0.324*** 0.333*** 
  (2.89) (3.12)  (3.18) (3.43)  (3.21) (3.41)  (3.12) (3.36) 
Inflation  -1.53 -1.46  -1.34 -1.45  -1.19 -1.49  -1.28 -1.49 
  (-1.24) (-1.56)     (-1.13) (-1.61)     (-0.98) (-1.58)     (-1.06) (-1.61)    
US spread  -0.32 -0.529**   -0.36 -0.528**   -0.46 -0.600**   -0.37 -0.551**  
  (-1.07) (-2.01)     (-1.24) (-2.08)     (-1.51) (-2.30)     (-1.26) (-2.13)    
Exterbal Balance  0.089* 0.03  0.099** 0.04  0.07 0.03  0.08 0.04 
  (1.72) (1.29)  (2.00) (1.48)  (1.42) (1.27)  (1.63) (1.36) 
External Debt  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (0.09)                  (0.24)                  (0.58)                  (0.41)                 
Share of Non-FDI  0.784* 0.783*    0.796* 0.780*    0.844* 0.783*    0.824* 0.783*   
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  (1.70) (1.80)  (1.70) (1.78)  (1.80) (1.80)  (1.76) (1.79) 
Openness  -0.01                  0.00                  -0.01                  -0.01                 
  (-1.45)                  (1.08)                  (-1.25)                  (-1.27)                 
Reserves  -0.06 -0.04  -0.04 -0.02  -0.05 -0.03  -0.05 -0.03 
  (-1.47) (-1.41)     (-1.31) (-0.83)     (-1.42) (-1.21)     (-1.41) (-1.15)    
Fiscal Balance  -0.11 -0.077*    -0.128* -0.089**   -0.12 -0.080*    -0.128* -0.084*   
  (-1.44) (-1.66)     (-1.67) (-2.00)     (-1.56) (-1.69)     (-1.67) (-1.82)    
Public Debt  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (0.15)                  (0.13)                  (0.08)                  (0.07)                 
Credit Growth  0.292*** 0.130*    0.278*** 0.133**   0.278*** 0.131*    0.288*** 0.133*   
  (2.91) (1.91)  (2.87) (1.99)  (2.76) (1.88)  (2.86) (1.95) 
Velocity  -0.93                  -0.55                  -0.67                  -0.68                 
  (-1.04)                  (-0.78)                  (-0.87)                  (-0.86)                 
ESI  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
  (0.05)                  (0.04)                  (0.13)                  (0.02)                 
Constant -1.782*** -2.68 -3.036*** -1.882*** -2.79 -3.230*** -1.918*** -2.82 -3.156*** -1.850*** -2.91 -3.146*** 
 (-3.37) (-1.04) (-4.37)    (-3.61) (-1.14) (-4.70)    (-3.66) (-1.13) (-4.57)    (-3.54) (-1.16) (-4.56)    
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.47 0.36 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.46 
 rho 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.18 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.13.  Models for Retrenchment Episodes based on gross Total Outflows 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 Rating -0.207** -0.269* -0.143 -0.096 -0.359*** -0.077 -0.137 -0.425*** -0.118 -0.056* -0.154*** -0.045 
  (-2.17) (-1.80) (-1.17)    (-1.26) (-2.65) (-0.76)    (-1.52) (-2.74) (-0.98)    (-1.78) (-2.74) (-1.07)    
G
lo
b
a
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
VIX 0.024*** 0.006 0.007 0.023** 0.006 0.007 0.023** 0.007 0.008 0.023** 0.007 0.008 
 (2.62) (0.45) (0.61) (2.52) (0.43) (0.59) (2.54) (0.51) (0.63) (2.55) (0.51) (0.62) 
US interest rate 0.116 0.16                 0.1 0.071                 0.1 0.07                 0.105 0.052                 
 (1.42) (0.86)                 (1.25) (0.37)                 (1.24) (0.36)                 (1.3) (0.27)                 
G7 GDP growth -0.204*** -0.076 -0.124*   -0.199*** -0.073 -0.126*   -0.200*** -0.075 -0.124*   -0.203*** -0.081 -0.125*   
 (-4.16) (-0.89) (-1.73)    (-4.08) (-0.84) (-1.77)    (-4.10) (-0.86) (-1.74)    (-4.13) (-0.93) (-1.75)    
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
Per Capita Income  0                  -0.001                  -0.005                  -0.013                 
  (0.00)                  (-0.03)                  (-0.11)                  (-0.31)                 
GDP Growth  -1.139*** -0.921***  -1.195*** -0.898***  -1.167*** -0.896***  -1.185*** -0.900*** 
  (-4.34) (-4.59)     (-4.43) (-4.50)     (-4.39) (-4.49)     (-4.46) (-4.51)    
REER  0.073 -0.012  0.06 -0.019  0.068 -0.018  0.067 -0.017 
  (0.88) (-0.14)     (0.74) (-0.23)     (0.83) (-0.21)     (0.81) (-0.21)    
Inflation  -1.766* -0.672  -1.576* -0.608  -1.933** -0.674  -1.741* -0.635 
  (-1.96) (-1.02)     (-1.76) (-0.92)     (-2.12) (-1.03)     (-1.93) (-0.96)    
US spread  -0.210** -0.067  -0.257*** -0.051  -0.249*** -0.056  -0.276*** -0.061 
  (-2.24) (-1.18)     (-2.75) (-0.98)     (-2.75) (-1.06)     (-2.88) (-1.12)    
Exterbal Balance  -0.025 -0.087***  -0.025 -0.089***  -0.026 -0.089***  -0.018 -0.088*** 
  (-0.58) (-3.48)     (-0.59) (-3.57)     (-0.61) (-3.55)     (-0.43) (-3.53)    
External Debt  0.005***                  0.005***                  0.005***                  0.005***                 
  (2.9)                  (3.03)                  (2.96)                  (3.1)                 
Share of Non-FDI  -0.652* -0.478  -0.625* -0.448  -0.654* -0.457  -0.681* -0.463 
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  (-1.87) (-1.49)     (-1.82) (-1.41)     (-1.89) (-1.43)     (-1.95) (-1.45)    
Openness  -0.003                  -0.003                  -0.003                  -0.003                 
  (-1.40)                  (-1.42)                  (-1.30)                  (-1.12)                 
Reserves  0.002 -0.016  -0.006 -0.018  -0.006 -0.018  -0.007 -0.018 
  (0.08) (-0.86)     (-0.30) (-0.94)     (-0.29) (-0.97)     (-0.31) (-0.97)    
Fiscal Balance  0.185*** 0.113***  0.178*** 0.112***  0.171*** 0.109***  0.182*** 0.110*** 
  (3.2) (2.96)  (3.09) (2.95)  (2.95) (2.86)  (3.12) (2.89) 
Public Debt  0.004                  0.008                  0.006                  0.007                 
  (0.66)                  (1.2)                  (0.9)                  (1.09)                 
Credit Growth  0.118* 0.138**   0.112* 0.143**   0.114* 0.141**   0.108 0.139**  
  (1.77) (2.4)  (1.67) (2.49)  (1.7) (2.45)  (1.61) (2.41) 
Velocity  -0.794                  -0.968*                  -0.853                  -0.815                 
  (-1.33)                  (-1.70)                  (-1.41)                  (-1.39)                 
ESI  -0.004                  0.003                  0.001                  0.002                 
  (-0.24)                  (0.21)                  (0.09)                  (0.11)                 
Constant -1.891*** -1.043 -0.449 -1.809*** -1.451 -0.475 -1.813*** -1.152 -0.469 -1.833*** -1.048 -0.458 
 (-4.44) (-0.55) (-0.93)    (-4.30) (-0.78) (-0.98)    (-4.29) (-0.61) (-0.97)    (-4.34) (-0.56) (-0.95)    
 N 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 578 515 565 
 sigma_u 0.349 0.294 0.483 0.36 0.29 0.484 0.36 0.309 0.484 0.358 0.289 0.483 
 rho 0.109 0.08 0.189 0.115 0.078 0.19 0.115 0.087 0.19 0.114 0.077 0.189 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; the rating variables are the residual series from the FE Specific Model 
reported in Chapter 4; the regressions reported here are based on the xtprobit routine in STATA; all variables are defined in the Appendix; all right hand variables are included with a lag; 
t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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variables take on positive signs, which accords with what we would expect (the 
higher the rating, the more attractive the country should appear to foreign 
capital).  Similarly, Table 5.13 reports some partial evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that ratings affect retrenchments of capital, provided that such 
episodes are captured via gross total outflows.  Accompanied by a negative sign, 
the evidence suggests that the higher the rating, the lower the probability that a 
Eurozone country will experience an episode of capital repatriation.   
Note however that all other specifications show the ratings to be 
insignificant, irrespectively of the rating agency and the variables selection31.  
Hence, the results of the previous paragraph should be interpreted with 
caution.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the case of those episodes that 
primarily relate with the pre-crisis era, as for instance in the case of capital 
surges, the econometric testing can be somehow difficult at the first place.  This 
is due to the fact that during the ‘good times’, ratings were relatively flat for 
most EMU countries.     
 
5.5.1 Robustness Checks 
 
 I now conduct a number of robustness checks on the results reported for 
sudden stops.  First I repeat all the regressions for sudden stop episodes using a 
complementary logarithmic transformation (cloglog) instead of assuming a 
normal distribution as in the case of the usual probit model.  The cloglog 
                                            
31 Other specifications include the models for surge episodes based on i) gross non-FDI inflows, 
ii) net total flows, and iii) net non-FDI flows.  In the case of retrenchment episodes they include 
the models based on net total and non-FDI flows, as well as the models based on gross non-FDI 
outflows of capital.  Moreover all different models of flight episodes are insignificant.  Results 
are not reported in the current but are available upon request.    
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approach allows for asymmetry as well as for fatter tails in the two ends of the 
cumulative distribution.  As a result, recent literature (Forbes and Warnock, 
2012a; 2012b; Schmidt and Zwick, 2013) has recommended it as a more 
suitable approach for capturing events of capital flow reversals, given that the 
latter are relatively scarce by nature.   
Secondly, I break the sample in the first quarter of 2008 and repeat all 
the regressions for the post crisis era (2008q1- 2012q4).  This gives a panel 
with a time span of twenty observations, which although small can still allow us 
to draw some basic inferences.   
Third, I repeat the multicollinearity-clear baseline regressions (the ones 
reported on the third column for each CRA on the main tables above) by adding 
an aggregate measurement of political instability for every country in the 
model.  This measurement is based on the summation of the six key indices of 
public governance provided by the World Bank (these include Government 
Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Evidence of Corruption).  The 
reason why I choose to aggregate them, rather than considering them 
separately, is the high degree of correlation amongst them.   
Fourth, I repeat the baseline regressions under alternative specifications 
for the sudden stop variables.  So far all my binary variables have been based on 
the most widespread definition of the relevant literature (established by Calvo 
et al., 2004).  The virtue of such approach is that it provides a common 
denominator between present and past findings, which in turn is of great value 
in facilitating comparison.  Nonetheless, as pointed out earlier any definition is 
to an extent arbitrary.  In that regard an important test of robustness is to see 
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whether the reported results are fragile to the specification of the binary 
variables.  To conduct such test, I alter the second condition of the baseline 
sudden stop definition, by shifting the two standard deviation threshold up and 
down by ten percent.  This gives rise to two alternative scenarios.  Under the 
first (second) one a sudden stop episode needs to contain at least one 
observation where the year-on-year fall in capital flows lies at least 1.8 (2.2) 
standard deviations below the sample mean.  In both cases the first and third 
criteria remain as before.  Namely, a sudden stop episode lasts as long as the 
year-on-year fall lies lower than one standard deviation below the mean, while 
any recorded episode needs to contain at least two time periods.   
Starting with the cloglog regressions, we can see in Table 5.14 that the 
results remain essentially unchanged.  All specifications that were found 
significant above manage to retain their significances, with the model based on 
gross non-FDI inflows exhibiting the highest significance for the sovereign 
rating variables.  Moreover across all specifications ratings keep appearing with 
the proper sign (minus).   
 With regards to the post-crisis subsample we can observe that some 
significance is lost in the models based on net capital flows.  However, as 
illustrated in Table 5.15, the significance of all ratings variables is considerably 
boosted for all the models that are based on gross flows.  Especially in the case 
of gross non-FDI inflows, I obtain robust significances at the 1% level across all 
CRAs and for almost all model specifications.     
Furthermore, we can see in Table 5.16 that the inclusion of the aggregate 
public governance indicator does not affect the significance and sign of the 
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Table 5.14.  Sudden Stop Regressions based on the Complementary Logarithmic Transformation (cloglog) 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 
Net Total Flows -0.320* -0.101 -0.109 -0.324*** -0.394** -0.211* -0.305** -0.337* -0.155 -0.124*** -0.117 -0.068 
 (-1.69) (-0.43) (-0.50)  (-2.80) (-2.16) (-1.82)   (-2.17) (-1.66) (-1.08) (-2.67) (-1.64) (-1.34)  
Net non-FDI  
Flows 
-0.654*** -0.547* -0.592**  -0.527*** -0.347 -0.364**  -0.542*** -0.468 -0.455* -0.230*** -0.191* -0.189**  
 (-4.00) (-1.93) (-2.25)   (-3.50) (-1.55) (-2.03)  (-3.49) (-1.63) (-1.85)   (-3.91) (-1.82) (-2.22)   
Gross Total  
Inflows 
-0.149 0.043 -0.046 -0.16 0.026 -0.127 -0.166 -0.04 -0.089 -0.063 0.004 -0.037 
 (-0.90) (0.2) (-0.25) (-1.30) (0.13) (-0.85) (-1.07) (-0.20) (-0.51)  (-1.28) (0.07) (-0.63) 
Gross non-FDI 
Inflows 
-0.297** -0.233 -0.199 -0.319*** -0.551** -0.311**  -0.335** -0.538*** -0.287 -0.126*** -0.183** -0.108* 
 (-1.97) (-0.86) (-1.03) (-2.73) (-2.47) (-2.09)   (-2.39) (-2.60) (-1.53)  (-2.72) (-2.33) (-1.81) 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; only the sovereign rating variables are reported here; the rating variables are 
the residual series from the FE Specific Model reported in Chapter 4; cloglog routine used in STATA, with robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors; similarly with the sequence of the 
main results, other than the rating, the 1st regression includes the global factors only, the 2nd one includes all global and domestic factors, while the 3rd includes only those factors that 
are immune to multicollinearity; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; only the coefficients and t-statistics of the ratings 
variables are reported. 
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Table 5.15.  Sudden Stop Regressions for the post-Crisis era (2008q1- 2012q4) 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 
Net Total Flows -0.244* -0.189 -0.131 -0.189* -0.325** -0.192 -0.157 -0.219 -0.139 -0.076* -0.109* -0.068 
 (-1.82) (-1.00) (-0.82)  (-1.91) (-2.22) (-1.61)  (-1.44) (-1.39) (-1.03)  (-1.87) (-1.78) (-1.33)  
Net non-FDI 
Flows 
-0.490*** -0.425 -0.169 -0.418*** -0.294 -0.172 -0.357*** -0.14 -0.057 -0.167*** -0.115 -0.053 
 (-2.65) (-1.39) (-0.60)  (-3.14) (-1.31) (-0.92)  (-2.58) (-0.63) (-0.28)  (-3.00) (-1.22) (-0.66)  
Gross Total  
Inflows 
-0.370*** -1.703*** -0.871*** -0.178* -0.790** -0.348* -0.191* -1.704*** -0.639*** -0.090** -0.700*** -0.255*** 
 (-2.67) (-3.29) (-3.25)   (-1.80) (-2.55) (-1.85)   (-1.71) (-3.20) (-2.75)   (-2.19) (-3.50) (-2.87)  
Gross non-FDI 
Inflows 
-0.336** -0.803*** -0.548*** -0.249*** -0.677*** -0.445**  -0.244** -0.897*** -0.582*** -0.107*** -0.443*** -0.236*** 
 (-2.40) (-2.87) (-2.68)  (-2.58) (-2.68) (-2.49)   (-2.21) (-2.99) (-2.87)   (-2.61) (-3.21) (-3.03)  
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; only the sovereign rating variables are reported here; the rating variables are 
the residual series from the FE Specific Model reported in Chapter 4;  time span used: 2008q1- 2012q4; xtprobit routine used; similarly with the sequence of the main results, other than the 
rating, the 1st regression includes the global factors only, the 2nd one includes all global and domestic factors, while the 3rd includes only those factors that are immune to 
multicollinearity; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; the total number of observations is 240 for the 1st regression, 211 
for the 2nd one, and 231 for the 3rd one; only the coefficients and t-statistics of the ratings variables are reported. 
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Table 5.16.  Sudden Stop Regressions including the Aggregate Public Governance Indicator 
 S&P Moody's Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 rating WGI rating WGI rating WGI rating WGI 
Net Total Flows -0.09 -0.015 -0.170* -0.023 -0.149 -0.019 -0.059 -0.02 
 (-0.85) (-0.29) (-1.84) (-0.46) (-1.38) (-0.37) (-1.55)  (-0.39) 
Net non-FDI 
Flows 
-0.282** -0.461*** -0.223** -0.549*** -0.231* -0.514*** -0.097**  -0.502*** 
 (-2.02)   (-2.68) (-2.05) (-2.86) (-1.77) (-2.76) (-2.13)    (-2.79)  
Gross Total  
Inflows 
0.053 0.236*** 0.016 0.235*** 0.037 0.236*** 0.014 0.237*** 
 (0.44) (2.73) (0.17) (2.72) (0.31) (2.73) (0.33) (2.73) 
Gross non-FDI  
Inflows 
-0.209* 0.084 -0.203** 0.067 -0.224* 0.077 -0.088**  0.074 
 (-1.72)  (1.02) (-2.03) (0.8) (-1.91) (0.92) (-2.10)  (0.89) 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; only the sovereign rating variables are reported here; the rating variables are 
the residual series from the FE Specific Model reported in Chapter 4; xtprobit routine used; the public governance 'WGI' variable is added to the 3rd. column type of regressions (i.e. to 
those regressions that are immune to multicollinearity); t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; for each rating agency the 
table reports the coefficients and significances of the relevant rating variable as well as of the WGI measurement. 
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Table 5.17.  Sudden Stop Regressions with Alternative Definitions of the Binary Variables 
 S&P Moody's  
 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 
 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 
Net Total Flows -0.137 -0.492*** 0.023 -0.616*** -0.007  -0.512***  -0.134*  -0.239*** -0.12 -0.055 -0.056 -0.184* 
 (-1.60) (-3.95) (+0.21) (-2.75) (-0.07) (-3.51) (-1.88)  (-2.66) (-1.32)  (-0.24)  (-0.73) (-1.81) 
Net non-FDI  
Flows 
-0.119 -0.465***  -0.105 -0.357 -0.013 -0.454***  -0.155* -0.289*** -0.045 -0.301 -0.035 -0.191*  
 (-1.25) (-3.84)    (-0.79)   (-1.35)   (-0.12) (-2.99)   (-1.95) (-3.20) (-0.40) (-1.62) (-0.41) (-1.83)  
Gross Total  
Inflows 
-0.098 -0.074 -0.099 -0.116 -0.078 0.046 -0.088 -0.107 -0.132 -0.640** -0.127 -0.116 
 (-1.10)  (-0.71) (-0.73) (-0.51)   (-0.79) (+0.32) (-1.15) (-1.25) (-0.92) (-2.31) (-1.47) (-0.89)  
Gross non-FDI  
Inflows 
-0.014 -0.342*** 0.091 -0.323** 0.079 -0.419*** -0.09 -0.271*** -0.201*  -0.510*** -0.079 -0.460*** 
 (-0.15)  (-3.25)  (+0.78) (-2.11)  (+0.79) (-3.03) (-1.18) (-3.18)  (-1.65) (-3.31) (-0.91) (-3.48) 
 Fitch Sum of the 3 CRAs 
 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 1st reg 2nd reg. 3rd reg. 
 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 1.8 st. dev. 2.2 st. dev. 
Net Total Flows -0.134 -0.300*** -0.095 -0.07 -0.032 -0.269**  -0.054*  -0.129*** -0.03 -0.135* -0.015  -0.123*** 
 (-1.60) (-2.84) (-0.89)    (-0.33) (-0.35) (-2.19) (-1.87) (-3.41) (-0.79)  (-1.80)  (-0.46) (-2.74) 
Net non-FDI  
Flows 
 -0.173* -0.380*** -0.035 -0.295 -0.037 -0.302**  -0.061* -0.145*** -0.025 -0.124 -0.012 -0.118**  
 (-1.83)  (-3.49)  (-0.27) (-1.41) (-0.34) (-2.26) (-1.87) (-3.77) (-0.55)  (-1.52)  (-0.33) (-2.53)  
Gross Total  
Inflows 
-0.128 -0.098 -0.266 -0.717*** -0.154 -0.119 -0.042 -0.039 -0.07 -0.236** -0.049 -0.029 
 (-1.41) (-0.97) (-1.58)  (-2.70) (-1.49)  (-0.79) (-1.34)  (-1.10) (-1.20) (-2.16)  (-1.39)  (-0.53) 
Gross non-FDI 
Inflows 
-0.071 -0.286*** -0.141  -0.519***  -0.029  -0.511*** -0.025  -0.119*** -0.036 -0.201*** -0.007 -0.202*** 
 (-0.79)  (-2.92)  (-1.10) (-3.05) (-0.28)  (-3.54) (-0.81)  (-3.42)   (-0.81)   (-3.19)  (-0.19)    (-3.70) 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary one, taking the value of 1 if there is an episode, being 0 otherwise; only the sovereign rating variables are listed here; the rating variables are the 
residual series from the FE Specific Model reported in Chapter 4; the results for two alternative definitions of sudden stops are reported.  In the first (second) scenario an episode occurs if 
there is at least one period where the year-on-year fall in capital flows is greater than 1.8 (2.2) standard deviations below the mean.  In both cases an episode lasts as long as the year-on-
year fall is greater than a standard deviation below the mean, while any episode needs to consist of at least two time periods; similarly with the sequence of the main results, other than the 
rating, the 1st regression includes the global factors only, the 2nd one includes all global and domestic factors, while the 3rd includes only those factors that are immune to 
multicollinearity; xtprobit routine used; t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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rating variables.  Similarly with the main findings, the sovereign ratings of all 
three CRAs exhibit the highest significance across those specifications that are 
based on non-FDI flows.  Interestingly, although the results concerning the 
public governance indicator are mixed and inconclusive, the variable appears to 
be significant at the 1% level for two out of the four sudden stop specifications. 
Lastly, Table 5.17 reports the results for the alternative specifications of 
sudden stop episodes.  While the first definition returns insignificant results for 
almost all regressions, the reverse holds true for the second specification.  In 
particular when setting the threshold of the second condition to a 2.2 standard 
deviation distance below the mean, the statistical significance of all rating 
variables is not only retained, but also strengthened for the vast majority of 
cases, when compared with the baseline results.  Most notably, all regressions 
for gross non-FDI inflows give significant results for the rating variables of all 
CRAs at the 1% level.  In addition, all the immune to multicollinearity 
regressions (third column for each CRA) give significant results for all net flows.  
In all cases the economic significance is also retained in that the rating variables 
consistently appear with a minus sign.  All in all, while such evidence shows that 
the baseline results reported earlier are not irrelevant to the definition of 
sudden stop episodes, it also shows that they are not dependent upon a specific 
binary construction either.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
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This chapter contributes to the stream of literature that seeks to point out 
the determinants of extreme capital flow movements.  While initially focused on 
developing countries, such literature has more recently shifted towards 
developing countries too.  In such a context the current chapter focuses on the 
dynamics of the twelve initial member states of Eurozone and investigates the 
statistical and economic importance of the sovereign ratings of the three CRAs 
(S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) upon episodes of sudden stops of capital.  The 
timespan of interest is 1999- 2012, a period that includes the 2010 European 
crisis, as well as the first post-crisis years.  Moreover, the methodology 
employed involves a panel probit model with random effects.   
In consistency with the findings of Chapter 4, the emphasis of the present 
chapter is on that part of sovereign ratings that reflects feelings of euphoria and 
panic.  This choice is navigated by two distinct motives.  First, in terms of 
economic intuition, it is interesting to explore the influence of exaggerated 
movements of sovereign ratings upon extreme movements of capital flows.  
Secondly, by decomposing the ratings, and isolating the component of panicked 
reactions from the portion of ratings that reflects the broader macroeconomic 
environment of a country, the approach enables the incorporation of sovereign 
ratings along with macroeconomic control variables into the model, without 
facing the issue of multicollinearity that would otherwise occur.  
Results are on the affirmative for the vast majority of econometric 
specifications and for all three CRAs.  Most notably, sovereign ratings appear to 
be significant for three out of the four ways of capturing sudden stop episodes 
(namely for the cases of net total flows, net non-FDI flows and gross non-FDI 
flows).  Results are also strengthened when considering non-FDI rather than 
 
 
161 | P a g e  
 
total flows.  In addition sovereign ratings appear with economically meaningful 
signs (minus) under all specifications.   
A number of robustness checks are conducted so as to safeguard the 
results.  These include: i) the repetition of the key regressions under a 
complementary logarithmic transformation (instead of assuming a normal 
distribution as in the baseline panel probit); ii) the re-estimation of the model 
for the period 2008q1- 2012q4, so as to account for the possibility of a 
structural break in the time series; iii) the inclusion of an aggregate 
measurement of political instability in order to account for an additional control 
variable; and iv) the repetition of the baseline regressions under alternative 
specifications for the left- hand binary (sudden stop) variable: given the 
unavoidable arbitrariness that to an extent governs the construction of such a 
binary, the intuition here is to see whether the results are dependent upon a 
particular specification or not.  Under all robustness checks, the key results 
remain qualitatively unaltered.   
All things considered, it is interesting to investigate the broader 
macroeconomic implications of the channel of influence highlighted here.  To 
the extent that sovereign ratings are important in affecting episodes of sudden 
stops of capital, one can also move a step further and reflect on the instability 
and constraints that arise.  This is done in Chapter 7 by means of a stock flow 
consistent model.  Furthermore there are concrete policy implications that are 
relevant with the topic.  These are considered in detail in Chapter 8.   
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5.7 Appendix 
 
5.7.1 List of Episodes of Capital Flow Reversals per Country 
 
  Sudden Stops of 
Net Total Flows 
Sudden Stops of Net 
non-FDI Flows 
Sudden Stops of Total 
Inflows 
Sudden Stops of non-FDI 
Inflows 
  Start  End Start  End Start  End Start  End 
Austria 2008q1 2008q3 2009q3 2010q1 2001q2 2001q4 2001q2 2001q4 
              2007q4 2009q4 
Belgium 2006q4 2007q3 2004q2 2005q1 2008q4 2009q3 2008q4 2009q3 
      2006q3 2007q2         
      2009q3 2010q2         
Finland  2001q1 2001q4 2009q4 2010q4 2001q1 2001q4 2009q2 2009q3 
          2012q3 2012q4 2012q3 2012q4 
France 2007q1 2008q3 2001q2 2002q1 2008q1 2009q3 2008q1 2009q3 
Germany         2000q4 2002q1 2008q3 2009q3 
          2008q3 2009q3     
Greece 2010q2 2011q2 2012q2 2012q3 2010q2 2011q2 2010q2 2011q2 
                  
Ireland 2008q4 2009q3 2002q4 2003q3 2001q1 2001q3 2000q4 2003q2 
          2004q4 2005q1 2007q4 2009q3 
          2008q2 2009q3     
Italy 2000q4 2001q4 2004q1 2004q3 2001q3 2002q2 2002q1 2002q2 
  2009q4 2010q1 2009q2 2010q1         
  2011q4 2012q1 2011q4 2012q1         
Luxembou
rg 
2006q4 2007q3 2006q4 2007q2 2008q2 2009q2 2006q4 2007q2 
              2008q2 2009q2 
                  
Netherland
s 
2003q2 2004q3     2001q2 2002q4 2007q4 2009q3 
  2009q2 2009q4     2008q1 2009q3     
Portugal 2011q2 2012q4 2012q1 2012q4 2002q2 2003q2 2002q4 2003q3 
          2004q3 2005q2 2005q1 2005q2 
          2010q4 2011q3 2010q4 2011q4 
Spain 2009q1 2010q1 2008q3 2010q1 2008q1 2009q3 2007q4 2009q3 
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  Surges of net Total 
Flows 
Surges of net non-FDI 
Flows 
Surges of Total 
Inflows 
Surges of non-FDI 
Inflows 
  Start  End Start  End Start  End Start  End 
Austria 2010q3 2011q1 2010q3 2011q2 2003q3 2005q4 2003q3 2005q2 
                  
Belgium 2008q1 2009q2 2008q1 2008q4 2007q2 2008q1 2007q2 2008q1 
          2010q2 2010q3 2004q3 2004q4 
          2011q3 2011q4 2010q2 2010q3 
Finland  2002q2 2002q4 2011q4 2012q3     2011q3 2011q4 
  2011q4 2012q3             
France 2008q4 2009q3 2009q1 2009q3 2005q1 2005q4 2001q1 2001q3 
Germany 2007q2 2008q1 2007q2 2008q2 2007q2 2008q1 2005q2 2005q3 
              2007q2 2008q1 
Greece 2000q2 2000q4 2000q2 2000q4 2001q4 2002q4 2001q4 2002q4 
  2001q3 2002q3 2001q4 2002q3 2007q2 2007q4 2007q2 2007q4 
Ireland 2007q3 2008q3 2004q1 2004q4         
          2003q4 2004q1 2003q4 2004q3 
          2006q3 2007q2 2006q3 2007q2 
Italy 2010q3 2011q1 2010q3 2011q1         
                  
          2003q1 2003q3 2003q1 2003q3 
Luxembou
rg 
2008q4 2009q3 2003q4 2004q3         
      2005q4 2006q2         
      2007q3 2008q2 2005q2 2006q1     
Netherlan
ds 
    2005q3 2006q2 2005q3 2006q2 2005q2 2005q3 
      2008q4 2009q3     2010q2 2010q4 
Portugal             2006q1 2006q2 
                  
                  
Spain     2004q3 2005q3     2005q3 2006q2 
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  Flights of Total 
Outflows 
  
Flights of non-FDI 
Outflows 
  
Retrenchments of 
Total Outflows 
Retrenchments of non-
FDI Outflows 
  Start  End Start  End Start  End Start  End 
Austria 2003q2 2005q4 2003q2 2005q2     2007q4 2009q4 
                  
Belgium 2007q1 2008q1 2007q1 2007q4 2008q4 2009q3 2008q2 2009q3 
Finland  2010q2 2010q3     2012q3 2012q4 2001q1 2001q2 
              2009q2 2009q3 
              2012q3 2012q4 
France         2008q1 2009q3 2008q1 2009q3 
Germany 2003q1 2003q2 2005q1 2005q3 2008q2 2009q3 2008q2 2009q3 
  2004q3 2005q4             
                  
Greece 2012q1 2012q4 2012q1 2012q4 2006q1 2006q4 2000q3 2000q4 
          2010q2 2011q2 2006q1 2006q4 
              2010q2 2011q2 
Ireland 2003q4 2004q1 2003q3 2004q1 2000q2 2001q3 2000q2 2001q3 
  2006q3 2007q2 2006q3 2007q2 2004q4 2005q1 2002q4 2003q1 
              2004q4 2005q1 
          2007q4 2009q2 2008q2 2009q2 
Italy 2003q1 2003q4 2003q1 2003q4 2002q1 2002q2 2002q1 2002q2 
  2005q1 2005q4 2005q2 2005q4 2008q1 2008q4     
                  
Luxembo
urg 
2005q2 2006q1 2005q2 2006q1 2008q2 2009q2 2006q4 2009q2 
Netherlan
ds 
2005q3 2006q2 2006q4 2007q3 2001q2 2001q3 2000q2 2001q2 
          2007q4 2009q3 2008q1 2009q3 
Portugal 2003q4 2004q1     2002q2 2005q2 2004q3 2005q2 
          2010q4 2011q3 2011q1 2011q4 
                  
Spain     2005q4 2006q2 2007q3 2009q3 2006q4 2007q1 
              2007q4 2008q3 
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5.7.2 Description of Variables 
 
  Description Unit Source 
Net Total Capital Flows net FDI+ net Portfolio Investment + net 
Other Investment 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Net non-FDI Capital Flows net Portfolio Investment + net Other 
Investment 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Total Capital Inflows FDI in Rep Economy + Portfolio 
Investment Liabilities + Other 
Investment Liabilities 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Total Capital Outflows minus (FDI Abroad+ Portfolio 
Investment Assets+ Other Investment 
Assets) 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Non-FDI Capital Inflows Portfolio Investment Liabilities + Other 
Investment Liabilities 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Non-FDI Capital Outflows minus (Portfolio Investment Assets+ 
Other Investment Assets) 
millions of Euro Eurostat 
Sovereign Ratings Long Term Foreign Currency Ratings Index numbers S&P, 
Moody's 
and Fitch 
websites 
Per Capita Income GDP at Mkt Prices/ Population; 
quarterly figures are seasonally 
adjusted and multiplied by 4 
Thousands of Euros Eurostat 
Real GDP Growth Real GDP = Nom GDP/GDP Deflator * 
100; seasonally adjusted 
% Eurostat 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(REER) 
deflator: unit labour costs in 37 trading 
partners  
% Eurostat 
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Inflation Rate Inflation Growth Rate; Harmonized 
Consumer Price Index used; seasonally 
adjusted 
% Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
Divergence of Inflation Rate from 
Eurozone Average Inflation.   
Inflation Growth Rate; Harmonized 
Consumer Price Index used; differences 
from EMU average taken in square 
terms; EMU inflation average computed 
by the author; seasonally adjusted 
% Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
Fiscal Balance [(Total Public Revenues- Total Public 
Expenses)/ GDP]*100 
% Eurostat 
External Balance (Current Account Balance/GDP)*100 % Eurostat 
External Debt  (External Debt/ Total Exports)*100; 
External Debt is approximated by 
(portfolio account, debt instrument 
liabilities+other investment, liabilities); 
Total Exports are the summary of 
(goods, credit+ services, credit+ income, 
credit); quarterly ratio divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Public Debt (Generan Government Debt/ GDP)*100; 
Maastricht Debt used; ratio divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Reserves (Foreign Reserves/ Imports)*100; 
divided by 4 
% Eurostat 
Unemployment Total Unemployment Rate; seasonally 
adjusted 
% Eurostat 
Government Effectiveness; Voice 
and Accountability; Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; 
Evidence of Corruption 
Indices reported in the World 
Governance Indicator Database; 
interpolated from annual to quarterly 
frequency; used 1998 as the entrance 
scores for 1999; copy pasted the 2000 
values in 2001 cause the latter were 
missing 
Index Numbers World Bank 
Trade Openness Measured as [(Exports+Imports)/ 
GDP]*100 
% Eurostat 
Income Velocity of Money. 
Measured as GDP/ M2 
M2 approximated by the sum of 
currency under circulation+ demand 
deposits+ other deposits;  GDP 
multiplied by 4 in the quarterly series 
simple ratio units 
used 
Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
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Domestic Credit Growth domestic credit approximated by the 
"MFI claims to Other Sectors" account; 
national residency criterion used 
% Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
Economic Sentiment Indicator qualitative measurement designed by 
Eurostat; based on monthly interviews; 
seasonaly adjusted by Eurostat itself; 
converted by the author to quarterly 
frequency (from monthly) by taking the 
last month of each quarter (eg March for 
Q1, June for Q2 and so on) 
Index numbers Eurostat 
VIX Volatility Index designed by the Chicago Board of 
Exchange (CBOE), based on a range of 
options' prices; for more information, 
see the FAQ 
http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/faq.as
px; converted by the author to quarterly 
frequency (from monthly) by taking the 
last month of each quarter (eg March for 
Q1, June for Q2 and so on) 
Index numbers Chicago 
Board of 
Exchange 
(CBOE) 
Interest Rate Spread based on the 
US rate 
US long term government yield used as 
a base 
% Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
US Interest Rate US long term government yield % Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
G7 GDP Growth Rate the IMF constructs area and world 
indices by applying a weighted average 
of country indices; see the IMF IFS 
manual for more info; G7 countries 
include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, UK, and USA; provided in annual 
frequency; extrapolated to quarterly by 
the author 
% Internation
al Financial 
Statistics 
IMF 
Share of non-FDI inflows out of 
total inflows 
Constructed by the author; formula 
used: (Portfolio Investment+ Other 
Investment)/ (Portfolio Investment+ 
Other Investment+ FDI); ratio focuses 
exclusively on positive inflows for the 
recipient countries so as to avoid 
extreme values that wouldn't make 
sense.  Hence whenever the inflow 
would be negative ("stop") the value 
was set equal to zero; in the cases where 
all inflows were negative, the ratio is not 
provided; smoothing has been applied 
% Eurostat 
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6 Chapter 6- A Few Notes on Macroeconomic 
Modelling32 
 
 
We “should wish to see a world in which education aimed at mental freedom rather than at 
imprisoning the minds of the young in a rigid armour of dogma calculated to protect them 
through life against the shafts of impartial evidence. The world needs open hearts and open minds, 
and it is not through rigid systems, whether old or new, that these can be derived.”  
UADPhilEcon’s motto, courtesy of Bertrand Russell33 
 
Chapter 7 moves away from econometrics and goes into macroeconomic 
modelling.  Its purpose is to provide a mathematical model that encompasses an 
endogenous sovereign rating mechanism which in turn feeds back to the 
aggregate macroeconomic dynamics.  Although in the case of econometrics it 
can often be said that econometric tools are not attached to a specific viewpoint 
of the world (but not always, see Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004 for critical 
reflections on the Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology), the same does 
not always hold for macroeconomic modelling.  Here the modelling framework 
that a researcher employs often determines to a certain extend his or her 
assumptions and understanding about the way the economy functions.  For this 
reason it is important to dedicate some space and discuss the merits and 
limitations of some of the alternative macroeconomic modelling methods that 
exist before moving on to the actual project.  This is done in the current chapter.  
By contrasting the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) with the 
                                            
32 The discussion in the current chapter has benefited from the useful remarks provided by Dr. 
Devrim Yilmaz. 
33 I obtained my MPhil degree in Economics from UADPhilEcon, the doctoral program of the 
University of Athens. 
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Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) approach, I provide a justification as to why the 
second is a more suitable approach for macroeconomic modelling.   
Outlined in brief I argue that DSGE has consistently been the analytical 
expression of neoclassical macroeconomic theory, and reflects its assumptions, 
and limitations. The latter involve, most notably, the compulsory use of 
microfoundations, as well as their understanding of stability as the normal state 
of the market economy.  As discussed below, microfoundating a macro world 
gives rise to a false social ontology, where society is simply assumed to consist 
of the aggregation of separate individuals, while it also creates the space for 
fallacies of composition.  Furthermore, the intrinsic assumption of stability 
across DSGE models creates a pre-fixed understanding as to what causes certain 
economic phenomena, such as unemployment.  Although open to non-
neoclassical features, such as the New Keynesian price and wage rigidities, and 
while recently updated so as to include important institutions such as banks 
and credit, those extensions do not remove the erroneous core of those models. 
On the other hand, SFC has recently emerged as an appealing alternative 
for macroeconomic modelling.  In contrast with the DSGE methodology, the SFC 
is a broader framework, which as such can be utilized by researchers coming 
from different theoretical backgrounds.  As its name suggest, the SFC approach 
clearly separates between stocks and flows.  This separation gives the model an 
element of dynamic interaction, whereby the realization of flows and the 
change of stocks link different short-term periods with each other.  
Furthermore, it provides a solid basis for coherent social accounting, while it 
also creates the appropriate space for a comprehensive consideration of 
financial dynamics.   
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:  I first outline the most 
important developments within the DSGE tradition throughout the recent years.  
I then move on to the critique of the approach.  Following, I discuss the 
alternative of SFC modelling, illustrating both its merits and its limitations.  The 
last section concludes. 
 
6.1 DSGE Models 
 
6.1.1 The State of the Art in DSGE Modelling 
 
Until some years ago it was quite straightforward to spot the 
shortcomings of DSGE models.  Up to the crisis, these models were not 
incorporating any kind of real world institutions such as banks, while concerns 
such as income inequality were consistently left outside their scope.  An 
extensive review of this generation of models is provided by Christiano et al. 
(2010) who argue that a key reason behind the ‘success’ of those models had 
been their capacity to fit the data (mainly referring here to the data up to the 
2007 crisis).  Indicatively, the Smets and Wouters (2002) model, a model that is 
still part of the toolbox of the European Central Bank (ECB)34, considers neither 
banks nor credit.  Rather, it contains only households and firms; its main 
highlight being the incorporation of some real world frictions, such as sticky 
prices and wages, habit formation in consumption, and variable capital 
utilization (notice here that in the DGSE jargon, the word ‘frictions’ usually 
                                            
34 See here https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher.en.html 
 
 
171 | P a g e  
 
corresponds to factors that slow down the price mechanism from equilibrating 
the market).   
Either as response to the above critiques, or as an effort to grasp the 
dynamics of the post-crisis era, DSGE modellers have recently made some 
important progress in building in a number of real world features.  To start 
with, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) incorporate a banking sector and 
attempt to explain the existence of multiple interest rates.  Gerali et al. (2010) 
introduce a banking sector with monopolistic power and study the importance 
of credit-supply factors in explaining investment and GDP fluctuations.  Their 
banks provide loans to both households and firms, and draw funds not only 
from savings but also from retained earnings, therefore creating an important 
link between the real and financial sides of the economy.  Furthermore, interest 
rates are sticky while households demand either deposits or loans depending 
on their level of ‘patience’ (patience relates here with the discount factors that 
households apply to their future utility).  Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) stress 
the role of inequality in increasing the financial leverage of households and in 
increasing the probability of a financial crisis.  In a similar vein, Charpe and 
Kuhn (2012) highlight the importance of inequality in dampening consumption 
and aggregate demand.  Their model includes a wage bargaining mechanism 
and an endogenous labour share of income.  Additionally they set a low 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour which limits the increase of 
labour demand that follows a fall in wages.  In contrast to most of the existing 
DSGE literature, their results show how wage rigidities such as minimum wage 
help to stabilize the economy by containing the falls of output and employment.  
Christiano et al. (2013) also endogenise wage inertia, and examine the response 
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of labour market variables to monetary, technology and investment shocks.  
Benes, Kumhof and Laxton (2014a; 2014b) construct a DSGE model with banks 
and household credit, following a balance sheet approach for their banks.  
Adopting the key insights of the endogenous money theory35, the authors 
suggest that it is not savings but rather demand for financing, banks’ 
expectations of future profitability and the risk absorption capacity of their 
capital that govern banks’ decisions to provide credit.  In that regard they use 
their model to show that banks have the capacity to create purchasing power ex 
nihilo, while at the same time they show how large and risky loans create the 
seeds of a financial crisis.  Christiano et al. (2014) also include financial frictions 
into their model, without however considering an explicit banking sector.  What 
is interesting in their paper is that they adopt a two stage decision mechanism 
for households, with a monetary shock in- between.  With households deciding 
the size of their portfolio in the first stage, and the allocation of their wealth in 
the second one, this model permits the authors to depict a “fly to safety” 
situation.    
 
6.1.2 Points of Critique 
 
6.1.2.1 Microfoundations 
 
The key point of the Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) was that expectations 
play an important role in explaining observed regularities at the aggregate level.  
                                            
35 For an outline of endogenous money theory see Fontana (2009; chapters 7 and 8).  It is 
interesting to note that although Benes and his colleagues clearly take the insights of 
endogenous money on board (see especially Benes et al., 2014a: 9- 11), they do so without 
providing a single reference to acknowledge the original source of the ideas they develop.   
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In that regard, once there is a policy change, expectations might change and as a 
result change the observed aggregate relationships.  To tackle this problem, 
macroeconomic models should start from the level of the individual, since 
structural parameters such as consumption preferences and production 
functions are immune to policy changes.  
The above critique shaped DGSE models from their genesis, so that the 
microfoundations approach provided DSGE models a strong raison d'être.  To 
evaluate the validity of the Lucas argument, one should first consider the 
purpose of mathematical modelling.  If our aim is to conduct accurate 
forecasting, as advocated by neoclassical economists (e.g. Friedman, 1953), the 
Lucas Critique is right in pointing out the possible instability in observed 
aggregate relationships.  But then the disappointing performance of DSGE 
models in forecasting the crisis and post-crisis economic dynamics (for 
evidence see Edge and Gurkaynak, 2010) could also be taken as a sign that not 
even the individual- based parameters are permanently fixed, as assumed by 
the microfoundations approach.  In that case we either need to think of 
abolishing mathematical modelling all together, or to acknowledge the 
artificiality of the closures we construct when building such models.   
A mathematical model is, in essence, an analytical tool for exposing and 
communicating an argument.  As such, it often requires a vast number of 
simplifications.  Although such communication might include projections of 
future scenarios, there is no obvious reason why we need to attach certain 
probabilities to possible scenarios, especially when our knowledge of such 
likelihoods appears to be so shaky.  Neither there is any reason to pretend that 
the parameters we utilize are going to stay constant, when we know that they 
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won’t.  Instead, we can reflect on the sustainability of the processes that arise 
out of the model and the experiments we conduct, as for instance in Godley 
(1999) and Godley and Lavoie (2007b).  Any projections will of course be liable 
to the stability of the parameters we have employed, but this not an error itself.  
In either a micro or a macro founded model, what is an error is to forget the 
artificiality that surrounds our constructs.    
Even if the microfoundations approach was to provide a solution to a 
problem, it only does so by creating a few new ones.  In particular, it introduces 
a false social ontology, which as such creates the hazard of false policy 
conclusions, while it also opens the space for fallacies of composition. 
To start with the first, microfounded models such as the DSGEs are 
based on the dubious idea that society is an aggregation of individual 
households and firms, so that we can conduct a valid macro analysis by focusing 
at the level of the representative agent without losing scope.  However, as 
argued by Kirman (1989, 1992) it is far from obvious that the aggregate of 
individuals acts in the same way with the representative agent, even if everyone 
is assumed to behave rationally.  Put simply, there is no direct relation between 
individual and collective rationality.  Furthermore, Kirman points out that even 
if we could somehow construct an accurate representative agent at a given 
point of time, such representation would be itself liable to policy changes.  In 
Kirman’s words ‘the representative constructed before the change may no 
longer represent the economy after the change’ (1992: 123; emphasis in the 
original).  This means that the Lucas Critique applies to DSGE models equally 
well (also see Skott, 2014).   
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Despite the recent developments in DSGE modelling in incorporating 
insights from Game Theory, the basic microfounded ontology of the model 
leaves aside any element of social conflict, class divisions or exploitation.  For 
instance under the basic routine of those models, households provide capital to 
firms, while in their role as workers they freely choose how much to work and 
how much to go on holidays based on the disutility they derive from their 
labour.  To the extent that those elements are important in capturing real social 
dynamics, DSGE models act in a way that constrains rather than liberates the 
mind of the researcher.   
Coming to the second point, when microfounding a macro world, it is 
easy to neglect the fact that some variables might have different and often 
opposing effects at the two levels.  Such cases are described as fallacies of 
composition.  For example, a key point raised by Keynes (Keynes, 1936) in his 
critique against the classical economics of his time is the ‘paradox of thrift’, a 
phenomenon that relates with the implications of increased savings.  As argued 
by Keynes, although increased savings can secure some increased future 
consumption if applied solely by the individual, the reverse occurs when such 
behaviour is adopted in a collective scale by the population.  In that case, rather 
than securing an augmented volume of future consumption, increased savings 
will reduce consumption demand, and therefore investment.  As a result, not 
only the economy will experience a slump but the actual savings will also end 
up being lower than before due to the fall in peoples’ incomes.    
 
6.1.2.2 Equilibrium 
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By virtue of their neoclassical underpinnings, DSGE models assume that 
equilibrium is something that exists in the real world.  In that regard, DSGEs 
work with the deeply-rooted assumption that the market mechanism is capable 
of providing stability and full employment if left to operate freely.  Of course 
actual DSGEs employ all different sorts of frictions so as to explain the data of 
the real world.  However, the usage of those frictions does not remove the main 
idea behind DSGEs, and this is of the utmost importance for policy conclusions. 
For example, one of the most common kinds of rigidities that can be 
found in DSGE is wage rigidities.  The conventional (but not universal) wisdom 
across the DGSE community is that wage stickiness explains unemployment 
since it keeps the market away from the equilibrium wage that would deliver 
full (or non-inflation accelerating) employment.  Put simply if there are legal 
barriers, such as the minimum wage, firms might not hire as many workers as 
they would do otherwise, and therefore the labour market does not clear.  Even 
more, when in a recession workers refuse to accept a cut in their wages firms 
will have to fire part of their staff in order to reduce their costs.  Other than the 
fact that as with before there is a fundamental fallacy of composition when 
taking wages solely as a cost factor, and omitting their role as a source of 
aggregate demand, there is also an important issue in that DSGE modellers 
would usually assume that there really exists at all times an equilibrium wage 
consistent with full or non-inflation accelerating employment.  They ignore the 
fact that firms’ decisions to hire does not relate solely with the wages they have 
to pay, but also with their expectations about the future, so that especially in a 
recession we might very well have falling wages and increasing unemployment 
going hand in hand.   
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 Or, to state another example, even in the most advanced DSGE 
formulations where banks are explicitly incorporated into the model, there is 
the implicit assumption that if we were to remove the specific element that 
creates financial crises we could think of a stable financial system.  For instance 
in Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) the trouble of high leverage is caused by 
income inequality, while in Benes et al. (2014a) it has to do with risky loans 
given out to households.  In none of the papers outlined above there is any 
thought towards the direction that financial instability might be inherent to the 
functioning of the capitalist economy, rather than a symptom of specific 
regularities.  This of course is not a coincidence, but a reflection of the fact that 
in DSGE models finance is at best considered as an afterthought, rather than an 
intrinsic feature of the process of capital accumulation.  All those models 
outlined earlier can equally well explain investment with or without finance.   
Needless to say, my point of critique does not imply that observed regularities 
such as income inequality or risky loans are not important, but that there can be 
deeper causes behind financial crises not picked up by DSGEs.  For instance 
Minsky (1986) and his celebrated Financial Instability Hypothesis shows how 
financial fragility and speculation can be seen as intrinsic outcomes of the 
capitalist economy, given the way overoptimistic expectations are formed and 
re-enforced in the expansionary phase of the business cycle.   
 The precise schema that intrinsically creates financial instability goes 
beyond the current discussion.  For my purpose it suffices to point out that as 
long as there exist coherent explanations as to how unemployment, financial 
instability and crises can arise as endogenous outcomes of the market economy, 
DSGE models act in a way that impoverish the researcher by binding him or her 
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to a very specific understanding of the economic system that assumes stability 
as its ultimately normality.  Furthermore, as Yilmaz (2015) argues this is a very 
important distinction at the terrain of policy: rather than focusing on policy 
recommendations that would allow us to prevent unsustainable and 
destabilizing processes from building up, DSGE models tend to provide 
recommendations on how to improve the shock absorbing mechanisms of the 
economy.  Even more, as it can be seen in the abovementioned literature, those 
recommendations are usually delivered in the aftermath of the occurrence of 
actual shocks, so that the usefulness of this kind of modelling can be directly 
questioned.  
 
6.2 The SFC Alternative 
 
 SFC modelling has recently emerged as a way out of the flaws of DGSEs, 
while also opening up the space for a richer comprehension of economic 
phenomena.  Despite the fact that the SFC approach has mainly been adopted by 
scholars broadly belonging to the Post Keynesian tradition, it sets a framework 
that can also be adopted by economists who do not necessarily share the 
assumptions and insights of the Post Keynesian theory.  While the SFC approach 
has its roots at the works of James Tobin and Wynne Godley (indicatively see 
Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1982; Godley, 1999), it was the seminal book 
of Godley and Lavoie (2007b) that provided the main unified framework for the 
development of those models.  It is this book, along with the recent review of 
SFC models provided by Caverzasi and Godin (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015) that 
mainly influence the outline provided here.  
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 First, as the name suggests, SFC models pay attention in clearly 
separating between stocks and flows.  As pointed out by Godley and Lavoie 
(2007b), such distinction gives an element of dynamic interaction in the model 
whereby different short-run periods are interrelated through the realization of 
flows and the corresponding change of stocks in the economy.  Furthermore, by 
focusing on the interaction of the balance sheets of all the agents that are 
included in the model, the SFC approach gives a strong emphasis to watertight 
social accounting.  Namely, every flow needs to come from somewhere and go 
somewhere else, while every asset in the economy is always somebody else’s 
liability.  Although conceptually simple, this rule is powerful in making sure that 
we do not conduct any fallacies of composition.  In addition, it forces the 
researcher to comprehend the multifaceted role of assets/ liabilities in 
economic dynamics.  For instance under proper SFC accounting, public debt 
always has a mirror reflection as wealth either at the hands of the private 
sector, or at the hands of the central bank.   
 The above rule also holds in the case of open economy stock flow 
modelling.  In contrast with non-SFC models, the stock flow approach requires 
the explicit modelling of the external sector.  Open economy SFC models usually 
include from two to four countries (see below) with an emphasis being ascribed 
to the proper modelling of all the sectors in all countries.  As with before, the 
logic of SFC models forces us to take into account the fact that every trade 
imbalance has two distinct points of view: the deficit of one country is always 
the surplus of another.  Similarly the wealth that flies out of a country does not 
go into a black hole, but ends up in the hands of an agent or fund in a foreign 
sector.  Furthermore, unless special assumptions are employed, there is nothing 
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in the system that guarantees balanced trade across countries in either the 
short or the long run.   
In neither the closed nor the open economy set-up there is any default 
assumption of gravitating tendencies towards a market clearing equilibrium 
point.  Of course the model still solves for a steady state in most (but not all) of 
the SFC applications (for a discussion of explosive trajectories in SFC models, 
see Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos, 2011).  However, this does not imply that 
equilibrium is understood here as a feature of the real world.  Rather the steady 
state is merely employed as a reference point so as for the researcher to be able 
to draw inference and conclusions out of the model and the experiment he or 
she conducts.  Similarly, it can be seen as a useful device for comparing 
alternative policies.   
Although there is a growing stream of agent based stock flow 
applications (see for instance Carvalho and Di Guilmi, 2013), microfounding a 
SFC model is not a compulsory requirement.  In fact, most of the SFC models, 
including the ones outlined in Godley and Lavoie (2007b), have been so far 
based on macrofoundations.  Notice here that the macrofounding a macro 
model does not imply a return to the old school IS/LM framework.  In most, if 
not in all SFC models there is a far richer interaction between the developments 
going on in the financial market and the real economy than what the IS/LM 
approach could allow for.   
With regard to the behaviour of the model’s agents, there is no specific 
requirement for assuming rational expectations.  Instead a variety of 
expectation mechanisms can be employed.  Most importantly, given that some 
key decisions of the agents are made in the beginning of the period, before the 
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economy engages into any sort of interactions, mistakes can also be realized.  
For instance, households can err when calculating their expected wealth, firms 
may face a discrepancy between the expected and actual sales of their products, 
and banks may face a gap between the asset and liability sides of their balance 
sheet.  In all cases a buffer element is assumed for every sector so as to ensure 
the ex-post coherency of the accounting.   
One of the most interesting aspects of an SFC model is the way the 
financial market is depicted.  As modelled, it is essentially based on the financial 
decisions of households, who after deciding at the beginning of the period how 
much to consume, go on to estimate their end of the period wealth and decide 
how to allocate it across the available financial assets (e.g. government bills and 
bonds, corporate equities etc.).  The (proportional to expected wealth) demand 
of every asset is not only a function of its own rate of return, but also relates 
with the rates of return of all the other financial assets, including cash.  In its 
usual set up, the demand for cash can be either for liquidity or transactions 
purposes.  In that way we end up with a system of equations that needs to 
satisfy the following Tobinisque principles: i) the column of the coefficients that 
relate with liquidity preference (the constants of the equations) needs to sum 
up to one; ii) the coefficients of all other columns need to sum up to zero; iii) the 
sum of all the coefficients on rates of return, reading horizontally need to sum 
up to zero as well.  The logic behind those rules is that what matters for the 
decision making of households is not the rate of return of every asset per se, but 
its yield relative to all other assets.  For the same reason, whether the rates of 
return are included in a nominal or in a real form, does not make any difference 
(Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 326- 7).  Furthermore cash usually plays the role of 
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the buffer so as to correct the realized mistakes in expectations.  In that regard 
the ex-ante demand for cash usually differs from the actual ex-post cash 
holdings.   
In the overall, there is a three-stage process that needs to be followed 
when setting up and solving an SFC.  First, in accordance with the requirement 
of the watertight accounting, a balance sheet matrix must be designed for the 
model.  This is meant to include all the stocks of assets and liabilities that every 
sector has at the beginning of the period, as well as their net worth.  Second, a 
transaction matrix is required so as to map every transaction that takes place 
throughout the period across the different sides of the economy.  Any capital 
gains are also included here.  As a reflection of proper accounting, in both the 
balance and the transaction matrices all columns and rows should sum up to 
zero.  Third, the accounting identities and behavioural equations of each sector 
need to be established in order to illustrate the causalities that are assumed to 
run across the model.  Following, the parameters and initial values of stocks and 
flows need to be obtained so as to simulate the model (alternatively one can 
solve the system analytically and stop there, or just stop at the specification of 
the identities and equations).  As discussed in Caverzasi and Godin (2015) 
numerical values can either be theoretical or empirical, while in the second case 
the researcher can either calibrate them or estimate them econometrically.  
Notice here that up to stage two the model does not have a ‘character’ yet.  
Rather, it is only by means of the equations of stage three that the model 
incorporates insights from theory (also see Toporowski and Michell, 2011).  For 
instance the model could be either a demand or a supply led one and up to stage 
two those assumptions would make no difference.   
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All in all, there are no specific constraints to the issues to be studied.  
Rather, SFC models can allow for a plethora of phenomena to be investigated 
such as income inequality, innovation and financialization (see literature 
outline below).  Moreover, there are no boundaries to the theoretical narratives 
that one might want to reflect in a model, so that the SFC approach does not 
advocate any kind of economic orthodoxy, either new or old. 
 
6.2.1 Literature Review 
 
Caverzasi and Godin (2015) provide the most up to date and complete 
literature outline of SFC applications.  In what follows I outline some of the most 
recent papers, with a relative focus on open economy case studies.   
 To start with, van Treeck (2009) introduces some aspects of 
financialization into the SFC framework, running a number of experiments 
related to share buybacks and higher dividend pay-outs.  Moreover, Arestis and 
Sawyer (2012) study the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and Ryoo and Skott 
(2013) investigate the fiscal requirements for continuous full employment.  
Dafermos (2012) designs a model that incorporates liquidity preference in all 
three sectors (households, firms and banks) at the same time.  His analysis is 
facilitated by the construction of an uncertainty index that links with the 
economic agents’ precautionary motive and asset selection, as well as their 
willingness to take up more debt.  Passarella (2012) introduces the Minskyian 
dynamics of financial instability, while modifying Minsky’s theory by allowing 
households’ autonomous consumption (in relation to capital gains and credit) 
and equity price inflation to enter the model.  Furthermore, Dafermos (2014) 
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attempts to put together some of the key insights of Godley and Minsky, by 
taking on board Godley’s ‘financial balances approach’ and merging it with an 
endogenous target of the private sector’s net debt-to-income ratio a la Minsky.  
Nikolaidi (2014) studies the joint role of wage stagnation and securitization in 
amplifying macroeconomic instability.  Her model consists of nine distinct 
sectors, including two types of households, commercial banks, Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV)-underwriters and institutional investors.  Bhaduri et al. (2015) 
investigate the links between asset price fluctuations and the real economy.  
Interestingly, Bhaduri and his colleagues show how the inflation of asset prices 
can drive funds from real to financial investment, and thus contribute to 
systematic financial fragility.  From their side Caiani et al. (2014) study 
Schumpeterian innovation and its interplay with financial dynamics.   
 Out of the open economy SFC applications, Lavoie and Daigle (2011) 
study the implications of different behavioural finance strategies upon the 
exchange rate and trade account movements.  Following Duwicquet and Mazier 
(2010/11) construct a two country asymmetric model.  Controlling for different 
types of possible shocks, the writers show that within a monetary union like the 
Eurozone, an efficient stabilization policy needs to rely on federal transfers, 
rather than the holding of foreign assets by households and the supply of 
intrazone credit.  In a similar fashion, Duwicquet et al. (2012) show the need for 
a federal budget in the Eurozone, and the stabilizing potential of the idea of 
euro-bonds.  Furthermore, Kinsella and Khalil (2011) investigate the effects of 
debt-deflation in a monetary union, showing that for a small participant country 
facing deflation, only transfers from the larger country and increased public 
expenditure can put an end to the recession.  More recently, Ehnts (2013) 
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explores the potential benefit of an exchange rate rule, taken in conjunction 
with expansionary fiscal policy, while Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) compares the 
distinct and combined effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in a two 
country SFC model that faces inflationary and recessionary pressures.  Bortz 
(2014) allows for the possibility of having sovereign and private debt 
denominated in foreign currency and corporate debt issued by foreign banks, 
and studies the relevant implications upon trade and financial flows, 
distribution, as well as on fiscal and monetary policy.  Moreover Khalil and 
Kinsella (2014) consider a two country model with two commercial banks in 
each state, and examine the contagion effects of non-performing loans between 
banks and towards the macro economy. 
At a more ‘brave’ level, Godley and Lavoie (2007a) and Lavoie and Zhao 
(2010) construct some three country models, with the first paper studying the 
intra-Eurozone imbalances and the possible ways to confront them, and the 
second investigating the impacts of a diversification of China’s foreign reserve 
assets upon the Eurozone and the US.  Similarly, Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti 
(2012) set-up a three country model, including the US, China and Eurozone, and 
contrast the effectiveness of fixed and flexible dollar-yuan parities in reducing 
global imbalances.  Valdecantos and Zezza (2015) expand such framework in 
order to formally elaborate Keynes’s bancor proposal and its usefulness in 
containing global imbalances.  Furthermore Belabed et al. (2013) set up a three 
country model and study the effects of changes in income distribution upon 
current account imbalances.  Lastly, Mazier and Valdecantos (2015) construct a 
four country model and explore the possibility of a Eurozone with two Euros.   
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6.2.2 Limitations   
 
 Although the SFC framework is a promising alternative to conventional 
macroeconomic modelling, it too has its limitations.  First most SFC models (but 
not all) still narrow down to a system of linear equations, as in the case of 
DSGEs.  Similarly, despite its usefulness as a methodological tool, the steady 
state assumption also creates some distance between the model and reality.  
Moreover, as discussed by Godley and Lavoie (2001/2) and Caverzasi and 
Godin (2015), the numerical solution of the model focuses around local 
stability, so that the researcher cannot know whether there are any other 
equilibria in the model, and whether these are stable or not.  
 Aggregate SFC models usually employ a vast amount of equations 
(probably around a hundred equations on average). In addition, as pointed out 
by Toporowski and Michell (2011) the analysis of some phenomena such as 
stock market inflation can require the splitting of one or more of the aggregate 
sectors and hence further augment the mathematical complexity of the model.  
In either case, such complexity can obscure economic interpretation, while the 
results can prove to be quite sensitive to parameter values.  As discussed by 
Caverzasi and Godin, the parameterization of the model always involves some 
arbitrariness, irrespectively of the strength of the underlying empirical analysis, 
while some times non-realistic values need to be assumed for the sake of 
obtaining a realistic steady state solution.   
 Furthermore, the SFC approach to open economy modelling essentially 
gives rise to a two-country (or more) closed economy model (under fixed 
exchange rates it could also be thought as a regional model).  As outlined above, 
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the SFC strategy to model the external sector is by making it part of the model.  
Nonetheless, this brings along the weak assumption that the entire 
international trade of country A is conducted solely with country B.  Other than 
the fact that this might obscure our understanding of international macro-
dynamics if taken too seriously, it also creates an issue when one wants to 
calibrate the model to real data.  In particular, if we work on the assumption 
that the exports of country A are identical to the imports of country B, and if at 
the same time we want to set the figures of country A equal to their actual 
values for a given year, then by necessity we have to allow the exports of 
country B also to obtain that number.  With this said, the extent to which an 
open economy SFC model is useful depends on what we want to study.  For 
instance if one were to focus on Eurozone the SFC methodology could be 
justified by the fact that although open at a member state level, the Euro area is 
to a large extend a big closed economy when taken as a whole.  If that is the case 
then despite its limitations an open economy SFC model could still be a 
powerful tool in analysing, let’s say, the way intra-Eurozone imbalances were 
created and maintained throughout the decade that led to the European crisis.   
Taking all these considerations into account, it is important to remember 
that the SFC approach is a method of mathematical modelling.  As pointed out 
earlier, while modelling techniques can allow us to understand and illustrate 
analytically some otherwise complex phenomena and interactions, there are 
always simplifications and sacrifices that need to be made.  But even the most 
advanced and extended model one could ever imagine would not be in a 
position to capture the richness of theory.  For example, although there are lots 
of clever mechanics that can be employed in order to illustrate aspects that 
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arise out of Keynesian uncertainty, uncertainty itself remains a non-quantifiable 
concept.  The way out of the conundrum is not to downgrade the importance of 
such non-quantifiable phenomena and constraints and treat them as 
disturbances to an otherwise smooth process, but to fully acknowledge them 
and in that sense also acknowledge the limitations of the modelling we are 
doing.   
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
 Paving the ground for the model developed in the following chapter, 
Chapter 6 discusses some of the main alternatives in macroeconomic modelling.  
In contrasting the DSGE with the SFC approach, the chapter points out the 
advantages of the second.  As shown, the DGSE methodology offers the 
researcher a narrow modelling framework which operates on the basis of 
microfoundations, and which intrinsically assumes stability as the normal state 
of the economy.  As discussed, microfounding a macroeconomic model gives 
rise to a false social ontology, whereby society is taken to be equal to the mere 
aggregation of individual households and firms, and where a clear 
correspondence between individual and collective rationality is assumed.  
Furthermore the microfoundations approach allows for a number of fallacies of 
composition, such as the ‘paradox of thrift’.  In turn, assuming stability as the 
normal state of the capitalist economy gives rise to a pre-fixed understanding of 
certain economic phenomena, such as the rise and maintenance of 
unemployment.  
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On the other hand, the SFC approach provides a broader framework that 
can be employed by researchers coming from a variety of theoretical traditions.  
Some of the main merits of the approach include the clear distinction between 
stocks and flows, the emphasis on watertight social accounting, as well as the 
creation of the space required for the thorough examination of the various 
financial relationships between the agents of the economy.  The separation 
between stocks and flows gives an element of dynamic interaction to the model, 
whereby different periods are linked with each other by the realization of flows 
and the change in stocks.  Additionally, the coherent approach to social 
accounting forces the researcher to consider the fact that everything comes 
from somewhere and goes somewhere else.  It also acknowledges the 
multifaceted role of financial assets/ liabilities in the economy.  
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7 Chapter 7- Sovereign Ratings, Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, and Fiscal Policy: Interactions 
within a Stock Flow Consistent Framework 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have long been recognized as an 
important driver of financial and macroeconomic dynamics.  Since the outbreak 
of the East Asian crisis, authors such as Ferri et al. (1999) have pointed out their 
role in exaggeratedly downgrading crisis-hit countries, and re-enforcing 
recessionary spirals.  More recently, researchers such as Arezki et al. (2011) 
and De Santis (2012) have demonstrated evidence as to how sovereign ratings 
have a significant impact upon interest rates, while in Chapter 5 of the current I 
showed how ratings relate with extreme capital flow movements.   
 Nonetheless, the effects of sovereign ratings on economic outcomes have 
not been investigated to date in a macroeconomic model.  This is done here by 
means of a two-country stock flow consistent (SFC) model.  Purpose of the 
model is to elucidate the links between sovereign rating movements, the 
financial market and the constraints for fiscal policy.  Approximating the 
Eurozone set-up, my framework separates between a relatively weak and a 
relatively strong economy (labelled as South and North respectively), and 
includes one currency and one central bank.  It also allows for the fiscal 
expenditure of the South to be endogenously determined.  In addition I 
establish an endogenous mechanism that sets the sovereign rating of the South 
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to be a function of the accumulated GDP growth and the debt to GDP ratio of the 
country.    
Based on this specification, this model connects the movements of the 
South’s sovereign rating with the domestic and international financial markets 
and thereby with the South’s public sector.  The key idea is that once a crisis 
episode occurs in the South, the country’s ‘fundamentals’ deteriorate so that 
CRAs decide to downgrade it.  The drop of the South’s rating score has a 
negative impact on the demand for the financial assets issued by the southern 
government.  By switching to more liquid assets, investors amplify the financial 
constraints that the government faces, so that the latter is forced to implement 
fiscal austerity.  In turn fiscal austerity diminishes the already falling aggregate 
demand and the recessionary spiral gets deepened.   
 A number of alternative closures are established.  Under the baseline 
scenario, the withdrawal of funds from the downgraded country is matched by 
an increase in liquidity preference and thus a rise in cash holdings.  An 
alternative scenario where those funds are instead driven towards the bills 
issued by the North is also assembled.  This set-up could be seen as a 
resemblance of the ‘flight to quality’ phenomenon that has commonly been 
observed in financial markets (see for instance De Santis, 2012).  In addition, 
building on the insights of Chapter 4, a scenario whereby CRAs exhibit an 
element of panic once downgrading the South is also explored.   
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section two outlines the 
background theory and evidence.  Section three prepares the ground for the 
model, by discussing two alternative specifications relating with the 
assumptions about the behaviour of the central bank.  It then introduces the 
 
 
192 | P a g e  
 
sovereign model and outlines the corresponding mechanism and causalities.  
Section four presents the results of the model, both for the baseline 
specification and the two alternative closures discussed above.  It also includes 
two robustness checks, namely a set of sensitivity tests and an extension of the 
baseline model with prices.  Lastly section five concludes.  All simulations of the 
current are done in R Studio.   The ‘PKSFC’ package has been used, a package 
that provides a set of commands for stock flow models based on the 
methodology developed by Kinsella and O'Shea (2010). 
 
7.2 Theoretical Background, Empirical Evidence and 
Contribution 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, CRAs have been an important part of the 
nexus of power throughout the neoliberal era.  With globalized and deregulated 
financial markets, and with the incorporation of ratings into financial 
regulation, ratings have been seen as a sort of a ‘blessing’ for rated entities, with 
the agencies’ decisions relating directly to the cost of financing.  Furthermore, 
sovereign ratings have been the key expression of CRAs’ power upon the state.  
As pointed out in Chapter 3, such power is a function of a government’s need to 
access the financial market.  In the case of the Eurozone, the lack of an 
institution that can act as an LLR exposes EMU member states to the sentiment 
of the market and therefore augments the power of CRAs.   
For the purposes of the current, one more dimension must be illustrated.  
In particular it is interesting to observe that the power of CRAs’ over the state 
contains an asymmetry in the way that agencies’ decisions affect governments.  
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More specifically, while it is easy to see that a government will need to apply 
measures of fiscal austerity in the aftermath of a severe downgrade so as to 
regain its access to the market, the reverse does not necessarily hold true.  For 
example, it can hardly be the case that a triple-A rated country will take its 
excellent rating as a blank check and start increasing its public expenditure by 
investing in public services, welfare provisions and infrastructure.  Rather, a 
sovereign rating upgrade, or the maintenance of a high rating score by CRAs, 
can be seen as an encouragement for continuing to apply a frugal approach to 
the public budget.  In a way a good rating score can be taken as a reward for 
exactly this kind of behaviour.  If the asymmetry pointed out here is right, it 
should also be reflected on a model that aims to capture the macroeconomic 
effects of sovereign ratings. 
Coming to the empirical evidence, Figures 7.1 and 7.2 provide an idea of 
the co-movement of sovereign ratings and public expenditure from 1999 to 
2012 across Germany and the Eurozone periphery (for the sake of diversity, 
given that the development of S&P sovereign ratings is already depicted in 
Figure 4.1 of the Chapter 4, I chose to illustrate those of Moody’s here).  As 
pictured in those graphs, there have been some severe rating downgrades in all 
five peripheral countries since 2008, with Greece providing the most 
conspicuous example.  Parallel to these downgrade movements, the fiscal 
expenditures of these countries have either remained stagnant or followed a 
downward trend too.   
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Figure 7.1. Moody’s ratings for a selection of EMU countries; ratings measured in a 1 to 17 
scale with 17 corresponding to AAA and 1 corresponding to any rating from CCC+ and 
below; source: Moody’s website and author’s elaboration. 
 
 
Figure 7.2.  Total Public Expenditures for a selection of EMU countries; unit: millions of 
Euro; source: Eurostat. 
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In accordance with the above remarks we can see that although Germany 
stands in contrast to the rest of the countries in that it has managed to retain its 
triple-A status, its public spending has exhibited a similar stagnating tendency.  
All in all, despite the fact that the evidence outlined here is not adequate to 
establish a particular line of causality and despite the peculiarities of each 
country, it is interesting to observe how the recent period of economic 
turbulence has driven all peripheral countries towards fiscal austerity, and how 
CRAs have reacted by severely downgrading all five of them. 
 Having said this, the present chapter contributes to existing literature in 
two distinct ways.  On one hand, it provides the first attempt to capture the 
effects of sovereign ratings in a formal macroeconomic model.  In that regard, it 
expands the political economy literature that critically reflects on the 
destabilizing and authoritarian role of CRAs by providing some new analytical 
insights (the relevant literature is discussed in Chapter 2 of the current).  
Secondly, it contributes to the SFC literature outlined in the previous chapter, 
and in particular to the open economy (two country) SFC branch.  While various 
authors have concentrated on issues that relate to the activity and channels of 
influence of CRAs, such as sovereign debt creditworthiness (Bortz, 2014) and 
endogenous shifts in liquidity preference (Dafermos, 2012), and several others 
have focused on the dynamics of the Eurozone (see for instance Duwicquet et 
al., 2012 and Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014), no one has so far attempted to 
explicitly incorporate European sovereign ratings into an SFC model.  Given the 
capacity of CRAs to affect the macroeconomy, as well as the institutional 
constraints of the Eurozone outlined above, there is a gap that the current 
chapter aims to fill.   
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7.3 The Model 
 
To formalize the potential effects of sovereign ratings in a macroeconomic 
model I employ a stock flow consistent (SFC) model, based on the approach 
developed by Godley (e.g. Godley, 1999) and more recently by Godley and 
Lavoie (2007b) (for a detailed discussion of the SFC methodology see Chapter 6 
of the current).  The basis of my model is model REG from chapter 6 of Godley 
and Lavoie (Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 170- 187).  This is an open economy, 
demand driven regional model.  It includes two economies, labelled as South 
and North, with two separate governments that issue bills, but there is only one 
currency and one central bank.  Although initially designed as a regional model, 
the single currency and central bank assumptions make it quite suitable as a 
tool for analysing Eurozone.  Moreover, while the two countries of the model 
are labelled as ‘North’ and ‘South’, one could use some imagination and think of 
them as Germany and Greece respectively.  In addition there is nothing to 
prevent us from labelling the central bank as ECB.  
All the equations of the model can be found in Appendix A of the current 
chapter.  In each economy GDP is composed of consumer expenditure, public 
expenditures, imports and exports.  Compared with the version of Godley and 
Lavoie, the only modification I have done is to add expectations (see eq. 7.4 and 
7.9 in Appendix A), and to allow households to purchase both domestic and 
foreign assets.  It is important to highlight that households’ portfolio asset 
decisions are essentially the locus of the financial market in this model (eq. 7.11 
to 7.16).  In the beginning of each period, after deciding how much to consume, 
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households estimate their end-of-period wealth and decide how to allocate it 
across the different financial assets.  Following the SFC tradition the asset 
demand functions are based upon the Tobinisque logic in that the demand for 
each financial asset is not only a function of its own rate of return, but also links 
with the returns of all other available assets (see the 𝜆𝑖𝑗 parameters below, with 
𝑖 ∈ [1,6];  𝑗 ∈ [1,3]).  It also relates with the demand for cash for liquidity and 
transaction purposes (captured by the 𝜆𝑖0 and 𝜆𝑖4 parameters respectively, with 
𝑖 ∈ [1,6]). Households’ expectations for disposable income and wealth are 
assumed to follow a simple adaptive rule, where the most recent observation is 
the expectation of the present period.   
With regards to notation, the ‘S’ and ‘N’ upper-scripts denote the South 
and the North respectively.  For example 𝐶𝑆 is the consumption of the South, 
while 𝑌𝑁 is the GDP of the North.  In addition the ‘h’ subscript denotes actual 
(ex-post) holdings of households, ‘e’ stands for expectations, ‘d’ for demand and 
‘s’ for supply.  In all financial assets, the upper script denotes the issuer and the 
lower script denotes the holder of the asset.  Greek letters are used for all 
behavioural parameters, while all magnitudes are expressed in a nominal form, 
using capital letters.  Furthermore there is a quite conventional notation used 
for the variables of the model: 𝑌𝐷 stands for households’ disposable income; 𝑌 
denotes Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 𝑇 is used for taxes; 𝑟 is the interest 
rate on bills; 𝐵 is used for government bills; 𝑉denotes wealth; 𝐻 stands for 
cash; 𝑟ℎdenotes the interest rate on cash holdings (set equal to zero); 𝑁𝑊 
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implies net worth; 𝐺is used for fiscal expenditure; 𝑋 means exports; 𝐼𝑀 is 
imports; and 𝐹is profits.   
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the balance sheet and transaction matrices 
of the model.  In both tables, all rows and columns must sum up to zero so as to 
satisfy the stock flow consistency requirements.  Table 7.1 describes the stocks 
of assets and liabilities that are inherited from the past (described with a plus 
and minus respectively).  In addition, Table 7.2 shows the transactions that take 
place within a period.  Here the plus and minus signs correspond to revenues 
and expenditures.  For instance households spend money in consumption and 
therefore 𝐶 appears with a minus in their column, while they are the sole 
recipients of income from production (wages and profits are amalgamated in 
the current) so that 𝑌 appears with a plus in their account.  Similarly, the 
households of both countries pay taxes to their governments, while they also 
receive interest payments from their bill holdings.  Furthermore, by the end of 
the period they update their stock holdings of all their assets.  As it can be seen 
from Table 7.1, there are three available financial assets for households, namely 
cash 𝐻, southern bills 𝐵𝑆 and northern bills 𝐵𝑁.  The ECB is the sole issuer of 
cash, with cash playing here the role of money, while it also purchases 
government bills from both countries.  Notice here that money is endogenous in 
that the ECB always provides any amount of cash that is demanded by 
households.  Moreover, the double entry bookkeeping helps us illustrate the 
fact that all stock of debt of the two governments is nothing but wealth at the 
hands of the private sector.  Under this system of accounting, the columns of the  
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Table 7.1.  Balance Sheet Matrix  
 South ECB North  
 Households Firms  Government  Households Firms  Government Σ 
Cash +𝐻ℎ
𝑆   −𝐻 +𝐻ℎ
𝑁   0 
Southern Bills +𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆   −𝐵𝑆 +𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  +𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆    0 
Northern Bills +𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁    +𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁  +𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁   −𝐵𝑁 0 
Balance −𝑉ℎ
𝑆  −𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑆  −𝑉ℎ
𝑁  −𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑁 0 
         
Σ 0  0 0 0  0 0 
Notes: plus and minus denote assets and liabilities respectively 
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Table 7.2.  Transactions Flow Matrix 
  South ECB North  
  Households Firms  Government C K Households Firms  Government Σ 
 Consumption −𝐶𝑆 +𝐶𝑆    −𝐶𝑁 +𝐶𝑁  0 
 Govt. Exp.  +𝐺𝑆 −𝐺𝑆    +𝐺𝑁 −𝐺𝑁 0 
 Trade  −𝐼𝑀𝑆     +𝑋𝑁  0 
   +𝑋𝑆     −𝐼𝑀𝑁  0 
 GDP  
[Memo Item] 
+𝑌𝑆 −𝑌𝑆    +𝑌𝑁 −𝑌𝑁  0 
 ECB’ Profits   +𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑆  −𝐹𝐸𝐶𝐵    +𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑁  0 
 Taxes −𝑇𝑆  +𝑇𝑆   −𝑇𝑁  +𝑇𝑁 0 
Interest 
On 
Southern Bills +𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑆   −𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵−1
𝑆  +𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑆   +𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑆    0 
Northern Bills +𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑁    +𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑁   +𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑁   −𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵−1
𝑁  0 
Change  
in the 
Stock of 
Southern Bills −𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆   +𝛥𝐵𝑆  −𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  −𝛥𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅ℎ
𝑆    0 
Northern Bills −𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁     −𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁  −𝛥𝐵𝐺𝐸𝑅ℎ
𝑁   +𝛥𝐵𝑁 0 
Cash −𝛥𝐻ℎ
𝑆    +𝛥𝐻 −𝛥𝐻ℎ
𝑁   0 
 Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: plus and minus denote revenues and expenditures respectively 
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firms in the transaction matrix give the national income identities of the two 
countries.   
There are a number of simplifying assumptions in the model.  First, firms 
act in an accommodating way viz-a-viz the rest of the economy.  They simply 
produce whatever is demanded.  They do not undertake any productive 
investment, while all their profits are immediately transferred back to 
households.  In that sense there is no endogenous economic growth in the 
model.  Secondly my set-up does not include private banks.   
For each simplification done in the current, the underlying hypothesis is 
that its inclusion would only serve to strengthen the simulation results 
presented here.  Indicatively, although the incorporation of commercial banks 
could open the space for the consideration of additional channels of influence of 
sovereign ratings, and thus give rise to more complex results, the recessionary 
effects caused by ratings would still occur unless we were to assume 
commercial banks capable of operating in a counter-cyclical manner.  In a 
similar fashion, the inclusion of an endogenous interest rate for the southern 
economy would only increase the persistence of the impact of a sovereign 
rating downgrade and thereby contribute to the deepening of the recession.   
With this said, the above simplifications were seen as necessary 
sacrifices in order to be able to focus on the dynamics of the household sector 
and the state, which are important for the purposes of the current.  By 
narrowing down the model, and making it as simple as possible, it becomes 
much more feasible not only to solve it on the computer and find a steady state 
solution, but also to trace the channels through which a change spreads out 
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across the two economies.  Tractability simply means that under all scenarios 
you know what is going on in the model you have constructed.  
The parameterization of the model is based upon the numbers provided 
by Godley and Lavoie (2007b).  These are reasonable steady state values that 
allow us to draw some useful inference from the model and contrast different 
scenarios and shocks.  The arithmetical values of all parameters and stocks are 
provided in the end of Appendix A.  As modelled the two countries are taken as 
identical in terms of size, with only small differences in their behavioural 
parameters (for instance the propensity to consume of the South is set to be 0.7, 
while the one of the North is set at 0.6).  They are then differentiated by the 
different shocks that are conducted in the model.   
 
7.3.1 Basic Set- Up (model FEX) 
 
In its basic version (let me call it model FEX) the model assumes that the 
ECB acts as a purchaser of last resort for both governments’ bills (see eq. 7.27 
and 7.28 below) and is happy to support any levels of deficits that arise.  This 
means that none of the two governments can ever default and that the influence 
of the financial market is limited for both countries (the only impact is through 
the component of consumption that comes out of wealth).  
To illustrate the properties of FEX I run three separate experiments, 
namely: i) I raise the propensity to import 𝜇 of the South from 0.180781 to 
0.20781; ii) I increase the exogenous fiscal expenditure of the South from 20 to 
25, and iii) I decrease the liquidity preference of southern households by raising  
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Figure 7.3.  Three experiments with FEX; experiment 1 (1st column): increase the propensity 
to consume of the South from 0.18781 to 0.20781; experiment 2 (2nd column): increase the 
(exogenous) fiscal expenditures of the South from 20 to 25; experiment 3 (3rd column): 
reduce the liquidity preference of southern households by setting 𝜆20 from 0.35 to 0.5.  First 
row describes the development of GDP across all three experiments, the second row shows 
the developments of the change in private wealth, as well as the fiscal and current account 
imbalances, while row three shows the development of the debt to GDP ratio for the two 
countries.   
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𝜆20 from 0.35 to 0.5.   Relevant results are reported in Figure 7.3.  Regarding 
the first experiment (first column in Figure 7.3), while the GDP in the Southern 
country falls, there is a symmetric rise of the Northern economy.  Moreover, 
given that the South’s public expenditures are exogenous, and that the fall of 
GDP causes a fall of tax revenues, the southern government needs to run a 
permanent budget deficit so as to keep supporting its expenditures (first 
column/ second row).  For the process to be sustainable the ECB needs to enter 
into ever increasing purchases of southern bills, so that the South’s debt to GDP 
ratio permanently increases once the shock has occurred (with the reverse 
happening for the North; see column1/ third row).  Under the second 
experiment, the rise of public expenditure in the South boosts growth in both 
countries.  This is because the higher income that is produced in the South also 
pushes upwards the income of the North, through the channel of international 
trade.  As with before, for the increased public expenditure to be supported, the 
southern government needs to run a permanent budget deficit, which in turn 
gives rise to an ever-increasing debt to GDP ratio on that country.  Lastly, 
experiment three highlights the limited importance of the financial market in 
this model.  While the fall of the liquidity preference of southern household 
increases the demand for southern bills, this change only manages to increase 
the country’s GDP by less than 1% (see the GDP scale at the first row/ third 
column graph).   
As argued by Godley and Lavoie (2007b) there is nothing in the model to 
drive the two economies towards balanced trade.  Current account and budget 
imbalances are fully compatible with a steady state environment.  Furthermore, 
by virtue of proper accounting, there is, under all scenarios, a twin deficit 
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situation in that the current account and budget imbalances are identical at the 
end of every experiment (see row 2 of Figure 7.3; also see the discussion at 
Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 176- 180).  However, as noted by Godley and Lavoie, 
the satisfaction of the twin deficit identity does not imply a specific line of 
causality in the model; it simply says that the two are always equal.  Still, the 
identity is powerful enough to remind us that in a closed-two country set up 
such as the one employed here, it is not only impossible for the two countries to 
run trade surpluses at the same time, but it is equally futile to simultaneously 
push them to achieve fiscal surpluses (Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 182- 3).      
 
7.3.2 Endogenous Public Expenditure for the South (model FEXEND) 
 
While the above model is a useful tool for reflecting on alternative 
policies for Eurozone, it lies on the assumption that there is an accommodative 
central bank that supports any imbalances that are created.  This is not 
however a realistic assumption for describing the behaviour of the ECB, which 
by its own constitution is forbidden to directly purchase government debt of 
EMU member states.  Hence there is a need for modifying the model so as to get 
closer to the actual dynamics of Eurozone.  To do this I create an alternative 
closure with endogenous fiscal expenditures for the South.  This closure is 
based on chapter 12 of Godley and Lavoie (see Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 465-
466 and 472-476).  The key change here is to flip the 𝐺𝑆 and 𝛥𝐵𝑠
𝑆 terms in eq. 
7.18, so that rather than having the southern public expenditure determining 
the required amount of bills to be issued, we now have the supply of bills 
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constraining the expenses that can be undertaken.  In addition the ECB’s 
purchasing of southern bills is set to be constant (eq. 7.27B below) so as to 
reflect the fact that it now ceases to act as a lender of last resort36.  There is also 
a new equation (7.27A) that determines the total supply of southern bills, so 
that in the overall we have: 
 
 𝐺𝑆 = 𝛥𝐵𝑆 + 𝑇𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆  
 
(7.18A) 
 
 𝐵𝑆 = 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 + 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 + 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  
 
(7.27A) 
 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 (7.27B) 
 
   
Doing so entirely changes the dynamics of the model.  As Godley and Lavoie 
point out, in this version there exists a recessionary bias not only for the South, 
but also for the system as a whole.  This is because any shock that would 
diminish the GDP of the South would also reduce the tax revenues of the 
country, which constitute the sole source of income for the state besides the 
issuance of new bills.  In that regard, unless there is some source of additional 
financing, the fall in tax revenues will lead to a reduction in southern public 
expenditures.  Nonetheless, under the new closure of the model, there is no 
source that could meet the southern state’s need for new borrowing.  With the  
                                            
36 The precise amount of 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  is set equal to the figure obtained from the steady state solution 
of the model.  Notice here that although any other level of 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  such as 0 would also enable us 
to solve the model, it would however violate the stock flow consistency requirement, since the 
redundant equation would not be satisfied any more.  
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Figure 7.4.  Three experiments with model FEXEND; experiment 1 (1st column): increase 
the propensity to consume of the South from 0.18781 to 0.20781; experiment 2 (2nd 
column): decrease the (exogenous) fiscal expenditures of the North from 20 to 15; 
experiment 3 (3rd column): increase the liquidity preference of southern households by 
reducing 𝝀𝟐𝟎 from 0.35 to 0.2.  First row describes the development of GDP across all three 
experiments, the second row shows the developments of the change in private wealth, as 
well as the fiscal and current account imbalances, while row three shows the development 
of the debt to GDP ratio for the two countries.   
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liquidity provided by the private market being initially flat and later falling due 
to the fall of GDP and wealth, and with no Central Bank acting as a purchaser of 
last resort, there is no way to sustain any level of budget deficit once a recession 
hits the South.  As a result the fiscal expenditure of the South is pushed 
downwards so as to maintain the balance of the budget.  In that way however 
the southern state is pushed to adopt an austerity policy that reinforces instead 
of containing the recessionary spiral.  With the fiscal expenditures of the South 
being endogenous and falling, and with the ones of the North staying 
exogenous, there is no source of demand to run counter-cyclically.  As a result 
the global economy is driven as a whole into recession once a negative shock 
occurs in the South.  
The above can be seen more clearly when repeating the first experiment 
of the above, where the propensity to import of the south raises from 0.180781 
to 0.20781.  As seen in the first column of Figure 7.4, not only the recession is 
deeper than before with regards to the South, but it also affects the North.  More 
specifically, in contrast with the model FEX, where there was a complete 
symmetry between the developments of the two countries, the North now sees 
the initial boost of its growth evaporating shortly after the shock.  At the new 
steady state, both countries find themselves with a lower GDP than before.  
On top of the above, I also conduct two more experiments, one by cutting 
the exogenous fiscal expenditures of the North, setting them from 20 to 15, and 
one by pushing the 𝜆20 parameter downwards from 0.35 to 0.2 (which implies 
a rise in the liquidity preference of Southern households).  In the first case 
(column 2 of Figure 7.4) the experiment shows how an exogenously given 
austerity in the North is fully transmitted to the South.  Moreover, as it can be 
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seen from the last experiment (column 3 of Figure 7.4), the financial market is 
now far more important than in model FEX in determining economic dynamics.  
Namely, the demand for bills not only affects aggregate demand indirectly 
through the consumption out of wealth channel, but there is also a direct link 
with the fiscal expenditures of the South.  In contrast with the previous case 
where the change in the liquidity preference only had an impact of about 1% 
upon the GDP of the South, it now affects it by more than 10%.   
At the same time, as it can be seen from the second and third rows of 
Figure 7.4, the levels of public debt never get out of hand, and the fiscal and 
current accounts are always balanced in a steady state environment.  These 
results hold irrespectively of the experiment considered.   We can therefore 
think of model FEXEND as one that replicates more closely the dynamics of an 
economy such as Eurozone where balanced accounts and stable public debts 
are the utmost policy priorities and where there are institutions such as the 
central bank and the financial market to discipline the countries that get out of 
track (also see the discussion in Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 474).  With this said, 
the key point of model FEXEND is to show that such priorities are not 
necessarily compatible with the stable growth of the economy.     
 
7.3.3 Incorporating Sovereign Ratings:  The SR Model 
 
Having constructed two alternative closures of the model, it is now time 
to introduce sovereign ratings.  As discussed earlier sovereign ratings are one of 
the key means by which rating agencies exercise power over national 
governments, by disciplining them and enforcing the idea of ‘sound finance’.  
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Notice however that it is one thing to acknowledge and take seriously such 
power, and is quite another to end up with a narrative that attributes 
cataclysmic forces to CRAs.  As pointed out in Chapter 2, CRAs act within a 
specific socio-economic surrounding, that of neoliberalism, which as such 
already includes forces attempting to enforce the dominant frame of thought to 
governments and the public.  In that regard it would be an exaggeration to 
construct a model that would put CRAs in a position where they can create a 
crisis ex nihilo.  Rather, a more accurate approach is to show how CRAs can 
affect and reinforce already ongoing recessionary spirals.  Hence out of the two 
models outlined above, it is the second one (model FEXEND) that is more 
suitable for using as a basis here.  With the ECB already playing the role of 
enforcing fiscal discipline, it is interesting to see how the picture can be 
amplified once sovereign ratings are also taken on board.   
In particular, we can think of a model where CRAs act as an institution 
that can potentially impose more severe constraints than the already 
established ones.  This can either be conceived as a result of CRAs being stricter 
in their requirements for approving the continuation of financing, or because 
CRAs might be looking more carefully at some variables that are not 
incorporated into the model yet.  While we can think of both scenarios holding 
true, it is primarily the second case that can be interesting here.  More 
specifically, as shown in that stream of literature that studies the key 
determinants of sovereign ratings (see Chapter 4 of the current), and as 
mentioned by CRAs themselves in their reports (see for instance S&P, 2013),  
CRAs do not only look at the levels of public debt and the levels of fiscal and 
current account deficits (which can be seen as the elements already  
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Table 7.3. Accumulated GDP Growth and Public Debt to GDP for EMU Peripheral Countries  
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece Accumulated Real GDP growth -0.22 -3.40 -8.35 -15.45 -21.82 
 Public Debt to GDP 112.90 129.69 148.33 170.31 156.87 
Ireland Accumulated Real GDP growth -2.17 -8.56 -9.63 -7.41 -7.31 
 Public Debt to GDP 44.16 64.42 91.19 104.08 117.40 
Italy Accumulated Real GDP growth -1.21 -6.68 -4.94 -4.48 -6.99 
 Public Debt to GDP 106.09 116.42 119.29 120.70 126.96 
Portugal Accumulated Real GDP growth -0.03 -2.95 -0.94 -2.22 -5.47 
 Public Debt to GDP 71.69 83.70 93.99 108.25 124.07 
Spain Accumulated Real GDP growth 0.85 -3.00 -3.21 -3.14 -4.80 
 Public Debt to GDP 40.17 53.98 61.66 70.47 85.97 
Notes: real GDP growth and Public Debt to GDP are both measured in % units; source: Eurostat and author's elaboration 
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constraining the FEXEND model), but also take into account the record of GDP 
growth of the economy under consideration.  Simply put this means that with 
everything else being the same, the falling rate of growth of a country will be 
identified by CRAs as a factor that increases the probability of default of the 
corresponding government on its debt (remember here that sovereign ratings 
are nothing but an expression of this probability).  The usual response of CRAs 
in such a case would be to downgrade the country under consideration.  But  
then, it is exactly this activity of CRAs that creates the potential for a self-
fulfilling prophecy, since the downgrading might make it even more difficult for 
the given country to reverse the falling trend of its GDP growth (for a similar 
point also see Ferri et al., 1999).  Despite what they claim for themselves, CRAs 
might be actually pushing a recession-hit country off the cliff.   
To capture the hypothesis into the model, I create a new variable that 
aims to approximate severe movements of the southern sovereign rating.  Let 
me call it 𝑆𝑅37.  Conceptually speaking we can think of the word ‘severe’ either 
as one big downgrade or as a cluster of smaller ones, which in either case result 
in augmented financial difficulties for the rated country.  Recalling here that 
institutional investors such as pension funds are usually obliged by law to shift 
their portfolios when an asset drops below the BBB- notch, we could think for 
instance of 𝑆𝑅 as the event of a downgrade that pushes the country below that 
threshold and towards the speculative range.   
Naturally, the 𝑆𝑅 variable needs to be a function of the magnitudes that 
matter for sovereign ratings.  In the context of the current model, such variables  
                                            
37 Hereafter, SR will be used to denote the SR model whereas 𝑆𝑅 in italics will denote the 
sovereign rating variable.  
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are the South’s ratio of Debt to GDP as well as the country’s accumulated GDP 
growth.   
Table 7.3 provides a quick overview of those variables for the peripheral 
countries of Eurozone.  In order to define whether an 𝑆𝑅 downgrading episode 
occurs we need to set some thresholds for its determinants, which if crossed 
would increase 𝑆𝑅’s value.  To do so I construct a dummy composition 
mechanism, which works as follows: 
 
 𝑆𝑅1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ < −15% 
 
(7.34) 
 
 𝑆𝑅2 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 > 85%  
 
(7.35) 
 
 𝑧 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑆𝑅1 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑅2 > 0 
 
(7.36) 
 
 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑅2 − 0.8 ∗ 𝑧 
 
(7.37) 
 
 Needless to say, the -15% and 85% thresholds are partly arbitrary.  In 
that sense, the model developed here captures the effects of sovereign ratings in 
a world where those thresholds exist.  With this said, it is easy to see how 
within a certain range, changing the thresholds would only alter the timing of 
the 𝑆𝑅 change.  Furthermore, in the 𝑆𝑅 expression I have added another 
dummy, the 𝑧 one, so as to distinguish between the impacts of the different 
determinants in terms of timing.  The hypothesis here is that 𝑆𝑅 will switch 
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from 0 to 1 once the first variable crosses its threshold, but will only rise for 
another 0.2 once the second one follows.   The idea is based on the simple fact 
that once a country has suffered from a severe downgrade, any further drop of 
the rating only does little more in deteriorating further the economy’s financial 
environment38.  Moreover the 𝑆𝑅 variable does not change more than twice.  
That is, once SR has switched to 1 and/or to 1.2 it does not go back to zero at 
any point.  This is simply for the purpose of being able to extract some 
meaningful inference from the model, since if I were to let 𝑆𝑅 to fluctuate freely 
I would create a repetitive loop that would strip the model from any meaningful 
economic results.  We can think of this set-up as a two-step experiment: at first 
we need to change a parameter so as to generate a recession in the South.  We 
then need to wait and see how and when the 𝑆𝑅 variable will respond.  In a way 
the process described here is not that different from the usual modeling 
simulation routines, with the main difference being that instead of studying a 
one-off experiment this project focuses on a two-stage process. 
Given the above mechanism, I set the sovereign rating (𝑆𝑅) of the South 
as a determinant of the liquidity preference parameters of both southern and 
northern households that relate with the demand for southern bills39.  
Expressed in a formal way this implies endogenizing the 𝜆20 and 𝜆60 
parameters of equations 7.11 and 7.15 respectively as follows: 
 
 𝜆20 = 𝜁20 + 𝜁21𝑆𝑅; 𝜁21 ≤ 0  (7.38) 
                                            
38 We could just remove the 𝑧 dummy and any results we get would just be intensified.   
39 The way liquidity preference parameters are endogenized is influenced by Dafermos (2012). 
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 𝜆60 = 𝜁60 + 𝜁61𝑆𝑅; 𝜁61 ≤ 0 
 
(7.39) 
 
Here, we can think of 𝜁20 and 𝜁60 as the default values of 𝜆20 and 𝜆60 
respectively.  Furthermore the 𝜁21 and 𝜁61 parameters capture the power of 
CRAs.  Measured in absolute terms, the greater the value of those parameters, 
the greater the influence of sovereign ratings upon households’ decision making 
(also see the sensitivity tests below).  Both 𝜁21 and 𝜁61are set to be negative (or 
zero), implying here that a rise in 𝑆𝑅 would increase the liquidity preference of 
households by causing a fall in 𝜆20 and 𝜆60.  Such development would shift 
demand away from southern bills and towards interest- free cash.  In 
accordance with Chapter 5 of the current, the 𝜁61 can be seen as a reflection of 
the degree of influence of CRAs upon foreign capital flows.  Furthermore, as 
constructed, the model provided here is a more general case of the 
corresponding model of Godley and Lavoie (2007b), with the latter being 
equivalent with the special case where 𝜁21 = 𝜁61 = 0.   
As the SR model is set, there is a chain of causality running from 
sovereign rating events to the fiscal expenditure of the South.  To facilitate the 
illustration of the channel I put together the most relevant equations, setting in 
bold the variables that link directly with the sovereign rating influence: 
 
 𝑮𝑺 = 𝜟𝑩𝑺 + 𝑇𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆  (7.18A) 
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 𝑩𝑺 = 𝑩𝑺𝒉
𝑺 + 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 + 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  (7.27A) 
 
 
𝑩𝑺𝒉
𝑺 = 𝑽𝒆
𝑺(𝝀𝟐𝟎 − 𝜆21𝑟ℎ + 𝜆22𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆23𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆24
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 )  
(7.11) 
 
 𝝀𝟐𝟎 = 𝜁20 + 𝜁21𝑺𝑹; 𝜁21 ≤ 0  (7.38) 
 
Equation 7.18A shows the endogenous determination of the southern fiscal 
expenditure, 7.27A determines the total supply of southern bills, equation 7.11 
sets the demand of southern bills by households that reside in the South, and 
equation 7.38 shows the abovementioned mechanism that links the sovereign 
rating of the south with the liquidity preference of southern households.    
Reading those expressions from bottom to top, it can be seen that 
when 𝑆𝑅 changes, causing 𝜆20 to change, we have 𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑒
𝑆 ∗ 𝛥𝜆20.  This 
implies that other than the power of CRAs, which as mentioned before is 
reflected by the 𝜁21 parameter, what matters in determining the overall effect 
of 𝑆𝑅 upon the southern fiscal expenditure is the total amount of wealth of the 
southern households: ceteris paribus, the greater the volume of wealth, the 
greater will be the exposure of the southern state to the sentiment of the 
financial market, and thus the greater the reduction in public expenditures it 
will need to confront when an 𝑆𝑅 shock occurs.  This link is of course a 
manifestation of the simple truth that the greater the stock of bills held by 
southern households, the greater the amount of bills they can get rid of at any 
point of time.  From here it would also be quite straightforward to expand and 
show how a similar mechanism also operates in the model at the terrain of 
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foreign flows (i.e. in that part of the model where northern households demand 
southern bills).   
 
7.4 Simulation Results 
 
7.4.1 Baseline SR Model 
 
Having established the SR model, I now need to generate a recession in 
the South so as to see how the sovereign rating mechanism responds.  For this 
purpose, I repeat the first experiment of the above, whereby the southern 
propensity to import rises from 0.18781 to 0.20781.  With regards to the 𝜁 
parameters, 𝜁20 and 𝜁60 obtain the steady state values of 𝜆20 and 𝜆60 (0.35 
and 0.32 respectively), while 𝜁21 and 𝜁61 are both set equal with -0.10. Figure 
7.5 shows the most essential simulation results of the model.  For the clarity of 
the comparison Figure 7.5 combines the results of the SR model with those 
generated by the same experiment in model FEXEND.   
As it can be seen, shortly after the generation of the recession, the sovereign 
rating mechanism is activated.  Due to the deterioration of the sovereign rating 
score of the South, the households of both countries attempt to reduce their 
holdings of southern bills.  With the ECB maintaining a passive role in 
purchasing a fixed amount of southern bills, the government of the South is 
pushed to implement fiscal austerity by cutting sharply its expenditures.  The 
key results are twofold.  First, the trends of the debt to GDP ratios are reversed 
in both countries.  On the one hand the South is forced to issue fewer bills as a  
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Figure 7.5.  Key results of the baseline SR model when a recession is caused by the increase 
of the South’s propensity to import.   Model FEXEND (continuous lines) used as a 
benchmark of comparison for the evaluation of the effects of the sovereign rating 
downgrade of the South. 
 
 
 
219 | P a g e  
 
result of the downgrade, while the North needs to sell an increased amount of 
its bills to the ECB so as to maintain its own (exogenous) fiscal expenditure.  
Secondly the GDP of both countries falls.   
While the loss of national income is naturally more profound for the 
South, it is interesting that the North is also affected.  This is mainly due to its 
foregone exports as well as the lower amount of wealth that the northern 
households end up with at the new steady state (recall that northern 
households give up southern bills and increase their holdings of cash).     
Notice that the fall of GDP caused by sovereign ratings is gradually 
recovered.  This is a result of the assumption of fixed interest rates.  Once the 
government of the south issues fewer bills, it automatically faces lower interest 
payments to conduct in the following periods, and hence the implemented 
austerity is reversed.  Nonetheless, with a dose of imagination one could still 
think of such development as a real world outcome.  It could for instance 
describe the case where the sovereign rating event causes an at least partial 
default of the downgraded government on its debt.  In a similar fashion one 
could think of the reversal of the trend of the South’s debt to GDP ratio as a 
result of debt restructuring.   
While it is important in the context of the model to generate a recession 
so as to activate the sovereign rating mechanism, there are more than one ways 
of doing that in the SR model.  An alternative could have been to generate a 
recession by repeating the second experiment of the FEXEND model whereby 
the public expenditure of the North falls from 20 to 15.  Preserving again the 
relevant FEXEND results as the benchmark, Figure 7.6 shows how the dynamics 
of the two economies are affected once there is an episode of a severe rating 
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downgrade of the South.  Most importantly, one can observe that all results 
reported above remain qualitatively unchanged.  As with before there is a fall of 
the GDP for both countries due to the drop of the South’s rating score, while in 
both countries the trends of their debt to GDP ratios are reversed.  
 
7.4.2 Alternative Specifications 
 
7.4.2.1 Shift of Demand towards the Bills of the North 
 
 The above specification is based on the assumption that once households 
get the news about the downgrade of the South, they will move funds away 
from southern bills and keep them in the form of cash.  The logic here is that the 
downgrade will be seen as the reflection of augmented uncertainty in the global 
economy.  According to Keynes (1936), in such cases people start moving 
towards more liquid assets so as to protect themselves against violent economic 
fluctuations (hence the term ‘liquidity preference’).  In its most extreme form 
such movement is driven towards money (cash in this model), as being the 
most liquid asset of the economy, or else the ‘ruler of the roost’.   
 Nonetheless, it would be fair to argue that a run towards cash does not 
always have to be the response to a downgrade.   In that sense we could also 
think of a scenario where once the southern downgrade takes place, the 
households of both countries move towards northern bills instead.  Although 
not the most liquid asset of the model, it would suffice for the hypothesis if we  
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Figure 7.6. Key results of the baseline SR model when a recession is caused by the fall of the 
public expenditure of the North.   Model FEXEND (continuous lines) used as a benchmark 
of comparison for the evaluation of the effects of the sovereign rating downgrade of the 
South. 
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Figure 7.7.  Alternative specifications of the SR model: Column 1 preserves the relevant 
results of the baseline specification; column 2 illustrates the model with endogenous 
liquidity parameters in the northern bills’ demand functions; column 3 illustrates a version 
of the baseline model with a random shock in the 𝑆𝑅 specification.   
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were to think of the northern bills as a relatively more liquid asset than the 
southern ones. 
Given the above, I set an alternative specification of the model where not 
only the liquidity preference parameters of the southern bills’ demand 
functions are endogenous (𝜆20 and 𝜆60), but also the ones related with the 
demand for northern bills.  The endogenous mechanism is dictated by a similar 
logic with before, so that on top of equations 7.38 and 7.39, the model now 
includes: 
 𝜆30 = 𝜁30 + 𝜁31𝑆𝑅; 𝜁31 ≥ 0  (7.40) 
 
 𝜆50 = 𝜁50 + 𝜁51𝑆𝑅; 𝜁51 ≥ 0 
 
(7.41) 
 
where 𝜆30 and 𝜆50 are the liquidity preference parameters of the demand for 
bills of the North by southern and northern households respectively (see 
equations 7.12 and 7.14).  Same as before, 𝜁30 and 𝜁50 take the steady state 
values of 𝜆30 and 𝜆50.  In addition the 𝜁31 and 𝜁51 parameters are set to be 
equal or greater than zero and are meant to capture the positive influence of the 
South’s sovereign rating on the demand for northern bills.  It is easy to see how 
the greater the value of those parameters, the greater the positive impact of a 
southern downgrade upon the demand for bills of the North.  Assuming for the 
sake of simplicity a similar influence of CRAs as before (in absolute terms), I set 
𝜁31 = 𝜁51 = 0.1.   
To evaluate the model, I repeat the first experiment of the above where a 
recession is caused by increasing the propensity to import of the South.  The 
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second column of Figure 7.7 illustrates the results of the model.  Keeping the 
relevant results of the baseline specification in the first column of the figure, 
one can see that the key results remain qualitatively similar.  The 𝑆𝑅 shock is 
still activated at the same point of time, while the recession is equally deep in 
both countries.  The main noteworthy change is that instead of bouncing back to 
the steady state that would have occurred had the 𝑆𝑅 shock not been there, the 
new steady state values of the GDP in both countries move to a slightly higher 
level (contrast the first two graphs of the first row, from left to right).  This is a 
result of the augmented consumption out of wealth that arises in both countries 
due to the increased popularity of the northern bills.   
 
7.4.2.2 ‘Nervous’ CRAs 
 
 Another alternative to the baseline specification of the SR model is to 
consider the hypothesis that similar with all other economic agents, CRAs can 
also be liable to feelings of euphoria and panic.  As discussed in Chapter 4, such 
feelings can be the result of amplified uncertainty, and as such may become 
more conspicuous in times of economic turbulence.  Formally speaking they can 
be seen as a product of the ‘qualitative’ side of the analysis of sovereign ratings.  
While Ferri et al. (1999) investigate econometrically a similar hypothesis at the 
terrain of the East Asian crisis, Chapter 4 provides some more recent evidence 
on the affirmative for the sovereign ratings of the periphery states of Eurozone.  
In both cases there is a robust post-crisis gap between the actual ratings of the 
main CRAs and the ones generated by a dry econometric model that 
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encompasses the key variables that are supposed to matter for sovereign 
ratings.   
 In the context of the current model, a way of approximating the above 
hypothesis can be by letting a random shock to influence the 𝑆𝑅 variable once 
both its determinants have crossed their thresholds.  In a sense the specification 
provided here can be seen as one where CRAs ‘get nervous’ once they fully 
downgrade the southern state.  Formally expressed this implies expanding 
equation 7.37 as follows:  
 
 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑅2 − 0.8 ∗ 𝑧 + 
𝑆𝑅1 ∗ 𝑆𝑅2 ∗ 𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 0, 𝑠𝑡. 𝑑𝑒𝑣.= 0.1) 
 
(7.37A) 
 
Recalling that the 𝑆𝑅1 and 𝑆𝑅2 dummies relate with the accumulated 
GDP growth and the debt to GDP ratio of the South respectively, the mechanism 
established here will add an element of random volatility once both of those 
dummies get activated.  While the zero mean of the random shock implies that 
the recession created by the sovereign downgrade is not made deeper, it can be 
easily seen how this could be the case under a positive mean40.  The third 
column of Figure 7.7 portrays the results obtained when the updated 𝑆𝑅 
function is incorporated into the baseline model.  As it can be seen, the 
augmented volatility arising from the temperament of CRAs is communicated to 
                                            
40 The mean would have to be positive so as to turn negative in its relation with the lambda 
parameters of the southern bills demand functions that the 𝑆𝑅 variable affects. 
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all the important variables of the model.  Additionally, it is transmitted to both 
countries.   
 
7.5 Further Robustness Checks 
 
7.5.1 Sensitivity Tests 
 
 In order to examine the sensitivity of the underlying model, I repeat the 
baseline simulations by trying different sets of numbers for the behavioural 
parameters.  In particular, I focus on the numerical values of the propensities to 
import of the two countries (𝜇𝑆 and 𝜇𝑁), the propensities of households to 
consume out of disposable income (𝛼1
𝑆 and 𝛼1
𝑁), the liquidity preference that 
relate with the demand of domestic assets (𝜆20 and 𝜆50), as well as the zeta 
parameters that capture the influence of CRAs in the demand for southern bills 
(𝜁21 and 𝜁61).  In the first three cases, I set every pair of parameters equal to 
the 90% and the 110% of the baseline values, and repeat the simulations in the 
FEXEND model.  In the forth case, I set the zeta parameters equal with the 80% 
and the 120% of their default figures (measured in absolute terms), and re-run 
the baseline SR model (the only reason why I chose a wider gap here was to 
facilitate the diagrammatical illustration).  Every scenario is examined 
separately.  That is, when I change for instance the propensities to import, all 
other behavioural parameters retain their baseline values.  Moreover, for every 
pair of parameters the values of both countries are jointly set to either the 90% 
or the 110% levels.  Table 7.4 reports the relevant numerical values for all 
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Table 7.4.  Sensitivity Tests (as percentages of baseline values) 
Parameter Baseline 90% 110% 90% 110% 90% 110% 80% (in abs. values) 120% (in abs. values) 
𝝁𝑺 0.187 0.1683 0.2057 - - - - - - 
𝝁𝑵 0.187 0.1683 0.2057 - - - - - - 
𝝀𝟐𝟎 0.35 - - 0.315 0.385 - - - - 
𝝀𝟓𝟎 0.35 - - 0.315 0.385 - - - - 
𝜶𝟏
𝑺  0.7 - - - - 0.63 0.77 - - 
𝜶𝟏
𝑵
 0.6 - - - - 0.54 0.66 - - 
𝜻𝟐𝟏 -0.1 - - - - - - -0.08 -0.12 
𝜻𝟔𝟏 -0.1 - - - - - - -0.08 -0.12 
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sensitivity tests.  In addition, Figures 7.8 and 7.9 illustrate the response of the 
different specifications to the first experiment of the above whereby a recession 
is caused by increasing the propensity to import of the southern economy.   
 As it can be seen, in three out of the four experiments, there is no 
qualitative difference between the default parameterization and the alternative 
scenarios.  To start with, all the trials based on different sets of propensities to 
import (see the first row of Figure 7.8) show that once the propensity to import 
of the South rises, there is a recession caused in the southern economy, while a 
fragile growth is experienced in the North.  In all occasions the GDP is higher in 
the North under the new steady state.  Moreover it is quite straightforward to 
see how the volume of the recession depends on the overall difference between 
the initial propensity to import of the southern economy (which varies under 
the relevant sensitivity tests) and the number introduced by the shock (same 
with the above experiment this is 0.20781).  Similarly, it can be seen that under 
all trials the new steady state gives a higher debt to GDP ratio for the South 
compared with the North.  
 Sensible results are also produced under the different specifications of 
the lambda and zeta parameters.  In the case of the first, the lower the values of 
𝜆20 and 𝜆50, i.e. the lower the autonomous demand for domestic bills, the 
deeper the recession for both countries.  Additionally, while the debt to GDP of 
the South always ends up being higher than the North’s under the new steady 
state, the gap between the two widens as we increase the values of the lambdas.  
Regarding the trials of the SR model with different zeta parameters (second row 
in Figure 7.9), it is easy to see how the greater the absolute values of 𝜁21 and 
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𝜁61, or else the greater the power of CRAs, the deeper the recession.  
Furthermore, the greater such influence, the lower the new steady state debt to 
GDP ratio for the South at the end of the recession.  The opposite holds for the 
North.    
 The only case of ‘puzzling’ results is when I try out different propensities 
to consume out of disposable income.  In particular, as it can be seen from the 
second row of Figure 7.8, when setting 𝛼1
𝑆 and 𝛼1
𝑁 equal with the 90% of their 
baseline values, the recession caused by the rise of the propensity of imports of 
the South is initially deepened but the GDP of both countries in the new steady 
state is higher than before.  The reverse holds when the alphas are set at the 
110% level.  At the same time the recession is still effective in that the GDP of 
the South ends up significantly lower than its initial level under all 
specifications.  Moreover, despite the fact that under all specifications the debt 
to GDP of the South ends up being higher than that of the North, we can observe 
some qualitatively different dynamics being developed.  On one hand the 90% 
setting gives a higher debt to GDP ratio for both countries compared with their 
baseline specification, while the opposite holds true under the 110% regime.   
 There is a simple explanation for such results.  They reflect the 
limitations of the model.  Recall that my model has no active firms, and no 
private banks.  At the same time, by construction model FEXEND positively 
associates fiscal expenditures with household savings and wealth.  In that 
regard, given the lack of investment and banking credit, there is a sort of 
neoclassical slip in that increased aggregate savings expand aggregate 
expenditure, rather than the other way around.  More precisely, when the alpha  
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Figure 7.8. Sensitivity tests with different values for the propensities to import and the 
propensities to consume out of income; illustration is based on experiment 1, where the 
propensity to import of the South increases; in all graphs the South is in black and the North 
in grey; each set of propensities is changed simultaneously for both countries, either in the 
90% or in the 110% level of their default values.  All tests are done in model FEXEND.   
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Figure 7.9.  Sensitivity tests with different values for the lambda and zeta parameters; 
illustration is based on experiment 1, where the propensity to import of the South 
increases; in all graphs the South is in black and the North in grey; each set of parameters is 
changed simultaneously for both countries; in the case of the lambda parameters the 90% 
and the 110% are tested and the underlying model is the FEXEND one; in the case of the 
zeta parameters, FEXEND is included for the facilitation of the comparison (continuous 
lines), and the tests are conducted in the baseline SR model; the zeta values are reset to the 
80% and 120% levels, measured in absolute terms. 
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Figure 7.10.  Three experiments with the version of FEXEND model with prices; experiment 
1 (1st column): increase the propensity to consume of the South from 0.18781 to 0.20781; 
experiment 2 (2nd column): decrease the (exogenous) fiscal expenditures of the North from 
20 to 15; experiment 3 (3rd column): increase the liquidity preference of southern 
households by reducing 𝜆20 from 0.35 to 0.2.  First row describes the development of GDP 
across all three experiments, the second row shows the developments of the change in 
private wealth, as well as the fiscal and current account imbalances, while row three shows 
the development of the debt to GDP ratio for the two countries.   
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Figure 7.11.  Comparison of the baseline SR model in the nominal version (left hand) 
and the version with price fluctuations (right hand column); recession generated by the 
rise of the autonomous propensity to import of the South; in all cases the corresponding 
FEXEND model (captured by the continuous lines) is used as a benchmark of 
comparison for the evaluation of the effects that arise out of the sovereign rating 
downgrade of the South. 
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one propensities to consume equal with the 90% of the baseline, more savings 
are generated which in turn raise the demand for government bills, therefore 
giving rise to an initial overshooting of the southern fiscal expenditure (not 
reported here).  Following, the fiscal expenditure of the south converges to the 
new baseline steady state, but as shown above the overshooting is sufficient to 
ameliorate the new steady state for the GDP of both countries.  
 With this said, let me note that it is precisely because of the limitation 
pointed out here that I have abstained from conducting experiments with the 
propensities to consume in the current.  To avoid misleading insights, such 
experiments would require a more rigorous modelling of the corporate and 
banking sectors, as for instance done in chapter 7 of Godley and Lavoie (2007b).   
 
7.5.2 A Version of the Model with Prices 
 
 Another evident limitation of the model as developed so far has been the 
assumption of fixed prices.  In particular, there has been no consideration of 
inflationary dynamics, which in an open economy environment might be 
thought to matter for international trade, most notably by affecting the 
competitiveness of trading countries.  For instance it could be said that the 
enlargement of the current account deficit in a country would push the latter to 
conduct some internal devaluation (given the assumption of fixed exchange 
rates) by cutting its production costs, mainly wages, so as to regain its 
competitiveness.  As a result, such policy could prevent a crisis from building 
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up, and in that way prevent episodes of severe downgrades such as the ones 
described above41. 
Although the assumption of fixed prices has been a deliberate choice so 
as to keep the model simple and allow myself to illustrate clearly the 
mechanism developed above, it is interesting to see how results are affected 
once prices are incorporated into the model.  In particular, building on the 
insights of chapter 12 of Godley and Lavoie (2007b), I introduce five price 
indices per country into the FEXEND model.  These include the GDP deflator 𝑝𝑦 , 
the sales and domestic sales indices (𝑝𝑠 and 𝑝𝑑𝑠 respectively), as well as the 
prices of imports and exports (𝑝𝑚 and 𝑝𝑥).  All new and modified equations can 
be found in Appendix B.  Following the conventional notation, small Latin 
letters denote real variables, while capital Latin letters stand for nominal ones.  
Furthermore, to avoid confusion notice that when found in front of a price 
index, the lower-script 𝑠 stands for ‘sales’ (and not ‘supply’ as before).  Most 
notably, the model now includes a standard Kaleckian mark-up mechanism for 
the sales of each country (eq. 7.62 and 7.77) while following the insights of 
chapter 9 of Godley and Lavoie there is also a mechanism of endogenous wage 
determination in each country (eq. 7.65, 7.66, 7.80 and 7.81).  Illustrated here 
for the case of the South: 
 
 
𝑝𝑠
𝑆 = (1 + 𝜑𝑆)
𝑊−1
𝑆 𝑁−1
𝑆 + 𝐼𝑀−1
𝑆
𝑠−1
𝑆  
(7.62) 
                                            
41 This line of thought, often associated with austerity policies, lies in some quite shaky 
assumptions such as for instance the idea that falling wages will translate into falling prices.  
Nonetheless, its in-depth critique of it goes beyond the purpose of the current.  
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𝜔𝑇
𝑆 = (
𝑊𝑆
𝑝𝑠
𝑆 )𝑇 = 𝛺10 + 𝛺11𝑝𝑟
𝑆 + 𝛺12(
𝑁𝑆
𝑁𝑓𝑒
𝑆 ) 
 
(7.65) 
 
   
 
𝑊𝑆 = 𝑊−1
𝑆 [1 + 𝛺13 (𝜔𝑇−1
𝑆 −
𝑊−1
𝑆
𝑝𝑠−1
𝑆 )] 
(7.66) 
 
where 𝜑 denotes the exogenously given mark-up, 𝑊 is the nominal wage rate 
and 𝑠 stands for real sales.  In addition 𝜔𝛵 is the real wage target of workers, 
which is set to be a function of the exogenously given productivity (𝑝𝑟) and the 
degree of employment (
𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
).  As set there is an adaptive mechanism in which 
the wage rate is updated in every period based on the discrepancy between last 
period’s targeted and actual real wage.  Also note that in the new version of the 
model households’ consumption decisions and expectations are based on real 
variables.  Furthermore the imports of the two countries are not only a function 
of domestic income anymore but also associate with relative prices. 
 An issue that arises in this version of the model is the non-linearity of the 
system once the mark-up equation has been established.  To circumvent the 
problem I allow all price mechanisms to operate with a lag so as to break the 
non-linear system into smaller linear ones.  At the terrain of economic logic 
such approach can be thought as a sort of price stickiness dynamic.   
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Having defined the model I now repeat the same experiments as in 
Figure 7.4.  Figure 7.10 reports the relevant results.  In the first experiment I 
raise the autonomous southern propensity to import (column 1). In the second 
one (column 2) I decrease the exogenous fiscal expenditure of the North, while 
in the third one (column 3) I drop the 𝜆20  parameter from 0.35 to 0.2.  In order 
to facilitate the comparison with the simple FEXEND model, Figure 7.10 
preserves a one to one correspondence with Figure 7.4 in the mapping of all 
graphs.   
 As it can be seen the incorporation of prices creates some cyclicality, 
which obscures the inference beyond the short and medium run.  This is a 
result of having endogenous fiscal expenditures and lagged prices (although not 
reported here, the version of the model with exogenous southern fiscal 
expenditures was much more stable).  With this said notice that all the essential 
short-term dynamics are similar with the ones developed in the simple FEXEND 
model.  For example, once the autonomous propensity to import of the South 
increases, a recession is created in the South, while a fragile growth arises in the 
North.  Similarly there is a rise of the southern debt to GDP ratio and a decline 
of the northern one.  Moreover a recession is caused in both countries when 
either the northern fiscal expenditure drops or the liquidity preference of the 
south increases.  The only substantial short-run difference with before is the 
fact that under experiment two, not only the debt to GDP ratio of the South but 
also that of the north increases (in contrast with the simple FEXEND model 
where the debt to GDP ratio of the North was experiencing a decline).   
Coming to the inclusion of the sovereign rating mechanism, Figure 7.11 
contrasts the results of the simple SR model (left-hand column) with the ones 
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obtained from the SR model with prices (right-hand).  Same as before recession 
is caused by an increase in the propensity to import 𝜇𝑆 in the case of the simple 
model.  At the same time, a similar recession is caused in the price model by 
increasing 𝜇10, the autonomous propensity to import of the South.  As 
documented in the relevant graphs, all key dynamics remain unchanged.  The 
𝑆𝑅 mechanism is still activated once the accumulated growth of the South and/ 
or the debt to GDP ratio of the country crosses a certain threshold (-14% for 
accumulated growth and 85% for the debt to GDP ratio).  The downgrade of the 
southern economy drives households’ demand away from southern bills and 
towards cash.  Such development reduces the fiscal expenditure of the southern 
state, and as a result both counties are driven deeper into recession.  In 
addition, same as before, the debt to GDP ratios reverse their trends. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
As pointed out in earlier chapters, CRAs are an institution of authority 
within the context of neoliberal capitalism, capable of dictating the terms of 
finance for borrowers, and influencing the decision making of lenders.  In turn 
sovereign ratings are the key expression of CRAs’ power upon the state.  By 
linking directly with the macroeconomic level, sovereign ratings are capable of 
affecting capital flow movements and imposing tight financial constraints upon 
national governments.  The latter’s exposure to the sentiment of CRAs relates 
with the behaviour of the associated central bank.   
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Interestingly, although there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature 
discussing the above, no one has attempted to capture the macroeconomic 
effects of sovereign ratings by means of a formal model.  This is done in the 
current chapter.  Utilizing an open economy SFC model, the chapter shows how 
sovereign ratings can contribute to an on-going recession by impeding a 
government’s access to financial resources and by pushing it to implement fiscal 
austerity.   
The model developed has two countries, one currency and one central 
bank.  Of the two countries, one- labelled as South- is assumed to be weak in the 
sense of not being unconditionally supported by the central bank.  This implies 
that its fiscal expenditure is endogenous to the volume of debt it can issue on 
the private market.  In such a framework, the liquidity preference of domestic 
and international investors is set as a function of the South’s sovereign rating.  
The latter is in turn affected by two key ‘fundamentals’ of the South, namely the 
country’s accumulated GDP growth as well as its debt to GDP ratio.    
The model shows how a recession shock deteriorates the two 
determinants of the southern sovereign rating and thereby generates a severe 
rating downgrade.  This in turn pushes investors to reduce their holdings of 
southern bills and move their wealth towards cash.  Such a shift forces the 
southern government to cut its public spending, therefore deepening the 
recession further.  Interestingly, the ‘strong’ economy (i.e. the North) is also 
affected due to its foregone exports and the drop in the total volume of wealth 
held by the households of the country.   
Two alternative closures are also considered.  Under the first one, the 
investors of the two countries switch to Northern bills instead of cash, once the 
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southern rating downgrade occurs.  Under the second one, there is an element 
of panic and volatility that is generated by CRAs and that is transmitted to the 
economic system once both determinants of the southern sovereign rating 
cross their threshold values.   
Furthermore, the chapter is accompanied by a sensitivity analysis and an 
expansion of the model with prices.  Regarding the sensitivity tests, all pairs of 
behavioural parameters are successively set as equal to the 90% and 110% of 
their baseline values.  In all cases the properties and stability of the model are 
retained.  On the other hand, the incorporation of prices raises the degree of 
complexity of the model and obscures the inference of long-term dynamics.  
Nonetheless the short and medium term results of the model are qualitatively 
similar as before.  
To facilitate the tractability and illustration of the model, a number of 
simplifications have been allowed.  Most notably, no active firms and private 
banks are considered.  It is quite straightforward to see how such 
simplifications limit the scope of the construct.  In that sense, a promising 
extension of the current could be to develop a model with a more rigorous 
treatment of those sectors, so that further links between sovereign ratings and 
the macro-economy can be explored.  For instance sovereign ratings could be 
thought to affect not only public expenditure, but also to influence the decisions 
of banks regarding their provision of credit. 
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7.7 Appendix A- Equations of the Simple Model 
 
 
Remarks 
 
 The ‘S’ and ‘N’ upper-scripts denote the South and the North respectively 
 Only the equations that are actually used in simulations are numbered. 
 In all financial assets, the upper script denotes the issuer and the lower 
script denotes the holder of the asset. 
 Lower scripts ‘d’, ‘s’, ‘h’, and ‘e’ denote demand, supply, actual holdings 
and expectations respectively 
 
Exogenous parameters 
 
 𝛼  propensities to consume  
 𝜆𝑖𝑗  tobinisque parameters (𝑖 = 1,2, . .6; 𝑗 = 1,2, . .5) 
 𝜃𝑆, 𝜃𝑁 taxation rates 
 𝑟𝑆, 𝑟𝑁 government bills interest rates 
 𝜇 propensities to import 
 𝐺 public expenditure of both countries 
 
Household Sector 
 
South 
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Income and Wealth (ex post) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑆 = 𝑌𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑁  
 
(7.1) 
 
 𝑉𝑆 = 𝑉−1
𝑆 + (𝑌𝐷𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆) 
 
(7.2) 
Equations related with the consumption and investment decisions of 
households 
.   
 𝐶𝑆 = 𝛼1
𝑆𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆 + 𝛼2
𝑆𝑉−1
𝑆  (7.3) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆 = 𝑌𝐷−1
𝑆  
 
(7.4) 
 𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝑉−1
𝑆 + (𝑌𝐷 𝑒
𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆) (7.5) 
 
 
North 
 
Income and Wealth (ex post) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑁 = 𝑌𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑆  
 
(7.6) 
 
 𝑉𝑁 = 𝑉−1
𝑁 + (𝑌𝐷𝑁 − 𝐶𝑁) 
 
(7.7) 
   
Equations related with the decisions of households 
 
 𝐶𝑁 = 𝛼1
𝑁𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁 + 𝛼2
𝑁𝑉−1
𝑁  (7.8) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑌𝐷−1
𝑁  (7.9) 
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 𝑉𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑉−1
𝑁 + (𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁 − 𝐶𝑁) (7.10) 
 
   
Asset Demand Functions 
 
 
South 
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆10 + 𝜆11𝑟ℎ − 𝜆12𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆13𝑟
𝑁 + 𝜆14
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆20 − 𝜆21𝑟ℎ + 𝜆22𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆23𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆24
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
(7.11) 
 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆30 − 𝜆31𝑟ℎ − 𝜆32𝑟
𝑆 + 𝜆33𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆34
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
(7.12) 
 𝐻𝑑
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑒
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
 
 𝐻ℎ
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
(7.13) 
 
North                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆40 + 𝜆41𝑟ℎ − 𝜆42𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆43𝑟
𝑆 + 𝜆44
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
 
 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆50 − 𝜆51𝑟ℎ + 𝜆52𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆53𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆54
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
(7.14) 
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 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆60 − 𝜆61𝑟ℎ − 𝜆62𝑟
𝑁 + 𝜆63𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆64
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑁 = 𝑉𝑒
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
(7.15) 
   
 𝐻ℎ
𝑁 = 𝑉𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
 
(7.16) 
 
Following the Tobinisque principles for each country, the vertical conditions are 
 
𝜆10 + 𝜆20 + 𝜆30 = 1 
𝜆11 + 𝜆21 + 𝜆31 = 0 
𝜆12 + 𝜆22 + 𝜆32 = 0 
𝜆13 + 𝜆23 + 𝜆33 = 0 
𝜆14 + 𝜆24 + 𝜆34 = 0 
 
for the South and 
𝜆40 + 𝜆50 + 𝜆60 = 1 
𝜆41 + 𝜆51 + 𝜆61 = 0 
𝜆42 + 𝜆52 + 𝜆62 = 0 
𝜆43 + 𝜆53 + 𝜆63 = 0 
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𝜆44 + 𝜆54 + 𝜆64 = 0 
 
 
for the North.  In turn the symmetry conditions are  
 
𝜆12 = 𝜆21 
𝜆13 = 𝜆31 
𝜆23 = 𝜆32 
 
and 
𝜆51 = 𝜆42 
𝜆61 = 𝜆43 
𝜆62 = 𝜆53 
 
for the South and the North respectively.  Also note that the fulfillment of the 
vertical and symmetry conditions automatically satisfies the horizontal 
conditions too  (Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 145).   
 
The Government Sector 
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South 
 𝑇𝑆 = 𝜃𝑆(𝑌𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑁 ) 
 
(7.17) 
 
 𝛥𝐵𝑆 = 𝐺𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆  
 
(7.18) 
 
−𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑆 = 𝐵𝑆 
 
North 
 
−𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑁 = 𝐵𝛮 
 
GDP, Imports and Exports 
 
 
 
South 
 
 𝑌𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐺𝑆 + 𝑋𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆 (7.21) 
 
 𝐼𝑀𝑆 = 𝜇𝑆𝑌𝑆 
 
(7.22) 
 𝑋𝑆 = 𝐼𝑀𝑁 (7.23) 
 
North 
 𝑇𝑁 = 𝜃𝑁(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑆 ) 
 
(7.19) 
 
 𝛥𝐵𝛮 = 𝐺𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁  
 
(7.20) 
 
 
 
247 | P a g e  
 
 
 𝑌𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁 + 𝐺𝑁 + 𝑋𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁 
 
(7.24) 
 𝐼𝑀𝑁 = 𝜇𝑁𝑌𝑁 
 
(7.25) 
 𝑋𝑁 = 𝐼𝑀𝑆 (7.26) 
 
 
The ECB 
 
 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆 = 𝐵𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 −𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
 
(7.27) 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁 = 𝐵𝛮 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 −𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
(7.28) 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵 = 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁 + 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  
 
(7.29) 
 𝐻ℎ = 𝐻ℎ
𝑁 +𝐻ℎ
𝑆  (7.30) 
 
 𝛥𝐻𝑠 = 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵  (7.31) 
 
 𝑟𝑆 = 𝑟𝑆̅̅ ̅ (7.32) 
 
 𝑟𝑁 = 𝑟𝑁̅̅̅̅  (7.33) 
 
 𝐹𝐸𝐶𝐵 = 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑆  
 
 
 
 
𝐻𝑠 = 𝐻ℎ  
(𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
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Current and Financial Account Identities 
 
𝑇𝐵 = Trade Balance; 𝐶𝐴 = Current Account; 𝐹𝐴 = Financial Account 
 
South 
 
 𝑇𝐵𝑆 = (𝑋𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆) 
 
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆 = (𝑋𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆) + (𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆 ) 
 
 
 𝐹𝐴𝑆 = (𝛥𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 − 𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁 ) + 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆   
   
North 
 
 𝑇𝐵𝑁 = (𝑋𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁)  
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑁 = (𝑋𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁) + (𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁 )  
 
 
 𝐹𝐴𝑁 = (𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁 − 𝛥𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 ) + 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁   
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Parameter and Steady State Values 
𝜶𝟏
𝑺 0.7 South's prop. to consume out 
of disposable income 
𝒀𝑺 106.4869 GDP of the South 
𝜶𝟐
𝑺 0.3 South's prop. to consume out 
of wealth 
𝑌𝑁 106.4869 GDP of the North 
𝜶𝟏
𝑵 0.6 North’s prop. to consume out 
of disposable income 
𝑌𝐷𝑆 86.4869 Disposable income of the South 
𝜶𝟐
𝑵 0.4 North's prop. to consume out 
of wealth 
𝑌𝐷𝑁 86.4869 Disposable income of the North 
𝝁𝑺 0.187 South's prop. to import 𝑇𝑆 21.62172 Tax revenues of the South 
𝝁𝑵 0.187 North's prop. to import 𝑇𝑁 21.62172 Tax revenues of the North 
𝜽𝑺 0.2 South's taxation rate 𝐵𝑆
𝑆 32.4325 Southern bills held by southern 
households 
𝜽𝑺 0.2 North's taxation rate 𝐵𝑆
𝑁 32.4365 Northern bills held by southern 
households 
𝝀𝟐𝟎 
(= 𝜻𝟐𝟎) 
0.35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tobinisque parameters for 
the asset demand functions of 
Southern households 
𝐵𝑁
𝑁 32.4325 Northern bills held by northern 
households 
𝝀𝟐𝟐 4.8 𝐵𝑁
𝑆  32.4365 Southern bills held by northern 
households 
𝝀𝟐𝟑 1 𝑉
𝑆 86.49062 Total wealth of the South 
𝝀𝟐𝟒 0.07 𝑉
𝑁 86.49062 Total wealth of the North 
𝝀𝟑𝟎 
(= 𝜻𝟑𝟎) 
0.32 𝐶𝑆 86.4869 Consumption of the South 
𝝀𝟑𝟐 1 𝐶
𝑁 86.4869 Consumption of the North 
𝝀𝟑𝟑 4.4 𝐻ℎ
𝑆 21.62162 Actual cash holdings of the South 
𝝀𝟑𝟒 0.03 𝐻ℎ
𝑁 21.62162 Actual cash holdings of the North 
𝝀𝟓𝟎 
(= 𝜻𝟓𝟎) 
0.35  
 
 
 
 
 
Tobinisque parameters for 
the asset demand functions of 
Northern households 
𝐺𝑆 20 Public expenditure of the South 
𝝀𝟓𝟐 4.79 𝑋
𝑆 19.99 Exports of the South 
𝝀𝟓𝟑 1 𝐼𝑀
𝑆 19.99 Imports of the South 
𝝀𝟓𝟒 0.07 𝐺
𝑁 20 Public expenditure of the North 
𝝀𝟔𝟎 
(= 𝜻𝟔𝟎) 
0.32 𝑋𝑁 19.99 Exports of the North 
𝝀𝟔𝟐 1 𝐼𝑀
𝑁 19.99 Imports of the North 
𝝀𝟔𝟑 4.4 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  21.62162 Southern bills held by the central 
bank 
𝝀𝟔𝟒 0.03 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁  21.62162 Northern bills held by the central 
bank 
𝜻𝟐𝟏 -0.1  
 
Parameters related with the 
influence of credit rating 
agencies 
𝐵𝑆 86.49062 Total stock of southern bills (public 
debt of the South) 
𝜻𝟑𝟏 0.1 𝐵
𝑁 86.49062 Total stock of northern bills (public 
debt of the North) 
𝜻𝟓𝟏 0.1 𝐻𝑠 43.24324 Total supply and holdings of cash 
(satisfied by the redundant 
equation) 𝜻𝟔𝟏 -0.1 𝐻ℎ 43.24324 
𝒓𝑺 0.025 Interest rate of the South 𝑟𝑁 0.025 Interest rate of the North 
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7.8 Appendix B- Equations of the Model with Prices 
 
Remarks: 
 Only the equations that are actually used in simulations are numbered. 
 The equations that are identical with the simple model retain the same 
numbers 
 In all financial assets, the upper script denotes the issuer and the lower 
script denotes the holder of the asset. 
 Capital letters correspond to nominal and small case ones correspond to 
real variables. 
 Variables in bold denote natural logarithms 
 
Exogenous parameters and variables 
 
 𝛼  propensities to consume  
 𝜆𝑖𝑗  tobinisque parameters (𝑖 = 1,2, . .6; 𝑗 = 1,2, . .5) 
 𝜃𝐺𝑅 , 𝜃𝐺𝐸𝑅  taxation rates 
 𝑟𝐺𝑅 , 𝑟𝐺𝐸𝑅 government bills interest rates 
 𝜇 propensities to import 
 𝐺 public expenditure of both countries 
 𝑝𝑟 level of productivity in the two countries 
 𝛺 parameters for wage setting 
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Price Indices 
 
 𝑝𝑦  GDP deflator 
 𝑝𝑠   sales index 
 𝑝𝑑𝑠 domestic sales index 
 𝑝𝑚  imports prices 
 𝑝𝑥    exports prices    
 
Household Sector 
 
South 
 
Income and Wealth (ex post) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑆 = 𝑌𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑁  
 
(7.1) 
 
 
𝑦𝑑𝑆 =
𝑌𝐷𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆 −
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑆 𝑉−1
𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆  
 
(7.42) 
   
 𝑉𝑆 = 𝑉−1
𝑆 + (𝑌𝐷𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆) 
 
(7.2) 
 
𝑣𝑆 =
𝑉𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆  
 
(7.43) 
 
Equations related with the consumption and investment decisions of 
households 
.   
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 𝑐𝑆 = 𝛼11𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑆 + 𝛼12𝑣−1
𝑆  (7.44) 
 
 
 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑐𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆  
 
(7.3A) 
 
 
 𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑆 = 𝑦𝑑−1
𝑆  
 
(7.45) 
 
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆 = 𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆 𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑆 +
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑆 𝑉−1
𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆   
 
(7.4A) 
 𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝑉−1
𝑆 + (𝑌𝐷 𝑒
𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆) (7.5) 
 
 
North 
 
Income and Wealth (ex post) 
 
 𝑌𝐷𝑁 = 𝑌𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑆  
 
(7.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑦𝑑𝑁 =
𝑌𝐷𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁 −
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑁 𝑉−1
𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁  
 
(7.46) 
 
𝑉𝑁 = 𝑉−1
𝑁 + (𝑌𝐷𝑁 − 𝐶𝑁) 
 
(7.7) 
 
 
 
𝑣𝑁 =
𝑉𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁  
 
(7.47) 
   
   
Equations related with the decisions of households 
 
 
253 | P a g e  
 
 
 𝑐𝑁 = 𝛼21𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑁 + 𝛼22𝑣−1
𝑁  (7.48) 
 
 𝐶𝑁 = 𝑐𝑁𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁  
 
(7.8A) 
 𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑦𝑑−1
𝑁  
 
(7.49) 
 
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁 𝑦𝑑𝑒
𝑁 +
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑁 𝑉−1
𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁   
(7.9A) 
 
 
 
 𝑉𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑉−1
𝑁 + (𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁 − 𝐶𝑁) (7.10) 
 
   
Asset Demand Functions 
 
South 
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆10 + 𝜆11𝑟ℎ − 𝜆12𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆13𝑟
𝑁 + 𝜆14
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆20 − 𝜆21𝑟ℎ + 𝜆22𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆23𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆24
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
(7.11) 
 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁
𝑉𝑒
𝑆 = 𝜆30 − 𝜆31𝑟ℎ − 𝜆32𝑟
𝑆 + 𝜆33𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆34
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑆
𝑉𝑒
𝑆  
 
(7.12) 
 𝐻𝑑
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑒
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
 
 𝐻ℎ
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
(7.13) 
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North                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆40 + 𝜆41𝑟ℎ − 𝜆42𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆43𝑟
𝑆 + 𝜆44
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
 
 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆50 − 𝜆51𝑟ℎ + 𝜆52𝑟
𝑁 − 𝜆53𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆54
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
 
(7.14) 
 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆
𝑉𝑒𝑁
= 𝜆60 − 𝜆61𝑟ℎ − 𝜆62𝑟
𝑁 + 𝜆63𝑟
𝑆 − 𝜆64
𝑌𝐷𝑒
𝑁
𝑉𝑒𝑁
 
 
𝐻𝑑
𝑁 = 𝑉𝑒
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
(7.15) 
   
 𝐻ℎ
𝑁 = 𝑉𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
 
(7.16) 
 
Following the Tobinisque principles for each country, the vertical conditions are 
 
𝜆10 + 𝜆20 + 𝜆30 = 1 
𝜆11 + 𝜆21 + 𝜆31 = 0 
𝜆12 + 𝜆22 + 𝜆32 = 0 
𝜆13 + 𝜆23 + 𝜆33 = 0 
𝜆14 + 𝜆24 + 𝜆34 = 0 
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for the South and 
𝜆40 + 𝜆50 + 𝜆60 = 1 
𝜆41 + 𝜆51 + 𝜆61 = 0 
𝜆42 + 𝜆52 + 𝜆62 = 0 
𝜆43 + 𝜆53 + 𝜆63 = 0 
𝜆44 + 𝜆54 + 𝜆64 = 0 
 
 
for the North.  In turn the symmetry conditions are  
 
𝜆12 = 𝜆21 
𝜆13 = 𝜆31 
𝜆23 = 𝜆32 
 
and 
𝜆51 = 𝜆42 
𝜆61 = 𝜆43 
𝜆62 = 𝜆53 
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for the South and the North respectively.  Also note that the fulfillment of the 
vertical and symmetry conditions automatically satisfies the horizontal 
conditions too (Godley and Lavoie, 2007b: 145).   
 
The Government Sector 
 
South 
 𝑇𝑆 = 𝜃𝑆(𝑌𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆ℎ−1
𝑁 ) 
 
(7.17) 
 
 𝛥𝐵𝑆 = 𝐺𝑆 − 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑆 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆  
 
(7.18) 
 
−𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑆 = 𝐵𝑆 
 
 
𝑔𝑆 =
𝐺𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆  
 
(7.50) 
 
North 
 
−𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝑁 = 𝐵𝛮 
 
 𝑇𝑁 = 𝜃𝑁(𝑌𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁ℎ−1
𝑆 ) 
 
 
(7.19) 
 
 𝛥𝐵𝛮 = 𝐺𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁  
 
(7.20) 
 
 
𝑔𝑁 =
𝐺𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁  
(7.51) 
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GDP, Imports and Exports 
 
South 
 
 𝑠𝑆 = 𝑐𝑆 + 𝑔𝑆 + 𝑥𝑆 (7.52) 
 
 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑠
𝑆 (7.53) 
 
 𝑦𝑆 = 𝑠𝑆 − 𝑖𝑚𝑆 (7.54) 
 
 𝑌𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆 (7.21A) 
 
 
𝑝𝑦
𝑆 =
𝑌−1
𝑆
𝑦−1
𝑆  
(7.55) 
 
   
 
𝑖𝑚𝑆 = 𝜇10 (
𝑝𝑦
𝑆
𝑝𝑚
𝑆 )
𝜇11
(𝑦𝑆)𝜇12 
 
𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 
   
   
 𝒊𝒎𝑺 = 𝜇10 + 𝜇11(𝒑𝒚
𝑺 − 𝒑𝒎
𝑺 ) + 𝜇12(𝒚
𝑺) 
 
(7.56) 
 𝐼𝑀𝑆 = 𝑖𝑚𝑆𝑝𝑚
𝑆  (7.22A) 
 
 𝑥𝑆 = 𝑖𝑚𝑁 (7.57) 
 
 𝑋𝑆 = 𝑥𝑆𝑝𝑥
𝑆 (7.23A) 
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 𝑝𝑚
𝑆 = 𝑝𝑥
𝑁  (7.58) 
 
 𝑝𝑥
𝑆 = 𝑝𝑚
𝑁  (7.59) 
 
   
 
 
 
𝑁𝑆 =
𝑦𝑆
𝑝𝑟𝑆
 
(7.60) 
 
 
 
 𝑝𝑟𝑆 = 𝑝𝑟𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (7.61) 
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑠
𝑆 = (1 + 𝜑𝑆)
𝑊−1
𝑆 𝑁−1
𝑆 + 𝐼𝑀−1
𝑆
𝑠−1
𝑆  
 
 
(7.62) 
 
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆 =
𝑆−1
𝑆 − 𝑋−1
𝑆
𝑠−1
𝑆 − 𝑥−1
𝑆  
(7.63) 
   
   
 
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑆 =
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆 − 𝑝𝑑𝑠−1
𝑆
𝑝𝑑𝑠−1
𝑆  
(7.64) 
   
 
𝜔𝑇
𝑆 = (
𝑊𝑆
𝑝𝑠
𝑆 )𝑇 = 𝛺10 + 𝛺11𝑝𝑟
𝑆 + 𝛺12(
𝑁𝑆
𝑁𝑓𝑒
𝑆 ) 
(7.65) 
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑆 = 𝑊−1
𝑆 [1 + 𝛺13 (𝜔𝑇−1
𝑆 −
𝑊−1
𝑆
𝑝𝑠−1
𝑆 )] 
(7.66) 
 
 
North 
 𝑠𝑁 = 𝑐𝑁 + 𝑔𝑁 + 𝑥𝑁  (7.67) 
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 𝑆𝑁 = 𝑠𝑁𝑝𝑠
𝑁  (7.68) 
 
 𝑦𝑁 = 𝑠𝑁 − 𝑖𝑚𝑁 (7.69) 
 
 𝑌𝑁 = 𝑆𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁 (7.24A) 
 
 
𝑝𝑦
𝑁 =
𝑌−1
𝑁
𝑦−1
𝑁  
(7.70) 
 
 
   
   
 
𝑖𝑚𝑁 = 𝜇20 (
𝑝𝑦
𝑁
𝑝𝑚𝑁
)
𝜇21
(𝑦𝑁)𝜇22 
 
𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 
  
 
 
 𝒊𝒎𝑵 = 𝜇20 + 𝜇21(𝒑𝒚
𝑵 − 𝒑𝒎
𝑵 ) + 𝜇22(𝒚
𝑵) 
 
(7.71) 
 𝐼𝑀𝑁 = 𝑖𝑚𝑁𝑝𝑚
𝑁  (7.25A) 
 
 𝑥𝑁 = 𝑖𝑚𝑆 (7.72) 
 
 𝑋𝑁 = 𝑥𝑁𝑝𝑥
𝑁 (7.26A) 
 
 𝒑𝒎
𝑵 = 𝜈0 + (1 − 𝜈1)𝒑𝒚
𝑵 + 𝜈1𝒑𝒚
𝑺   
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝜈1 < 1 
 
 
(7.73) 
 
 𝒑𝒙
𝑵 = 𝜐0 + (1 − 𝜐1)𝒑𝒚
𝑵 + 𝜐1𝒑𝒚
𝑺   (7.74) 
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𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝜐1 < 1 
 
 
 
 
𝑁𝑁 =
𝑦𝑁
𝑝𝑟𝑁
 
(7.75) 
 
 
 𝑝𝑟𝑁 = 𝑝𝑟𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (7.76) 
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑠
𝑁 = (1 + 𝜑𝑁)
𝑊−1
𝑁 𝑁−1
𝑁 + 𝐼𝑀−1
𝑁
𝑠−1
𝑁  
 
 
(7.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁 =
𝑆−1
𝑁 − 𝑋−1
𝑁
𝑠−1
𝑁 − 𝑥−1
𝑁  
(7.78) 
 
𝜋𝑑𝑠
𝑁 =
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁 − 𝑝𝑑𝑠−1
𝑁
𝑝𝑑𝑠−1
𝑁  
(7.79) 
   
 
𝜔𝑇
𝑁 = (
𝑊𝑁
𝑝𝑠𝑁
)𝑇 = 𝛺20 + 𝛺21𝑝𝑟
𝑁 + 𝛺22(
𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
𝑁 ) 
(7.80) 
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑁 = 𝑊−1
𝑁 [1 + 𝛺23 (𝜔𝑇−1
𝑁 −
𝑊−1
𝑁
𝑝𝑠−1
𝑁 )] 
(7.81) 
 
 
 
The ECB 
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 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆 = 𝐵𝑆 − 𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑆 −𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆  
 
(7.27) 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁 = 𝐵𝛮 − 𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑁 −𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁  
 
(7.28) 
 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵 = 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁 + 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆  
 
(7.29) 
 𝐻ℎ = 𝐻ℎ
𝑁 +𝐻ℎ
𝑆  (7.30) 
 
 𝛥𝐻𝑠 = 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵  (7.31) 
 
 𝑟𝑆 = 𝑟𝑆̅̅ ̅ (7.32) 
 
 𝑟𝑁 = 𝑟𝑁̅̅̅̅  (7.33) 
 
 𝐹𝐸𝐶𝐵 = 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑁 + 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵−1
𝑆  
 
 
 
 
𝐻𝑠 = 𝐻ℎ  
(𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
  
 
 
Current and Financial Account Identities 
 
𝑇𝐵 = Trade Balance; 𝐶𝐴 = Current Account; 𝐹𝐴 = Financial Account 
 
South 
 
 𝑇𝐵𝑆 = (𝑋𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆) 
 
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆 = (𝑋𝑆 − 𝐼𝑀𝑆) + (𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁 − 𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆 ) 
 
 
 𝐹𝐴𝑆 = (𝛥𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 − 𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁 ) + 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑆   
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North 
 
 𝑇𝐵𝑁 = (𝑋𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁)  
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑁 = (𝑋𝑁 − 𝐼𝑀𝑁) + (𝑟−1
𝑆 𝐵𝑁 ℎ−1
𝑆 − 𝑟−1
𝑁 𝐵𝑆 ℎ−1
𝑁 )  
 
 
 𝐹𝐴𝑁 = (𝛥𝐵𝑆ℎ
𝑁 − 𝛥𝐵𝑁ℎ
𝑆 ) + 𝛥𝐵𝐸𝐶𝐵
𝑁   
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Parameter and Steady State Values of the Model with Prices 
𝝁𝟏𝟎 0.6389787 Autonomous propensity 
to import of the South  
𝝊𝟎 0 Autonomous component of 
exports prices of the North 
𝝁𝟐𝟎 0.6389787 Autonomous propensity 
to import of the North 
𝜈0 0 Autonomous component of 
imports prices of the North 
𝝁𝟏𝟏 0.7 Imports price coefficient 
of the South 
𝜐1 0.5 Relative weight of foreign prices 
upon export prices of the North 
𝝁𝟐𝟏 0.7 Imports price coefficient 
of the North 
𝜈1 0.7 Relative weight of foreign prices 
upon import prices of the North 
𝝁𝟏𝟐 0.5 Imports income 
coefficient of the South 
𝑁𝑓𝑒
𝑆  111.3309 South's full employment 
𝝁𝟐𝟐 0.5 Imports income 
coefficient of the North 
𝑁𝑓𝑒
𝑁  111.3309 North's full employment 
𝒑𝒓𝑺 1 Productivity of the South 𝑁𝑆 111.3342 South's employment 
𝒑𝒓𝑵 1 Productivity of the North 𝑁𝑁 111.3343 North's employment 
𝜴𝟏𝟎 0.2731589 Wage targeting 
autonomous parameter of 
the South 
𝑆𝑆 125.6098 South's nominal sales 
𝜴𝟐𝟎 0.2731589 Wage targeting 
autonomous parameter of 
the North 
𝑆𝑁  125.6098 North's nominal sales 
𝜴𝟏𝟏 0.1 Wage targeting 
productivity coefficient of 
the South 
𝜔𝑇
𝑆  0.7731709 South's wage target 
𝜴𝟐𝟏 0.1 Wage targeting 
productivity coefficient of 
the North 
𝜔𝑇
𝑁 0.7731709 North's wage target 
𝜴𝟏𝟐 0.4 Wage targeting 
employment coefficient of 
the South 
𝑊𝑆 0.7395176 South's nominal wage rate 
𝜴𝟐𝟐 0.4 Wage targeting 
employment coefficient of 
the North 
𝑊𝑁 0.7395176 North's nominal wage rate 
𝜴𝟏𝟑 0.3 Nominal wage adjustment 
parameter of the South 
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑆  0.9564807 South's domestic sales index 
𝜴𝟐𝟑 0.3 Nominal wage adjustment 
parameter of the North 
𝑝𝑑𝑠
𝑁  0.9564806 North's domestic sales index 
𝒑𝒚
𝑺 0.9564807 South's GDP deflator 𝑝𝑚
𝑆  0.9564807 South's imports prices 
𝒑𝒚
𝑵 0.9564806 North's GDP deflator 𝑝𝑥
𝑆 0.9564807 South's exports prices 
𝒑𝒔
𝑺 0.9564835 South's sales index 𝑝𝑚
𝑁  0.9564807 North's imports prices 
𝒑𝒔
𝑵 0.9564835 North's sales index 𝑝𝑥
𝑁 0.9564807 North's exports prices 
𝝋𝑵 0.2381 Mark-up of the North 𝜑𝑆 0.2381 Mark-up of the South 
Note: only the new parameters and stocks of the model are reported here; everything else 
is essentially identical with the simple model 
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8 Chapter 8- Conclusion and Policy Reflections 
 
 This thesis focuses on the political economy of CRAs and investigates the 
macroeconomic implications of sovereign ratings.  Summarizing here some of 
the key points, Chapter 2 sets the scenery by pointing out the particular 
importance of CRAs within the context of neoliberal capitalism and 
financialization.  Key features that underpinned the rise of CRAs’ power were 
the process of disintermediation, whereby traditional forms of bank credit were 
replaced by new financial instruments, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
system and the globalization of capital flow movements, as well as the 
attachment of CRAs to financial legislation.  By emerging as a significant voice of 
authority, these agencies came to play the role of the gatekeeper to those 
seeking to access the financial market.  In that way, rated entities came to adopt 
the conceptual framework of CRAs and limit their choices to what would be 
considered to be compatible with a good rating.  At the same time, CRAs 
provided an artificial sense of stability to investors regarding the uncertainties 
behind heterogeneous debt instruments.  By making such uncertainties look 
like calculable risk, CRAs allowed investors to feel comfortable with the trade of 
such instruments, and neglect the underlying complexity and correlations. 
Chapter 2 also points out the particular importance of sovereign ratings.  
Most notably, sovereign ratings link directly with the macroeconomic level by 
providing a ceiling for all other categories of domestic credit ratings.  This 
implies a strong correlation and causality running from sovereign ratings 
towards the rest.  Furthermore, sovereign ratings are the most direct 
expression of CRAs’ power towards the state.  Across a number of cases, such 
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power has been effective in narrowing down the range of public choices and in 
imposing severe financial constraints for elected governments.   
Chapter 3 outlines some key stylized facts for a selection of core and 
peripheral Eurozone countries.  Following a period of growth based on huge 
and unsustainable trade imbalances, the Eurozone entered into the crisis during 
the period 2009/10.  Key features of the crisis have been the stagnant and 
falling GDP growth, and the ballooning unemployment for the countries of the 
European periphery, especially for Greece and Spain.  As pointed out by 
heterodox scholars key factors that led to the crisis were the flawed 
institutional set-up of the Eurozone- with its lack of full employment policy 
targets, and with arbitrary thresholds for the public debt and deficits of EMU 
countries- as well as the process of financialization.   
The chapter also discusses the rise of influence of CRAs in Eurozone.  
Most importantly, given the establishment of the Euro as an external currency 
for Eurozone member states and the prohibition of the ECB from acting act as a 
lender of last resort for their governments, EMU countries came to be 
downgraded to the status of developing countries and the probability of 
sovereign default was brought to the fore.  Such development exposed those 
countries to the sentiments of the financial markets, and thus to the judgements 
rendered by CRAs. 
 Coming to the contribution of this thesis, Chapter 4 investigates 
empirically the hypothesis that CRAs do not only conduct a technical analysis of 
macroeconomic data, but they are also liable to feelings of euphoria and panic.  
Such hypothesis is underpinned by the concept of fundamental uncertainty and 
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the corresponding impossibility of accurate forecasting for economic 
phenomena. 
 In terms of methodology, Chapter 4 employs linear panel data 
econometrics and sets up a number of alternative models for explaining the 
recent sovereign rating movements of the crisis-hit EMU peripheral countries.  
The key idea is to econometrically generate sovereign rating scores that capture 
those macroeconomic variables that are supposed to matter for CRAs’ own 
analyses.  My analysis then seeks evidence of systematic discrepancies between 
econometric and actual ratings.  In case where the latter are lower than the 
former for a continuous period of time, the evidence is taken as supportive of 
the abovementioned hypothesis.   
Overall, the chapter provides some robust affirmative evidence, by 
showing how the actual post-crisis downgrades of the European peripheral 
countries have been significantly exaggerated as compared to what those 
countries’ fundamentals would justify.  While the precise difference between 
the actual and the econometrically generated ratings might partly depend upon 
the actual specification of the model, the post-crisis gap between the two is 
retained for the vast majority of peripheral countries.  Results are consistent 
across the three rating agencies, while they also satisfy a number of robustness 
checks.  More specifically, results remain qualitatively unchanged after 
incorporating two new variables into the model, while they also prove to be 
robust to cross-sectional dependence.   
Chapter 5 contributes to the stream of literature that seeks to identify 
the determinants of extreme capital flow movements, focusing on episodes of 
sudden stops.  Utilizing a panel probit model with random effects, and 
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concentrating on the twelve initial members of the EMU in the period 1999q1- 
2012q4, the chapter considers the economic and statistical significance of 
sovereign ratings in explaining such episodes.  In consistency with the findings 
of the previous chapter, the emphasis is on that part of sovereign ratings that 
captures exaggerated and panicked reactions of CRAs.  Besides the economic 
intuition in testing for the importance of such reactions, the applied rating 
decomposition is also motivated by the solution it provides to the issue of 
multicollinearity that would otherwise occur between the sovereign rating and 
the rest of the macroeconomic variables that are included in the model.  
Results show that exaggerated reactions of CRAs are indeed important in 
affecting episodes of sudden stops.  This holds for three out of the four ways of 
specifying such episodes (can be done by means of net and gross total inflows 
as well as net and gross non-FDI inflows), while the strongest findings appear in 
the case of non-FDI flows.  Results are also consistent across the three rating 
agencies.  Under all specifications the sovereign rating variable has an 
economically meaningful sign (minus).  In addition, four robustness checks are 
conducted, with the findings remaining qualitatively similar in all cases.   
Chapter 7 offers the first attempt to incorporate the effects of sovereign 
ratings into a macroeconomic model.  This is done by means of an open 
economy stock flow consistent framework.  The model developed includes two 
countries, one currency and one central bank, and it aims to approximate the 
north and south dichotomy of the Eurozone.  In that sense, the southern country 
of the model is designed to be weak by setting its fiscal expenditure as 
endogenous to the volume of debt it can issue at the private market.  Such 
dependence implies that the central bank of the model is not willing to act as a 
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lender of last resort for the South.  Moreover, the liquidity preference 
parameters that relate to the demand for southern bills are set to be a function 
of the South’s sovereign rating, which in turn is affected by the rate of 
accumulated GDP growth and the debt to GDP ratio of the country.     
Outlined in brief, the model shows how an exogenous recessionary shock 
in the South can deteriorate the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country, 
and thereby generate a severe sovereign rating downgrade of the South.  This 
event affects domestic and foreign investors’ liquidity preference.  As a result 
investors decide to move their wealth away from southern bills and towards 
cash.  Such a development significantly restrains the fiscal expenditure of the 
South, and hence the recession gets deepened.  An interesting aspect of the 
model is that the northern economy is also affected due to its foregone exports 
and the fall in the stock of wealth held by the households of the country.   
Two alternative closures are considered for the model.  Under the first 
one, households of both countries move their funds towards northern bills 
instead of cash.  Although this behaviour partly ameliorates the new steady 
state reached, it does not alter qualitatively the dynamics of the model.  Under 
the second alternative an element of panic is introduced into the behaviour of 
the rating agency.  This extension results in an amplified volatility that 
transmits to all the key variables of the model once a severe sovereign 
downgrade occurs.   
Lastly the chapter includes a set of sensitivity tests for all the essential 
parameters of the model, as well as an extension of the model with prices.  In 
the vast majority of cases, the change in parameter values does not affect the 
behaviour of the model.  In addition, although the incorporation of prices raises 
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the degree of complexity of the model and creates some cyclicality, the short 
and medium run dynamics described earlier remain qualitatively similar.  
 
8.1 Policy Reflections 
 
 While my thesis makes a contribution in illuminating new dimensions 
with regard to CRAs, it is certainly not the first one to discuss policy proposals 
aiming at containing CRAs’ influence in Europe.  More specifically, starting in 
2013 the European Commission (EC) has launched a process of reducing the 
mechanistic reliance on ratings and promoting transparency in the ratings 
market42.  To this end the Commission has announced the following: 
i) Reduced overreliance on credit ratings.  Banks and other financial 
institutions are requested to enforce their own credit risk 
assessments, rather than relying mechanistically on CRAs.  
Furthermore, the EC has set a target of removing all reference to 
external ratings from EU legislation by 2020; 
ii) For sovereign ratings, CRAs will have to set up a calendar every year, 
indicating when they are going to publish new ratings throughout the 
year to follow.  CRAs will not be able to conduct rating 
announcements for more than three times per year.  Moreover 
ratings will only be announced after the closing of the markets on 
Fridays, and at least one hour before they re-open; 
iii) Increased accountability of CRAs.  An investor or an issuer can now 
sue a CRA if the latter causes him or her some damage by violating 
                                            
42 For all relevant reports and press releases see here 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/rating-agencies/index_en.htm.   
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the existing legislation, either intentionally or unintentionally (e.g. by 
announcing a downgrade in a date outside the announced calendar 
described above); 
iv) Reduced conflicts of interest.  Amongst other measures, the CRAs will 
have to disclose if a shareholder of 5% or more of the agency under 
consideration also owns 5% or more of a rated entity.  A CRA will 
also be prohibited from rating when a shareholder of 10% or more of 
the agency’s capital or voting rights also holds 10% or more of a 
rated entity; 
v) As of June 2015, all ratings of financial instruments are to be 
published on a European Rating Platform in order to improve their 
comparability and visibility.  The EC expects such a step to help 
investors make their own credit risk assessments, as well as to 
promote diversity in the ratings market.  
vi) Support of smaller CRAs, so as to boost competitiveness in the ratings 
market.  The EC aims at creating a network of smaller CRAs in order 
to make the latter more visible across the investors’ community.   
Besides the above policy action steps, there are also certain ideas that 
were considered by the EC but were eventually rejected43.  These include the 
overall prohibition of sovereign ratings, as well as the proposal of establishing a 
European rating agency.  Regarding the first, the EC assessed that if such a 
prohibition were to be established, it would give the impression that EU 
member states have something to hide.  As a result, such a move would 
                                            
43 See the discussion here http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
571_en.htm?locale=en  
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augment financial instability and rise borrowing costs for member states.  As for 
the plan of setting up a European rating agency, the EC claims that the idea was 
rejected due to the anticipated cost of such an institution (the EC estimates a 
cost of 300 to 500 million euros over a period of five years), due to the issues of 
credibility that would be raised (in the sense that a public European rating 
agency would have to rate the member states which in turn would fund the 
agency), and due to the concern that private CRAs would be put in a 
comparative disadvantage. 
Overall, although the new European legislation moves in the right 
direction, it does not go far enough.  To begin with, it can be seen that points iii) 
to vi) of the list above aim at boosting ratings’ transparency and 
competitiveness as well as eliminating possible conflicts of interest.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, although those ideas do have some merit, they do not 
provide a comprehensive solution.  Especially with regard to sovereign ratings, 
if my thesis is right in pointing out their relative immunity to moral hazard 
considerations, and if those ratings are important in affecting macroeconomic 
dynamics, more needs to be done.  
Potentially, proposals i) and ii) could be seen as effective in containing 
the influence of sovereign ratings.  Nonetheless, the Commission’s approach is 
rather hesitant and piecemeal.  First, the setting of a maximum limit of three 
rating announcements per year is still quite high for sovereign ratings.  As a 
matter of comparison it suffices here to illustrate the fact that even in a period 
of a crisis such as the current one, where one should find the most severe 
clusters of rating announcements, there are rarely more than three 
announcements per year.  This is shown in Table 8.1 by focusing on S&P, an 
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agency with a relatively high frequency of announcements as compared with 
the other two.  Thus, it can be seen that with the exception of Greece no other 
peripheral country of Eurozone has experienced more than three rating 
announcements per year since the outburst of the crisis.  
 
Table 8.1. Number of S&P announcements per year for EMU peripheral 
countries (2009- 201544) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Greece 4 3 4 5 0 1 5 
Italy 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 
Spain 3 1 2 3 1 1 0 
Portugal 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 
Ireland 3 2 3 1 2 2 1 
Source: author's elaboration, based on S&P’s website.  As recorded here announcements 
include either rating changes or changes in the credit outlook/ watch that S&P provides 
 
Furthermore, the target of 2020 for the removal of all legislative 
reference to external ratings is a quite arbitrary and remote one.  In view of the 
on-going public debt crisis, the EU could have established a shorter horizon for 
implementing such change.  The EC’s defence here was to claim that the sudden 
removal of all references would lead to legal uncertainty.  Hence the 
Commission assessed that alternative credit risk measures need to be in place 
first.  Such a position may nevertheless be criticized on the grounds that instead 
of waiting for several years for banks and investors to develop their own credit 
                                            
44 The 2015 rating changes are recorded up to the end of July 2015.   
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risk assessment mechanisms, the EU could facilitate them by establishing an 
institution such as a European rating agency.   
Although as discussed above the EC has come up with numerous reasons 
in order to justify the rejection of the idea, these are not very sound.  First, the 
argument about the prohibitive cost of setting up a European agency is flimsy 
when it comes from a sovereign entity such as the EU.  The ECB could simply 
provide some financial support.  Secondly, the issues of credibility and moral 
hazard are the exact same ones that are raised with regards to private CRAs, 
under the ‘issuer-pays’ model.  If these issues can be thought of being capable of 
be faced for private CRAs, they can equally well be faced for a European rating 
agency too.  Thirdly, worrying about not putting private CRAs in a comparative 
disadvantage contradicts at the very first place the idea of controlling them.   
There may indeed be some merit in setting up a European rating agency.  
Such a development could push rating making to be much more accountable to 
public institutions as well as detach it completely from the field of profit-making 
market activities.  In particular, it may be argued that CRAs do not reveal the 
precise model and methodology they follow in order to protect the profitability 
of their products.  In contrast, a non-profit public rating agency could work on 
the basis of a publicly available methodology.  Moreover, since it would not be 
only technocratic but also political in nature (see discussion in Chapter 2), this 
methodology could also be subject to debate amongst democratically elected 
European authorities such as the European Parliament.   
All in all, while ideas such as the above are well intentioned, their 
unfolding also reveals the limitations that surround them.  More specifically, it 
is unlikely that such projections are capable of producing concrete results in 
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transforming economic constraints and providing economic stability on their 
own.  Rather, they might be more effective if seen as part of a wider change in 
Europe.   
To start with, the proposal of a European rating agency - if the insights of 
Chapter 4 are right in pointing out that every agent and institution is liable to 
feelings of euphoria and panic– implies that those insights should also apply 
here.  In that sense, the aim of setting up a European rating agency cannot be in 
constructing an institution that will deliver accurate forecasts.  Even if one 
assumed that a European rating agency would be able to perform better than 
the private ones, we would still be looking in the wrong direction.   
Rather it is a question of power.  In that regard, the reason why the 
European rating agency plan has some merit is because it could transfer some 
amount of authority away from a private institution and back to a public one.  
But then, thinking within the current status quo of Eurozone, it would be naïve 
to believe that a European rating agency would be any less harsh against 
member states than its private counterparts.  Under the prevailing set of ideas 
of today, such institution would only accompany European authorities such as 
the ECB in promoting recessionary values, such as the ideas of ‘sound finance’ 
and balanced budgets across the European economies.   
Similarly, in conjunction with the discussion of Chapters 3 and 6, unless 
there is an accommodating ECB for member states, with the power to make 
fiscal transfers across borders, and with the authority to act as a lender of last 
resort, those economies would still be exposed to the sentiment and 
expectations of private lenders.  Unavoidably then, by the time a Eurozone state 
would find itself in financial distress, the European rating agency would still end 
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up downgrading it, irrespectively of the precise technicalities behind its 
methodology. 
On what has to do with democracy, although establishing a European 
rating agency and making it accountable to the European parliament might 
sound good, one should also bear in mind the limited importance of the latter.  
Despite being the most democratic institution of the EU structure, the European 
parliament has no actual authority in changing economic policy rules, voting 
laws and exercising control over other European institutions such the ECB or 
the so called Eurogroup.  As Varoufakis notes in a recent interview, a parliament 
that does not legislate is not a parliament45.   
In a similar vein, following the insights of Chapters 5 and 7 we could also 
give some credit to the idea of prohibiting sovereign ratings.  If as the results of 
those chapters indicate sovereign ratings are important in affecting episodes of 
extreme capital flow movements, and in imposing additional constraints upon 
fiscal policy, their complete prohibition could indeed enhance financial and 
economic stability across Eurozone.  Moreover in order to face the 
abovementioned response of the EC against the proposal, one could argue that 
financial instability and high borrowing costs for member states have already 
become a reality across Europe.   
Nonetheless, although promising, the above idea can hardly be expected 
to be effective in isolation.  As argued in Chapter 2, CRAs’ influence is to an 
extent explained by financial deregulation, as well as by the complexity 
surrounding several categories of debt instruments.  Hence, if we were to keep 
                                            
45 Varoufakis’ point was made in Greek; see here 
http://www.skai.gr/news/greece/article/285665/o-varoufakis-os-vouleutis-pia-sto-kafeneio-
tis-voulis/  
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deregulated financial markets as they are, any attempt to prohibit sovereign 
ratings would only manage to replace one voice of influence with another.  
Sooner or later, some other source of private authority, such as a group of 
megabanks would emerge, producing the exact same destabilizing results as 
CRAs.  Although a detailed discussion of how to reform the European financial 
system goes beyond the purposes of the current thesis (for some up to date 
proposals see for instance Dymski and Kalterbrunner, 2014), some key ideas 
could be to ban naked trading (i.e. the sort of trading that involves financial 
derivatives with no attachment to their underlying assets), as well as to place 
some barriers in the mobility of short-term capital, such as portfolio investment 
flows, across borders.  The evidence outlined in Chapter 5 can be used in 
support of the latter.  As pointed out, it was non-FDI flows that dominated 
European capital flow movements since the establishment of the Euro, while it 
is such flows that are mostly affected by the movements of sovereign ratings.  
The above thoughts do not aim at postponing actions that seek to 
contain the influence of CRAs.  They only aim at highlighting their dependency 
on the surrounding environment.  In that sense they aim to strengthen the 
reach of such reforms.  To think otherwise would be to an extent 
counterproductive.  It is equally false on the one hand to limit our scope on CRA 
reforms without any consideration of what needs to change in the broader 
picture, and on the other to think that only a full-scale reform or vision is worth 
applying.  The latter is highly important in providing us with a direction.  But 
then, equally well, it is our actions that make a vision useful, and in that way 
protect it from being converted to a metaphysical concept.   
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